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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 4, 1987, Conrail locomotives ran through a stop sig-
nal into the path of an oncoming Amtrak passenger train near Chase,
Maryland.' In the collision that followed, what is now considered to
be the worst train wreck in Amtrak history, sixteen people were killed
and 175 others were injured.2 Although the Conrail engineer claimed
that a warning signal had malfunctioned, an investigation by the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration focused on the possibility of human
error.' The results of drug tests administered to the engineer and
1. McGinley, Conrail Crewman Tested Positive for Marijuana, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1987,
at 2, col. 2.
2. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at I, col. 2.
3. McGinley, supra note 1, at 2, col. 2.
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brakeman of the Conrail locomotives showed evidence of marijuana
use by both men.4 A Baltimore grand jury subsequently indicted the
Conrail engineer on sixteen counts of manslaughter.'
In San Francisco, on July 11, 1985, a computer programmer in
her sixth year of employment with Southern Pacific Transport Com-
pany was sitting at her terminal when two supervisors demanded that
she produce a urine sample.6 Barbara Luck was one of 486 employ-
ees at Southern Pacific who were asked to comply with the company's
new mandatory drug-testing policy. 7 Luck refused to submit to a
drug test, and Southern Pacific subsequently fired her.8 Luck brought
suit against her employer in San Francisco County Superior Court,
alleging that she was wrongfully discharged for refusing to submit to
a urine test.9 On November 6, 1987, in a verdict against Southern
Pacific, a jury awarded Luck $485,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages.1° Luck's attorney claimed that the verdict was a message
to employers that mass or random drug testing of employees in purely
administrative positions is not acceptable. 11
The Conrail catastrophe and the saga of Barbara Luck illustrate
the inherent tension between the interests of employers, the public,
and employees that mandatory drug testing presents. Employers
have an interest in maintaining a safe and secure working environ-
ment, particularly when the nature of their business implicates public
safety or national security. The public shares in these interests, as do
employees. Employees juxtapose their interests in privacy, in
4. Id. At the time of the disclosure of the drug-test results, the Federal Railroad
Administration "cautioned that the drug test results 'represented only one element of the
inquiry into human performance in the circumstances of ... [the] accident . . . [and did] not
constitute an allegation of fault or determination of probable cause.'" Id. (quoting statement
of the Federal Railroad Administration).
5. The manslaughter indictments stated that the engineer and brakeman were operating
the locomotives in a "grossly negligent manner" amounting to "wanton or reckless disregard
for human life." N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at 8, col. 2. The engineer pleaded guilty to a
single misdemeanor manslaughter count, and was sentenced to five years in prison. Miami
Herald, Mar. 30, 1988, at IIA, col. 1.
6. Weinstein, Drug Tests: Privacy vs. Job Rights, L.A. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Bishop, Worker Drug Tests Resisted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1985, at DI, col. 3.
10. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. 843,320 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1987)
(judgment on special verdict).
11. Morain, Railroad Employee Wins $485, 000 in Southern Pacific Drug- Test Case, L.A.
Times, Oct. 31, 1987, at 33, col. 4; see also Cox, Juries Sympathetic in Drug-Test Cases, Nat'l
L.J., Dec. 7, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (reporting jurors' statements to the press that drug testing of a
computer programmer is not appropriate, and that two of the jurors had wanted to double the
punitive damage award).
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preventing unwarranted intrusions into their personal lives, and in
continued employment.
Mandatory drug testing of employees is the most recent attempt
by employers to identify drug-impaired workers. Employees have
responded to the increased use of drug testing in the workplace by
taking legal action against their employers and lobbying their elected
officials for statutes that place limits on the ability of employers to
implementing drug-testing programs. This Survey examines the myr-
iad legal issues surrounding employee drug testing. Section II of the
Survey provides an overview of the prevalence of drug use in society,
the increased use of drug testing in the workplace, and the accuracy
and reliability of the various drug-testing methods. Section III dis-
cusses the federal constitutional protections that public employees
have invoked to challenge mandatory drug testing. These protections
include the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in
the fourth amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination in the
fifth amendment, the penumbral right of privacy, and the guarantees
of substantive and procedural due process in the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 12
Section IV assesses the rights and duties implicated by the classi-
12. Employees have invoked other constitutional provisions to oppose drug-testing
programs, with limited success. In Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District, 653 F. Supp.
1510 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, No. 87-1441 (8th Cir. Apr. 14, 1988), employees of a nuclear
power plant challenged alcohol- and drug-testing programs under the free exercise clause of
the first amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the program incorporated by reference the
literature of the employee assistance program characterizing alcoholism as an illness. Id. at
1516. The court reasoned that "[tihe plaintiffs believe[d] that calling alcoholism an illness
means calling it a disease and that calling it a disease means that it is not a sin and that saying
it is not a sin contradicts the Bible, the written source of their religious beliefs." Id. at 1519.
In addition, "(o]ne of their precepts [was] that they must be separated from heretical materials,
and they conclude[d] that participating in a program that offers a treatment that calls
alcoholism a disease and not a sin would lash them to an heretical idea." Id. The court
rejected the plaintiffs' free exercise claim, because although the programs burdened the
plaintiffs' religious practices, they were the least restrictive alternatives for satisfying the state's
compelling interests in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the public and the
employees of the nuclear power plant. Id. at 1516.
Similarly, courts have rejected equal protection challenges to employee drug testing. See
Copeland v. Philadephia Police Dep't, 2 IER Cas. (BNA) 1825 (3d Cir. 1988); Everett v.
Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (1 th Cir. 1987); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 2 IER Cas.
(BNA) 1625 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833
(N.D. Ind. 1988). In Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, train crew members alleged
that the drug-testing program was underinclusive and arbitrarily discriminated against
similarly situated classes of persons in violation of the equal protection clause, because the
regulatory scheme did not require drug testing of supervisors. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
The court held that the program was valid under the equal protection clause, because the
objective of railway safety was legitimate, and the regulatory scheme was reasonably related to
this goal in that supervisors responsible for the safe operation of trains were subject to drug
testing at the discretion of the railroad. Id. at 592.
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fication of drug testing as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act.'" Section V presents the
protections available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641"
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1 Title VII prohibits an
employer from instituting a drug-testing program if drug use does not
affect job performance and safety, and the effect of the program is to
discriminate against members of a minority group. The Rehabilita-
tion Act prohibits employers from taking adverse action against
employees who are qualified drug abusers.
Section VI discusses the safeguards that state constitutions and
statutes may provide to employees during mandatory drug testing.
Section VII presents the common law theories most commonly
invoked by employees to challenge drug testing, including wrongful
discharge, invasion of privacy, defamation, and negligent and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Section VIII suggests that,
paradoxically, in certain circumstances, employers may have a duty
to test employees for illicit drug use and to take reasonable action to
protect third parties from the hazards associated with drug-impaired
employees.
The legal issues discussed in this Survey arise at particular stages
of a drug-testing program. Thus, Section IX provides a temporal
framework to reconcile the legal issues surrounding mandatory drug
testing. Finally, the Survey concludes in Section X that the validity
of a drug-testing program will depend on the nature of the position,
and the sector of society in which the work is performed, as well as
the privacy and employment interests of the employees.
II. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DRUG PROBLEM AND DRUG
TESTING AS A RESPONSE
Illicit drug use is a grave problem in American society.' 6 The
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1982).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
15. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
16. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG
ABUSE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME 5 (1986). The Commission estimated
that drug trafficking generates income for organized crime in amounts as high as $110 billion
per year. Id. (citing House Select Comm. on Narcotics and Drug Abuse and Control, Annual
Report for the Year 1984, H.R. REP. No. 1199, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1985)). Other
authorities have estimated that income from illicit drugs ranges "from $100 billion, a rather
conservative estimate these days, to $500 billion. If we used a figure of $100 billion, this would
place drug trafficking just behind Exxon and General Motors in the 'Fortune 500' companies."
OSHA Oversight Hearing on the Impact of Alcohol and Drug Abuse on Worker Health and
Safety. Hearings of the House Subcomm. on Health and Safety of the Comm. on Education and
Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985) (statement of Robert L. DuPont, M.D., Vice President,
1988]
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National Institute on Drug Abuse has reported that twenty million
Americans use marijuana and four million Americans use cocaine.' 7
In fact, it is estimated that one out of every six working-age Ameri-
cans uses some form of illicit drugs.' 8  The House Subcommittee on
Health and Safety of the Committee on Education and Labor has esti-
mated that illicit drug use by employees costs industry $26 billion per
year in lost productivity and employment.' 9 An employee who uses
illicit drugs is 3.6 times more likely than an unimpaired worker to be
involved in an accident while working, 2.5 times more likely to have
absences from work lasting eight days or longer, and five times more
likely to file a worker's compensation claim.20 In addition, an illicit
drug user receives three times the average health benefits, and func-
tions at 67 percent of the work potential of an unimpaired worker.2'
The negative effect of illicit drug use on industrial safety is well illus-
trated by statistics in the transportation industry. The Federal Rail-
Bensinger, DuPont & Associates, and President, Center for Behavioral Medicine) [hereinafter
OSHA Oversight Hearings].
It has been suggested that ten million out of the 106 million workers in America have a
drug or alcohol abuse problem. OSHA Oversight Hearings, supra, at 10 (statement of Robert
L. DuPont, M.D., Vice President, Bensinger, DuPont & Associates, and President, Center for
Behavioral Medicine); see also Quayle, American Productivity. The Devastating Effect of
Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 454, 455 (1983) (illicit drug use has
resulted in decreased productivity).
17. OSHA Oversight Hearings, supra note 16, at 24 (statement of Elaine M. Johnson,
Acting Deputy Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse). A National Institute on Drug
Abuse survey revealed:
[Two] million Americans are currently using stimulants; over I million
Americans are using sedatives without a prescription .... Among America's
young adults, between the ages of 18 and 25, which is the segment of the
population generally thought to use drugs most extensively, 65 percent have
experience with illicit substances; 41 percent have tried marijuana; roughly 20
percent used marijuana daily for at least 1 month during their adolescence; 20
percent had tried cocaine; and 84 percent used alcohol. This is the population
now entering the workforce. Clearly, with this history of prior drug use, there is
cause for serious concern.
Id.
18. Commentary by John Chancellor (NBC Nightly News, Mar. 2, 1988). There was no
mention of the frequency of usage in the commentary.
19. OSHA Oversight'Hearings, supra note 16, at 6. A National Institute on Drug Abuse
study estimated that workplace alcohol and drug use resulted in productivity losses of $50.6
billion and $25.9 billion respectively, and lost employment costs of $44 billion and $312
million respectively. Id. (statement of Robert L. DuPont, M.D., Vice President, Bensinger,
DuPont & Associates, and President, Center for Behavioral Medicine); see also Stille, Drug
Testing: The Scene Is Set for a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employers and
Workers, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (estimating that drug abuse costs businesses $33
billion in lost productivity, employee theft, absenteeism, health care costs, and below standard
workmanship).
20. OSHA Oversight Hearings, supra note 16, at 39 (statement of J. Ronald Blount,




road Administration reported that between 1975 and 1984, illicit drug
use by employees caused forty-eight accidents resulting in thirty-seven
fatalities, eighty nonfatal injuries, and more than $34 million in prop-
erty damage.22
A. The Prevalence of Drug Testing
In response to the demonstrable decrease in productivity and
safety that accompanies illicit drug use, employers have implemented
drug-testing programs designed to detect the presence of illicit drugs
in employees' systems.2 3 In the public sector, President Reagan has
22. OSHA Oversight Hearings, supra note 16, at 13. John H. Riley, Administrator of the
Federal Railroad Administration, has noted:
[O]ver the seven year period of 136 cases in which an autopsy was performed on
a railroad employee who died in a fatal accident, in 16 percent of those cases, the
autopsy revealed significant levels of alcohol or drug[s] present in the
bloodstream, and we have reached a point today where alcohol and drug use on
the railroad is a principal, if not the principal cause of employee fatality.
Id.; see also Quayle, supra note 16, at 455 (illicit drug use may increase workplace accidents);
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 174, at A-3 (Sept. 10, 1987) (reporting that a Southeastern Penn-
sylvania Transportation Authority trolley driver under the influence of cocaine ran a yellow
caution light and a red stop light, rammed into the back of another trolley, and injured seven-
teen passengers).
23. Hanson, Drug Abuse Testing Programs Gaining Acceptance in Workplace, CHEMICAL
& ENGINEERING NEWS, June 2, 1986, at 7. Employers have instituted drug-testing programs
for the same reasons that they have instituted alcohol-abuse programs: "[T]he health and
safety of their employees, and the expense of having someone who is simply not doing his or
her job." Id. Employees also recognize the dilemma. A national survey of employee
attitudes, conducted in 1986, reported that two-thirds of workers surveyed supported drug
testing, and that one in five workers believed that drug abuse is a workplace problem. Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 129, at A-13 (July 8, 1987). Moreover, 47 percent of the adults
surveyed in a Gallup poll agreed that workers should be tested for drugs. Steiger, The Public
Says "Yes" to Mandatory Drug Testing, HosPITALS, Sept. 5, 1986, at 100.
Urinalysis is by far the most popular method of testing. Denenberg & Denenberg,
Employee Drug Testing and the Arbitrator: WhatAre the Issues?, ARB. J., June 1987, at 19, 27.
Urinalysis is the preferred test, but many other methods of detection are available. Blood tests
are considered to be more invasive than urine tests, but they can be tailored to detect recent
drug use, unlike urinalysis tests, which can only measure metabolites in urine. Id. An
American Management Association survey indicated that training supervisors to detect signs
of drug abuse and to confront employees may be more effective than urinalysis in curtailing
substance abuse. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at A-3 (Jan. 2, 1987). The United States
Postal Service and the Office of Personnel Management recently heard testimony about the use
of hair analysis as an alternative to urinalysis. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 98, at A-2 (May
22, 1987). Hair analysis would be less intrusive than urine tests, measure a longer drug history,
be less susceptible to cheating, and cost $50 per test. Id. General Motors employs undercover
detectives who pose as plant workers to spot drug abuse. Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
The Coors Company abandoned polygraph testing for preemployment screening, and replaced
it with a program encompassing urine testing for illegal drug use, a Stanton Survey to test for
theft proclivity and honesty, and a reference check by an outside firm. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 28, at C- 1 (Feb. 12, 1987). For a discussion of the accuracy and reliability of polygraph
testing and urine testing, see Lykken, The Validity of Tests: Caveat Emptor, 27 JURIMETRICS
J. 263, 263 (1987).
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issued an Executive order mandating a "drug-free federal workplace"
and authorizing drug testing of employees to achieve that goal,24 and
Congress has established guidelines to implement this Executive
order.25 The Department of Transportation has adopted regulations
concerning drug testing in railroad operations 26 for employees in
"sensitive and critical" positions.2 " This plan for ensuring safety in
the public sector transportation industry may be mirrored in the pri-
vate sector transportation industry.2
24. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301 app. at
133-35 (West Supp. 1 1987). On March 3, 1986, the President's Commission on Organized
Crime issued a report to President Reagan and Attorney General Meese recommending
various methods of reducing consumer demand for drugs in the United States. See
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 16, at 482-86. The Commission
recommended thirteen methods of reducing the demand for drugs, including more rigorous
law enforcement, and review of budgetary allotments for drug enforcement. Id. It further
recommended that both government and private employers consider drug testing of employees
and applicants for employment. Id. at 485. Many businesses depend heavily upon the
revenues derived from government contracts for their livelihoods. To encourage employers to
follow the Commission's recommendations, the Commission also recommended that the
government withhold contracts from companies that fail to implement drug-testing programs.
Id. at 483. Awarding government contracts on the basis of drug-testing programs would
almost certainly promote immediate and large-scale drug testing in the workplace. Thus, the
government can influence conduct in the private sector by threatening to withhold such
contracts. Id.
25. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-71, § 503, 101 Stat. 468, 469-471
(1987). The New York Times has reported that a cabinet level position was suggested to
consolidate and orchestrate federal efforts in drug testing. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at
A18, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1987, at A31, col. 1.
26. Control of Alcohol and Drug Use, 49 C.F.R. § 219 (1987).
27. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at A-8 (Sept. 9,1987). The random drug-testing plan
affects 30,000 employees at the Department of Transportation in sensitive positions. Id. The
Department has defined sensitive positions as those that "affect public safety and security,"
including "air traffic controllers, test pilots, firefighters, railroad safety inspectors, Coast
Guard drug enforcement officers, motor vehicle operators, and employees with security
clearances." Id. In addition, the Federal Railroad Administration has issued regulations
authorizing employers to drug test when a supervisor suspects that a railroad employee is
under the influence of drugs. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(1), (c)(2) (1987).
28. See id. at A-9 (reporting that then Secretary of Transportation Dole considered
random drug testing of employees in the private sector transportation industry). The Federal
Aviation Administration has promulgated regulations requiring crew members of civil aircraft
to submit to drug testing based on a reasonable belief that the crew member is using drugs that
affect his faculties, and therefore threaten safety interests. 14 C.F.R. § 91.1 l(d) (1987); see also
Control of Drug and Alcohol Use for Personnel Engaged in Commercial and General Aviation
Activities, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,432, 44,434 (1986) (specific drug-testing provisions). In a statement
concerning the right of passengers to safe transportation, Senator Ernest F. Hollings said:
Individual passengers have absolutely no means of ensuring their own safety for
the duration of an airline flight or train ride. They have no option other than to
trust those responsible for the safe operation of the train or plane . . . [and
consequently] there is absolutely no question as to where our priorities must lie.
Preble, Air Traffic Controllers Sue to Block FAA Drug Testing, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 2, 1987, at 32, 33.
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In the private sector, nearly 50 percent of the Fortune 500 com-
panies conduct drug testing.29 Corporations have even considered
creating a coalition to promote a "drug-free environment in the pri-
vate sector," and to campaign against the passage of bills in state leg-
islatures that would restrict corporate power to drug test.3" The
media has also responded to the drug problem by donating $500 mil-
lion worth of advertising for a "drug-free America."'" Indeed, the
Wall Street Journal has reported that the "Partnership for a Drug-
Free America" was the eighteenth most popular television commer-
cial of 1987.32
In conjunction with drug-testing programs, employers have initi-
ated employee assistance programs (EAP's) to counsel and rehabili-
tate employees who have tested positive for illicit drug use.3 3
Companies that have EAP's have recorded successful rehabilitation
rates as high as 80 percent.34  Moreover, under a cost-benefit analy-
29. Hanson, supra note 23, at 14 (as many as 50 percent of the Fortune 500 companies
may be testing employees for drugs); see also Chapman, The Ruckus over Medical Testing,
FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at 58 (estimating that 25 percent of Fortune 500 companies may be
testing employees for drugs). In a recent survey of companies and government agencies, nearly
30 percent reported that they conduct some form of drug testing. See Daily Lab Rep. (BNA)
No. 179, at A-1 (Sept. 17, 1987). Of the respondents to the survey, 94.5 percent tested job
applicants, while 73 percent tested current employees on a "for cause" basis. Id. Programs
were more likely to be found in companies with more than $500,000 in annual sales. Id. A
survey of the top thirty-five Fortune 500 companies showed that 29 percent screen applicants
for employment and 26 percent test some employees under certain conditions. Gampel &
Zeese, Are Employers Overdosing on Drug Testing?, Bus. & SoC'y REV., Fall 1985, at 34, 36.
Among the employers who have instituted mandatory urinalysis programs are International
Business Machines, The New York Times, the United States Postal Service, The Boeing Co.,
General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co., Aluminum Co. of America, Boise Cascade Corp.,
Toyota Motor Sales, The Greyhound Corp., and American Airlines Inc. Employee Drug
Testing: Intrusive, Degrading, PRIVACY J., May 1985, at 1, 1. Interviews with officials of
corporations, government entities, and unions revealed that tens of thousands of job applicants
have been rejected, and hundreds, or even thousands, of employees have been fired because of
positive drug-test results. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 1, col. 2.
30. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 167, at A-3 (Aug. 31, 1987). Corporate representatives
met in Washington, D.C., on August 24, 1987, to plan strategy for the coalition. If corporate
commitment is high, the organization will be given official status. Id.; see Henry, Reporting the
Drug Problem, TIME, Oct. 6,1986, at 73 (reporting that the media may be collectively inflating
the drug-abuse problem).
31. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1987, § 4, at 15, col. 3.
32. Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1988, § II, at 19, col. 4 (ranking popularity of television
commercials according to viewer preference).
33. Masi, Company Responses to Drug Abuse from AMA's Nationwide Survey, PERSONNEL,
Mar., 1987, at 40, 45. In an American Management Association survey, it was reported that
companies have been offering EAP counseling and rehabilitation in response to employee drug
abuse. Id. EAP's appear to be the "resource of choice" for employers surveyed. Id.
34. "The success of EAPs is indicated by the estimated recovery rates of 65 to 80 percent
among employees who accept a referral for help .... This means that at least 65 percent of all
employees receiving EAP services will be returned to 'full' productivity within one year." W.
SCANLON, ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE, EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE
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sis, EAP's have proven to be worthwhile to business by improving
productivity and safety.35 Although EAP's can effectively combat
many of the consequences of illicit drug use by employees, they are
limited in scope because they depend on the willingness of employees
who need assistance to come forward.36 Most employees who use
illicit drugs deny their drug problems and are not motivated to seek
help from an EAP. 37 A drug-testing program can identify employees
who have used illicit drugs, 38 and thus provide the hard evidence nec-
essary to confront the denial system, thereby contributing to worker
safety and productivity.
Employers in the public and private sectors have recorded
increases in safety and productivity after instituting drug-testing pro-
grams.39 The United States Navy has reported that positive drug-test
results decreased from 47 percent in 1981 to 4 percent in 1984, with a
concomitant decrease in drug-related accidents.' Similarly, the
Southern Pacific Railroad Company has calculated that accidents
caused by human error declined 66 percent from August 1984, when
it initiated a drug-testing program, to January 1986. 4'
B. The Methods of Drug Testing
An employer who has decided to test employees for drugs can
select from several analytical methods to achieve the goals of its drug-
testing program. The reliability and accuracy of the analytical meth-
PROGRAMS 96 (1986); see also Alcohol and Drug Abuse: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1986) (reporting that a
program rehabilitating commercial aviation pilots who have alcohol problems has met with a
91 percent success rate) (statement of Mr. Jones, Deputy Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration) [hereinafter Alcohol and Drug Abuse Hearings].
35. W. SCANLON, supra note 34, at 99. In discussing the cost-effectiveness of EAP's,
Scanlon noted:
The New York Transit Authority computed a savings of $1 million per year in
paid sick leave benefits alone; General Motors boasts a 72 percent reduction in
the dollar amount paid for accident and sickness disability benefits; and the
Oldsmobile program showed similar reductions in costly alcohol- and drug-
related job-performance problems.
Id. (quoting W. DUNCAN, THE EAP MANUAL 6 (1982)).
36. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-I (Sept. 3, 1987); see also W. SCANLON, supra
note 34, at 40, 41, 45, 46.
37. Daily Lab Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-1 (Sept. 3,1987).
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
40. See Hanson, supra note 23, at 8; see also O'Connor & Miller, The Military Says "No",
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1986, at 26 (reporting that the Navy has initiated drug testing to
enhance operational safety).
41. See Alcohol and Drug Abuse Hearings, supra note 34, at 34 (statement of William H.
Dempsey, President, Association of American Railroads).
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ods that the employer selects are critical aspects of the program"
because employers will ordinarily take adverse action against employ-
ees who have tested positive for illicit drug use.43 In addition,
although drug tests detect the presence of illicit drugs in employees'
systems, they cannot measure levels of intoxication." This limitation
of drug testing further accentuates the importance of the reliability
and accuracy of the analytical methods selected.
The most widely used analytical method is the enzyme multi-
plied immunoassay technique (EMIT).45 The EMIT is popular
because it is inexpensive, requires little formal training for operators,
has a short analysis time, and can detect a wide range of drugs.46
Experts, however, regard the EMIT as suitable only for preliminary
42. See Englade, Who's Hired and Who's Fired, STUDENT LAW., April 1986, at 20, 23;
Gampel & Zeese, supra note 29, at 34-35; Stille, supra note 19, at 23. For a discussion of an
employer's liability based on unreliable testing methods or procedures, see infra notes 695-700
and accompanying text. See also Hanson, supra note 23, at 8 ("The accuracy and reliability of
drug testing procedures are probably the most frequently attacked part of any drug testing
program."); cf Lykken, supra note 23, at 263, 264 ("reliability and accuracy are different,
though related, concepts .... [Reliability means] the consistency with which the test produces
the same result in the same circumstances, and [validity means] the probability that the test
result is accurate or true.").
43. See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (bus driver discharged
based on positive drug test); cf Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ.,
70 N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 510 N.E.2d 325 (1987) (teachers who refused to submit to
drug testing were not recommended for tenure).
44. Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The analytical methods used
by most laboratories for the detection of drugs in bodily fluids are classified into two main
categories: immunoassays and chromatography. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 73, at 30 (1986)
[hereinafter NIDA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH]. Immunoassays add a substance to the urine
sample that produces a reaction indicating the presence or absence of drugs. Id.
"Chromatography is a method of analysis in which the various components in a biological
specimen can be separated [for identification] by a partitioning process." Id. at 32.
45. The EMIT was developed by the Syva Company in 1980, and is classified as an
immunoassay test. The scientific principals underlying the EMIT are the following:
[A] reagent is prepared by combining an antibody with an antigen, which serves
as the indicator. The antibody and the indicator undergo a chemical reaction in
which the indicator binds itself to the antibody. After the reagent is prepared,
urine is introduced into it. If a [drug] metabolite is present in the urine, it will
displace the indicator and bind itself to the antibody. Displacement of the
indicator occurs because the metabolite's competitive displacement and binding
properties are stronger than those of the indicator. The indicator, which has
been separated from the antibody, is then measured and compared to the reagent
to determine the concentration of the [drug] metabolite in the specimen.
Bible, Screening Workers for Drugs: The Constitutional Implications of Urine Testing in Public
Employment, 24 AM. BUs. L.J., 309, 311-12 (1986).
46. See NIDA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH, supra note 44, at 31. The cost of a single EMIT
test ranges from five to twenty-five dollars. See Chapman, supra note 29, at 60; Rust, The
Legal Dilemma, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 51, 51.
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screening, because of its propensity for error." The EMIT has been
criticized on two grounds. First, some experts have stated that the
EMIT registers a positive test result after an individual has "pas-
sively" inhaled marijuana smoke.48 Passive inhalation occurs when
an individual inhales air containing marijuana smoke exhaled by
others who have smoked the drug in a confined space, such as a small
room or a car.49 An employee who has passively inhaled marijuana
but has not actually smoked it may be subjected to disciplinary meas-
ures based upon a misleading test result. Second, experts have criti-
cized the tendency of the EMIT to yield false positive test results"°
based on cross-reactivity with legitimate drugs and certain foods.5
47. See Hanson, supra note 23, at 9-10. For all federal testing programs, gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry is the only authorized confirmation method. See
Mandatory Guidelines on Federal Employee Drug Testing Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 70, at E-14 (Apr. 12, 1988). For a discussion of the due process implications of
unconfirmed initial screening, see infra notes 302-23 and accompanying text.
48. See Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, 1 DRUG L. REP. 25, 28 (1983) (reporting a
study, conducted by the American Journal of Psychiatry in 1977, that found positive test
results after passive inhalation of marijuana). The controversy over the passive inhalation
issue is probably due to "differences in the type and quality of marijuana smoked, the
environment in which the marijuana is smoked, the method of smoking, and the metabolism of
each individual." Id. at 28. Richard L. Hawks, an expert from the research technology
branch of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, has stated that passive inhalation can only
occur under extreme circumstances. Hanson, supra note 23, at 11.
49. See Hanson, supra note 23, at 11.
50. The existence of a false positive test result depends upon the sensitivity limit and cutoff
level of a drug test. NIDA has defined these terms as follows:
The concentration of drug in the urine below which the assay can no longer be
considered reliable is the "sensitivity" limit [of the test] .... The "cutoff" point
is the concentration limit that will actually be used to assay samples. It is a value
serving as an administrative breakpoint for labelling a urine result positive or
negative .... Setting screening cutoffs too low would allow for longer detection
time after drug administration, but the results might be difficult to confirm
reliably. If the confirmatory procedures are not sensitive enough, the screened
positive may not be confirmed and the result would appear as a false positive....
On the other hand, setting high cutoff levels for the screening procedures will
generate false negatives because drugs may be present in significant concentration
but below the designated cutoff and would therefore be reported negatives.
NIDA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH, supra note 44, at 36-37. The cutoff level in a particular
drug-testing program may reflect the employer's judgment as to the permissible degree of drug
levels in the workplace.
51. See Budiansky, Busting the Drug Testers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 20,
1986, at 70 (reporting that chemical traces remaining after digesting a poppyseed bagel
triggered a positive test result for cocaine); Zeese, supra note 48, at 26 (Syva Company, the
manufacturer of the EMIT, has reported that aspirin, amphetamine, amitriptyline, benzo-
cyclecgonine, diazepam, meperdine, methaqualone, morphine, phencyclidine, propoxyphene,
and secobarbital, among other substances, may create false positive results.); O'Connor, A
Question of Privacy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18 ("The presence of medicines such as
cold remedies and allergy pills can cause a positive result for anything from marijuana to
heroin."). Confirmation by another analytical method is essential because of the possibility of
false positive results occurring with initial screening methods. Even if an initial EMIT result is
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The manufacturer of the EMIT has claimed that the test is 95 percent
accurate.5 2 Yet the company has also recommended that a positive
test result be confirmed with another analytical method,53 thereby
essentially conceding that the EMIT is not reliable as a single testing
method."4
The analytical method that experts consider to be the most con-
clusive means of confirming positive screening results is gas chroma-
tography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). 5' A survey of twenty-five
confirmed by a subsequent EMIT test, a false positive result will always occur if there is a
cross-reactive substance in the urine sample. Zeese, supra note 48, at 26. The probability of
error from cross-reactivity, however, is an unknown factor in determining the accuracy of the
EMIT because of normal variations in urine composition between individuals. Leal,
Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results for the Purpose of Detecting Marijuana
Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 394 (1984). One expert has stated that false positive
results caused by cross-reactivity do not constitute a deficiency in methodology, but rather a
failure to utilize adequate confirmation methods. See NIDA RESEARCH MONO-
GRAPH, supra note 44, at 51.
52. Zeese supra note 48, at 26.
53. Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees:
Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 201,
205 (1986).
54. But see Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The inclusion
of [the manufacturer's] recommendation, however, by no means renders the unconfirmed use
of the EMIT test an unreliable procedure to follow."). Studies focusing on the accuracy of the
EMIT have produced mixed results. One report concluded that the test is 87 percent accurate.
Zeese, supra note 48, at 26. A study conducted in 1982 by the Department of Defense found
that the test is 88.9 percent accurate. See id. at 26.
Another frequently used drug-screening technique, radioimmunoassay (RIA), is based on
the same scientific principles as the EMIT. Hanson, supra note 23, at 7, 9. Among the
advantages of RIA is high sensitivity, which means the ability to detect small concentrations of
drugs, and the potential for high automation, which means its adaptability for large volume,
multiple testing. See NIDA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH, supra note 44, at 31. The test's
drawbacks include the long analysis time, and propensity to yield false positive results due to
cross-reactivity. Id. Additionally, RIA is very expensive because it requires use of radioactive
substances and special instrumentation. 1d; see Hanson, supra note 23, at 9.
Many laboratories use the thin-layer chromatography (TLC) test for preliminary
screenings, although it is not as popular as the the EMIT or RIA. See NIDA RESEARCH
MONOGRAPH, supra note 44, at 33. The TLC test is inexpensive to administer, can screen for a
variety of drugs simultaneously, and has a short analysis time. Id. The chief shortcomings of
the test are its inability to detect small amounts of drugs, unsuitability for automation, and
dependency on the skill of technicians in interpreting the results. Id.
55. See NIDA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH, supra note 44, at 35. A sufficiently high
concentration of the drug allows the mass spectrometric detection of GC/MS to give the most
conclusive identification for each drug because the mass spectrum "represents a 'fingerprint'
pattern that is unique for each drug ..... Id. The gas chromatography (GC) technique is also
widely used to confirm positive results of initial screening tests such as the EMIT. Id. at 33.
The GC technique is used primarily as a confirming test because of its high cost and
complexity. One of its strongest features is the ability to detect small quantities of drugs. Id.
at 34. Nevertheless, the GC technique is a slow technique that requires highly skilled
technicians. Id. Although many experts agree that the GC technique can provide acceptable
results, it is not the preferred confirmation method. In a survey of twenty-five technical
experts, the GC technique rated "somewhat defensible" against legal challenges, but scored
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technical experts revealed that GC/MS is the only confirmation test
that, when used in conjunction with the EMIT, is rated "fully defensi-
ble against legal challenge" for a wide range of drugs. 56  The federal
government requires that all federal employers use GC/MS to con-
firm positive test results from initial screening methods. 7 The only
disadvantages of the GC/MS are its high cost and complexity.5
A drug-testing program includes more than the analytical meth-
ods used to detect illicit drugs in urine samples; it also includes the
quality assurance procedures of drug-testing laboratories. Employers
can maximize the accuracy and reliability of the analytical
approaches of their drug-testing programs by selecting laboratories
that follow strict quality assurance procedures. 59  The laboratory
should use qualified personnel6° who adhere to "chain-of-custody"
procedures in handling samples.6" External quality control proce-
dures also contribute to the accuracy and reliability of drug-testing
programs.62 Thus, an employer should compare the performance of
its laboratory with that of other laboratories.63 The danger of using
poor quality control procedures is illustrated by a challenge to the
below the GC/MS as a confirmation test. See Hoyt, Finnigan, Nee, Shults & Butler, Drug
Testing in the Workplace-Are Methods Legally Defensible?, J. A.M.A., July 24, 1987, at 504,
506-07 [hereinafter Hoyt].
56. See Hoyt, supra note 55, at 506.
57. Mandatory Guidelines on Federal Employee Drug Testing Programs, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 70, at E-14 (Apr. 12, 1988).
58. See NIDA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH, supra note 44, at 35. The cost of a single GC/
MS test ranges from twenty to fifty dollars. See Chapman, supra note 29, at 60.
59. Quality assurance "involves all aspects of the testing laboratory. Specimen acquisition,
processing, testing, and reporting of test results must all be as error free as possible in order to
achieve the goals of urine drug testing." NIDA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH, supra note 44, at
46. For a discussion of drug-testing statutes, see infra notes 664-89 and accompanying text; see
also McGovern, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the Battlelines in the War on
Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1453, 1471-74, 1513-17 (1987) (discussing statutory guidelines for
drug testing). The scientific and technical guidelines promulgated by the Department of
Health and Human Services specify extensive procedures for laboratory analysis, and for
reporting and review of test results for federal drug-testing programs. See Mandatory
Guidelines on Federal Employee Drug Testing Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 70, at
E-1 (Apr. 12, 1988). These guidelines and standards for drug testing of federal employees
provide a model program for private employers who want to maximize the accuracy and
reliability of their drug testing programs.
60. For a discussion of personnel requirements for federal testing programs, see
Mandatory Guidelines on Federal Employee Drug Testing Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 70, at El (Apr. 12, 1988).
61. The laboratory must keep records of all individuals, both in and outside the
laboratory, who have access to the specimen, and must also document and preserve these
records for future reference. See NIDA RESEARCH MONOGRAPH, supra note 44, at 47.




accuracy of drug tests administered by the military in 1981.64
Because the military used an inaccurate confirmatory technique and
selected laboratories with poor quality assurance procedures, military
tribunals ordered the reinstatement of thousands of servicemen.65
Thus, even if an employer utilizes the most reliable and accurate ana-
lytical techniques available, a drug-testing program is only as defensi-
ble as the quality assurance procedures of the testing laboratory.
III. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Constitutional rights restrict the actions of federal, state, and
local governmental entities only, and thus the actions of private
employers in drug-testing cases ordinarily escape constitutional scru-
tiny.66 Courts may apply constitutional limitations to the actions of
nongovernmental entities, in rare instances, however, if a sufficient
nexus exists between the actions of the private employer and a govern-
mental entity. 67  In these circumstances, the full range of constitu-
64. Budiansky, supra note 51, at 70. The Center for Disease Control and the National
Institute on Drug Abuse have conducted a blind study evaluating the performance of thirteen
laboratories. This study also illustrates the ramifications of poor quality control. See Hansen,
Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing, J. A.M.A., Apr. 26, 1985, at 2382. The study
revealed that false positive rates were as high as 37 percent for amphetamines and 66 percent
for methadone. Id. Error rates for false positive results on "samples containing barbiturates,
amphetamines, methadone, cocaine, codeine, and morphine.., ranged from 0 to 6 percent, 0
to 37 percent, 0 to 66 percent, 0 to 6 percent, 0 to 7 percent and 0 to 10 percent, respectively."
Id. The high rate of error among the laboratories was attributed to "lack of uniformity in
minimum reporting levels, minimum quality-control requirements, and reporting procedures
for results." Id. at 2386.
65. See Budiansky, supra note 51, at 70.
66. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) ("[P]rohibitions of the [fourteenth]
amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority."). For an example of
modern commentary on the limits of constitutional protections, see Bible, supra note 44, at
321-23; Bompey, Drugs in the Workplace: From the Batter's Box to the Boardroom, 28 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 825, 825-26 (1986); Silets, Of Students' Rights and Honor: The
Application of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Strictures to Honor Code Proceedings
at Private Colleges and Universities, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 47, 51 (1987); Spicer, Drug Testing,
Student Athletes, and the Constitution, VA. B.A. J., Winter 1987, at 11, 12-13; Comment,
Unrestricted Private Employee Drug Testing Programs. An Invasion of the Worker's Right to
Privacy, 23 CAL. W.L. REV. 72, 88-90 (1986); Comment, Random Urinalysis. Violating the
Athlete's Individual Rights?, 30 How. L.J. 93, 116-18 (1987); Development in the Law-The
Constitutional Issues of Drug Testing in the Workplace, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 553, 554-55
(1987) [hereinafter Development in the Law].
67. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution forbids a state from assisting a
private individual in abridging a constitutional right. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20
(1948) (judicial enforcement of racially restrictive private agreements constitutes state action
that denies private citizens equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment).
Mere abstention by a governmental entity, however, which leaves private parties free to act in
deprivation of constitutional rights, does not rise to the level of state action triggering
constitutional protection. Id. at 19. Accordingly, a judicial determination that no
constitutional violation occurred would not in itself constitute state action. Id. Thus, a court's
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tional protections normally afforded to public employees may also
apply to protect private employees confronted with mandatory drug
testing. A sufficient nexus to state action may be found under any of
three theories: the government function theory, the entanglement
theory, and the coercive state action theory.
A. State Action and Mandatory Drug Testing
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,68 the Supreme Court of the United
States enunciated a four-factor test to determine whether the actions
of private employers meet the state action requirement of the four-
teenth amendment: (1) whether the income of the private employer is
derived from government funding; (2) whether state regulation of the
private employer is extensive and detailed; (3) whether the function
performed by the private employer is traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative of the state; and (4) whether a symbiotic relationship between
the private employer and the state exists.69  No single factor is dis-
positive of the state action issue. Moreover, the Rendell-Baker test is
not the exclusive measure of whether a nexus exists, and courts have
proceeded under several theories to determine whether constitutional
limitations should apply to the actions of private actors.
Under the government function theory, if a private actor exer-
cises a power that is traditionally reserved to the government, a, court
may find that the actions of the private entity have a sufficient nexus
refusal to intervene to protect a private employee from mandatory drug testing would not
constitute state action. Constitutional rights are protected only when the state intervenes in a
manner that indicates approval of the private actor's conduct.
68. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
69. Id. at 840-43. As expressed in this case, these factors are conducive to restrictive
factual interpretations. The Court limited the notion that government funding constitutes
state action, stating: "Acts of ... private contractors do not become acts of the government by
reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts." Id. at
841. The second factor, state regulation of the private actor, should be construed in light of
the parameters established in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), and Beck v.
Communications Workers of America, 776 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd on rehearing en
banc, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 2480 (1987), which held that the
specific power exercised over employees must be influenced or compelled by federal law. The
third factor, performing a public function, does not provide a sufficient nexus unless the
function has been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State." Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). The fourth factor of the test, a symbiotic
relationship between the private actor and the government, is not met when a contractor
merely performs services for the government in a fiscal relationship. Cf Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (The relationship between the state and a private
restaurant located on public property, wherein rent from the restaurant contributed to the
support of a public parking garage, met the requirement of state action). As the factors
expressed in Rendell-Baker imply, Burton may be anomalous, because the mere existence of a
financial relationship with the government does not normally provide a sufficient nexus to state
action.
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with a governmental entity to satisfy the requirement of state action.7°
"[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and [are] subject to its constitutional
limitations."'" Although the government function theory would
appear to be well suited for use against private entities undertaking
traditional government functions such as education, the Supreme
Court has implicitly rejected expansive analogies based on the govern-
ment function theory, thereby reducing the practical utility of this
theory as a means for private employees to avail themselves of consti-
tutional protections.72
Under the entanglement theory, the Constitution limits the
conduct of private parties only if a governmental entity has been
involved "to some significant extent" with the intrusive private con-
duct.73  The Supreme Court has not quantified state action in this
70. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (holding that the public services of a
private park were subject to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because
they were municipal in nature).
71. Id. at 299.
72. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). In Flagg Brothers, the Court
distinguished the holding in Evans as hinging on extraordinary facts, and held that the
government function at issue must be one that ordinarily is reserved exclusively to the
sovereign. Id. at 159 ni.8. The Court expressed no view regarding the extent to which a state
may delegate the performance of a function such as education and thereby avoid the limits of
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 163-64; see also Silets, supra note 66, at 54 (illustrating that
courts have rejected the public function theory as a basis for finding state action in almost all
cases involving private colleges); Spicer, supra note 66, at 13 (asserting that Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), indicate that the
Court continues to take a restrictive view of the conduct by a private party that may constitute
state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment).
73. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("[P]rivate conduct
abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have become involved
in it."). In Burton, the Court found that the city's lease of space to individuals for a privately
owned restaurant in a state-owned parking building constituted state action. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court opined: "[T]he peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the parking
facility in which it is located confers on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits." Id. at
724.
The Burton Court's benefits analysis may be extended to the relationship created by
government contracts when, in conjunction with contract awards, the government encourages
private employers to violate the rights of their employees. Private employers who have
lucrative contracts with the government may be considered to be primary beneficiaries of a
contractual relationship with the government. Not only do government contractors glean
incidental benefits from their relationship with the government, as in Burton, but they also
receive direct financial support for services rendered. Under this analysis, the
recommendation of the President's Commission on Organized Crime, that contracts be
withheld from private employers who do not drug test their employees, may bring the actions
of government contractors within the limits of the Constitution. If leasingparking spaces from
the government is sufficient involvement with private conduct to constitute state action, then
overt governmental policies coercing private employers into initiating compulsory drug-testing
1988]
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context, preferring instead to make the, determination on a case-by-
case basis.74 The Court has stated that if an employer's operation is
so intertwined with a governmental body that the government has the
power to hire, promote, or terminate the subject employees, the
employer may be an arm of the government under the entanglement
theory.75
Under the coercive state action theory, private employees may
invoke constitutional protections when the government has com-
manded or encouraged a private employer to engage in an activity
that infringes on the rights of the private employees.7 6 Employees in
heavily regulated private industries may also attempt to use the coer-
cive state action theory to gain access to the same constitutional rights
that protect public sector employees. Note, however, that "[tlhe
mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by
itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 77
The government function theory of state action may apply in the
drug-testing context, for instance, when a volunteer fire department
institutes mandatory drug testing of its firefighters, because courts
may find that fire protection is a traditional government function.78
Additionally, private employees who can show that the government
has encouraged private employers to establish compulsory drug-
testing policies may establish a sufficient nexus of state action between
the deprivation of employees' constitutional rights and the overt gov-
ernmental encouragement of such a policy.7 9 The drug-testing pol-
programs should also suffice. The state action nexus for an employee aggrieved by such a
drug-testing policy on these facts is even clearer than in Burton.
74. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of
the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 722.
75. See Bible, supra note 45, at 321-22.
76. Development in the Law, supra note 66, at 554-55.
77. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974). In Jackson, the
Supreme Court found that even extensive and detailed regulation, as in the case of most public
utilities, does not by itself constitute state action. Id. at 350-51. The Court emphasized the
fact that the inquiry should proceed on a case-by-case basis and that "the inquiry must be
whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."
Id. at 351.
78. Municipal firefighters are a frequent target of mandatory drug testing. See, e.g.,
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 876 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (firefighters); Capua
v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) (firefighters and police department
employees). The same safety considerations that led municipalities to begin drug testing of
firefighters may lead private actors to test volunteer firefighters for drugs in the future.
79. Overt state encouragement of the deprivation of constitutional rights has been referred
to as the coercion test. Spicer, supra note 66, at 13; see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004
(1982) ("[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has
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icy would then be brought within the ambit of the Constitution. For
example, the report of the President's Commission on Organized
Crime, which calls on government and private sector employers to
consider mandatory drug testing, constitutes governmental encour-
agement of private employers to initiate compulsory drug-testing pro-
grams of the kind currently being challenged in the courts by private
employees."0 If enacted into law, the Commission's recommenda-
tion that the government withhold contracts from private entities that
do not test their employees for drug use approaches the level of a
governmental mandate for such companies to test. Such a relation-
ship probably would not constitute a sufficient nexus to state action,
however, unless the contours of the contractual relationship between
a private entity and the government required drug testing.
In Railway Labor Executives'Association v. Burnley"' (R.L.E.A.),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
mandatory drug testing of employees of a private railroad pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration was
sufficient governmental action to bring the drug-testing program
within the limits of the fourth amendment.8 2 Although the court did
not identify the nexus theory it was applying, the court's analysis of
the relationship between the government and the drug-testing pro-
gram is most consistent with the entanglement theory. The court
found that the government's role in promulgating the drug-testing
scheme and in regulating its implementation was significant gov-
ernmental involvement for purposes of the fourth amendment.83
Considering the incidence of government regulation of industry,
courts applying R.L.E.A. and the entanglement theory may find, in
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."). In Beck v.
Communications Workers of America, 776 F.2d 1187 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'd on rehearing en
banc, 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 2480 (1987), nonunion employees
brought suit against the union in their shop, challenging the union's practice of expending part
of agency fees for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining as a violation of their first
amendment rights of free speech and association. The court found that state action existed
because the powers of the collective bargaining representative were conferred by federal
statute. Id. at 1209.
80. Private employees have challenged compulsory drug-testing programs under a variety
of state constitutional provisions and common law tort theories. For a discussion of state
constitutional challenges to compulsory drug-testing programs, see infra notes 649-63 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of common law tort challenges to compulsory drug-
testing programs, see infra notes 690-823 and accompanying text.
81. 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 582. The court stated that "the government's role in the railroad drug testing
program has been a dominant one, sufficiently significant for fourth amendment purposes."
Id.
83. Id. at 581.
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many cases that drug testing of private employees is subject to consti-
tutional limitations.
B. The Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures 4 is perhaps the most frequently invoked and
most controversial ground for challenging drug testing of public
employees, and as such has been termed "the privacy issue of the dec-
ade.""5  Determining whether drug testing of public employees con-
stitutes an unreasonable search and seizure requires two inquiries:
whether drug testing is a search, and if so, whether it is unreasonable.
The lower courts have held without exception that drug testing is a
search, but they have adopted two conflicting standards in determin-
ing the reasonableness of drug testing as a search under the fourth
amendment. Some courts have held that an employer must have
reasonable suspicion that a particular employee is drug-impaired
before requiring that employee to undergo drug testing. Other courts
consider that a government employer need not have individualized
suspicion of drug use before testing employees who are responsible
either for national security matters, or for the safety of others. Until
the Supreme Court of the United States confronts the fourth amend-
ment issue,8 6 it remains unclear whether individualized suspicion is a
prerequisite to drug testing of public employees, or whether courts
may simply consider the totality of the circumstances in determining
the reasonableness of drug testing as a search.
1. DRUG TESTING AS A SEARCH
The courts expressed doubts in early decisions as to whether
requiring a public employee to provide a urine sample for analysis
constituted a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amend-
84. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
85. Cox, supra note II, at 3.
86. The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to provide a fourth amendment
standard for drug testing of employees next term when it reviews National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072
(1988).
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ment.87 The Supreme Court has stated that the fundamental pur-
pose of the fourth amendment is to protect the privacy and security of
individuals against the state:8 8
It is not the breaking of [a person's] ... doors, and the rum-
maging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense;
but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction or some public offense ... 89
Consistent with this approach, in Katz v. United States,90 the Supreme
Court articulated a two-part test to determine whether challenged
action constitutes a search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. First, a person must actually have exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy. 9 Second, that expectation of privacy must
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.92 Although
this formulation captured the privacy underpinnings of the fourth
amendment, it is more descriptive than directive, and therefore did
not provide much guidance in determining whether drug testing is a
search.
The courts resolved the issue by analogizing urinalysis to the
blood testing at issue in Schmerber v. California,93 in which the
Supreme Court held that extracting blood for alcohol testing consti-
tutes a fourth amendment search.94 Sehmerber provides a striking
parallel to the facts of drug-testing cases because it involved interfer-
ence with bodily integrity, rather than with property interests. The
Schmerber Court's emphasis on a blood test's physical intrusion
within the body's surface95 weakened the analogy, however, because
"urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged from the body so that
no actual [physical] intrusion is required for its collection .... "96
Nonetheless, the courts found two compelling reasons for conclud-
ing that the taking of a urine sample for drug testing constitutes a
search. First, urine is "normally discharged and disposed of under
circumstances that merit protection from arbitrary interfer-
87. See, e.g., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266-67
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
88. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
89. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
90. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
91. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
94. Id. at 768.
95. Id. at 769.
96. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
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ence .... " Second, urine, like blood, is a bodily fluid that can be
"analyzed in a medical laboratory to discover numerous physiological
facts about the person from whom it came."98  Reasoning that every
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal
information that bodily fluids contain, the courts have concluded that
compulsory urinalysis testing of public employees constitutes a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 99
2. ASSESSING THE REASONABLENESS OF DRUG TESTING
AS A SEARCH
The rule that compulsory urinalysis constitutes a search does not
end the fourth amendment inquiry."° Rather, a search is invalid
under the fourth amendment only if it is found to be unreasonable. °0
Traditionally, for a search to be considered reasonable, it must have
been carried out pursuant to a warrant "issued by a neutral and
detached magistrate"'' 0 2 upon a finding of probable cause. 103  Over
time, however, the Supreme Court has articulated numerous excep-
tions to the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements in
situations in which reasonable expectations of privacy are diminished,
97. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513).
98. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1508.
99. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 580 (9th Cir.
1988); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d
335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942
(D.C. Cir. 1987); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307
(8th Cir. 1987); Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F.
Supp. 1560, 1566 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 586 (N.D.
Ohio 1987); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 879 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Capua
v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482, 488-89 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Smith v. City of East Point, 183 Ga.App. 659, 660, 359 S.E.2d 692, 693-94
(1987), rev'd on other grounds, 365 S.E.2d 432 (Ga. 1988)
100. New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (A court's determination that a search
occurred "only ... begin[s] the inquiry into the standards governing such searches.").
101. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1499 (1987).
102. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364, 371 (1968). In determining whether sufficient grounds exist to support a warrant, a
magistrate must consider the warrant's description of the particular premises to be searched,
and of the items to be seized. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); see Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965). At a suppression hearing, if the individual shows that the
search was conducted in violation of the fourth amendment, then evidence which was obtained
as a result of the search will be inadmissible at trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58
(1961).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 577 (1971); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 412 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 115 (1964).
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or exigent circumstances exist."°4 In assessing the reasonableness of a
particular search, courts weigh the degree to which the search violates
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against the govern-
ment's need to search. °5 In Bell v. Wolfish,' °6 the Supreme Court
explained that this balancing test considers both the purpose of the
search, and whether the scope, place, and manner of the search are
reasonably related to that purpose. 0 7
In O'Connor v. Ortega,t0 8 the Supreme Court determined that the
warrant and probable cause requirements do not apply to a public
employer who conducts an administrative search of an employee's
104. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987) (administrative search of closely
regulated industry); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (border
searches); New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of school children's belongings);
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (inventory search); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981) (administrative search of closely regulated industry); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980) (consent); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (regulatory inspection
pursuant to statutory authority); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain
view); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (administrative search);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot
pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile exception); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (search incident to arrest).
In cases in which government officials have conducted a warrantless search with probable
cause, the Supreme Court has created various exceptions to the warrant requirement. See New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (upholding validity of search of passenger
compartment of automobile, including closed containers found in the car, because the search
was made incident to a valid arrest of a person in or near the car). In addition, exigent
circumstances may justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. These circumstances
include preventing the imminent destruction of evidence, preventing harm to persons, and
searching in hot pursuit for a suspect. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982)
(holding that police officers legitimately stopped an automobile because the officers had
probable cause to believe that contraband was in the car); see also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291 (1973) (upholding seizure of flesh scrapings from fingernails of suspect to prevent
destruction of evidence). The rule of hot pursuit allows police to enter and search a private
place while they are immediately and continuously chasing a fleeing criminal. See Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967). A police officer can detain and frisk a suspicious
person briefly if the officer has observed unusual conduct and has concluded, in light of his
experience, that criminal activity may be underway. Under this limited search exception, the
officer is entitled to conduct a limited search of the outer clothing of a dangerous person to
discover weapons that might be used to assault the officer. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
95, 96 (1979) (suspicion must be individualized to conduct a limited search); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (requiring articulable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous
in order to conduct a limited search).
105. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985).
106. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
107. Id. at 559; see, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 624 (1977); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
886-87 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-
59 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966); see also O'Connor v. Ortega,
107 S. Ct. 1492, 1499 (1987) (acknowledging that each particular search has its own
appropriate standard of reasonableness).
108. 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
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desk and files.' °9 The Court reasoned that requiring employers to
obtain a warrant before conducting a search for a noninvestigatory
work-related matter, such as retrieving a file, would "seriously disrupt
the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome." 10
Similarly, for an "investigatory search for evidence of suspected work-
related employee misfeasance,""' the Court found that a probable
cause requirement would unduly undermine the employer's interest in
the "efficient and proper operation of the workplace."' ' 12 Therefore,
the Court replaced the warrant and probable cause requirements with
a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances, meaning that
both the inception and scope of the intrusion must be reasonable
under the Bell balancing test. 113
Because the Court expressly declined to "address the proper
Fourth Amendment analysis for drug and alcohol testing of employ-
ees,,,II4 it is unclear whether the O'Connor standard of reasonableness
under the circumstances applies to drug testing of public employees.
Two additional statements that the Court made in O'Connor further
cloud the issue. First, the Court repeatedly noted that assessing the
reasonableness of a search is a particularized fact-sensitive inquiry.1 5
Second, because the employer in O'Connor had "individualized suspi-
cion" of work-related misconduct,1' 6 the Court emphasized that it did
not need to determine whether individualized suspicion is an "essen-
tial element of the standard of reasonableness." ' 7
a. The Individualized Suspicion Standard
Although individualized suspicion is not an "irreducible require-
ment" of the fourth amendment,1 '8 the Supreme Court has stated that
exceptions "are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests
implicated by a search are minimal."' 9  In addition, the Court has
109. Id. at 1503.
110. Id. at 1500.
1ll. Id. at 1501.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1502-03. The Court stated that the inception of the search will ordinarily be
justified if the employer has "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct." Id. at 1503.
114. Id. at 1504 n.**.
115. See id. at 1497, 1499, 1501, 1504; see also id. at 1506-07 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1503.
117. Id.
118. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
119, New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985). Thus, in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, the Court held that questioning occupants of a vehicle at a permanent border
checkpoint did not constitute an invalid search even though the border agents had "no reason
to believe" that the vehicle contained illegal aliens. 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976). The Court
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implied that when the government has a means of generating individ-
ualized suspicion, that requirement should not be discarded. 120  As
such, even when employee drug use presents a danger to the public, or
threatens national security, many courts have held that drug testing
constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure in the absence of indi-
vidualized suspicion. 2' In Railway Labor Executives' Association v.
Burnley (R.L.E.A.), the Ninth Circuit invalidated Federal Railroad
Administration regulations mandating drug testing of all members of
a train crew involved in an accident or fatal incident, and authorizing
railroads to require drug testing of employees who have violated rail-
road operating rules. 22 Applying O'Connor, the court noted that the
inception of a drug test is justified only if the employer has reasonable
weighed the government's interest in conducting the search without individualized suspicion
against the fourth amendment interest of the individual. Id. at 554-64. The Court explained in
a subsequent case that "[t]he crucial distinction was the lesser intrusion upon the motorist's
Fourth Amendment interests. ... Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656 (1979); see also
McMorris v. Alioto, 767 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding metal detector and pat-down
searches of attorneys entering a courthouse); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910-11 (9th
Cir. 1973) (upholding metal detector searches of airline passengers before boarding).
120. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975) (refusing to discard
individualized suspicion requirement for roving border check based in part on the fact that
"the nature of illegal alien traffic and the characteristics of smuggling operations tend to
generate articulable grounds for identifying violators.").
121. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp.
1560, 1566-67 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (bus drivers); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578,
586 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (police officers); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1434-36 (N.D.
I11. 1987) (correctional employees); Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J., Local 318 v.
Township of Washington, 672 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1987) (police officers); American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v: Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733-36 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (federal police
officers); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 881-83 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(firefighters); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516-17 (D.N.J. 1986) (police and
firefighters); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (high voltage
electricity workers); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 249-50 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (city
court clerk); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (firefighters and
police officers); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57,
517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 460, 510 N.E.2d 325, 330-31 (1987) (school teachers).
The Third and Eleventh Circuits have upheld drug testing of employees based on
individualized suspicion, without deciding whether individualized suspicion is a necessary
element of a constitutional search. See Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 2 IER Cas.
(BNA) 1825 (3d Cir. 1988) (police officers); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511-12 (1 1th
Cir. 1987) (firefighter). In Everett, the Eleventh Circuit implied that, in some cases,
individualized suspicion might be unnecessary. The court noted:
Future development by case law will undoubtedly clarify what, if any, basis is
needed to order a search depending upon such factors as: the nature of the work
involved; the danger to others, including the public; any governmental interest,
legitimate business concerns by employers and the totality of the surrounding
circumstances including the intrusiveness and reliability of the tests or
examinations under consideration.
Everett, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 n.5.
122. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201, .301(b)(2)-(3) (1987).
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grounds for suspecting that the drug test will reveal that the employee
has possessed or used controlled substances on the job. 123 Because
drug testing threatens serious privacy interests, the court interpreted
"reasonable grounds for suspecting" to mean that an employer, must
have individualized suspicion before requiring an employee to submit
to drug testing.' 24 The court concluded that the regulations were
invalid because "[a]ccidents, incidents or rule violations, by them-
selves, do not create reasonable grounds for suspecting that tests will
demonstrate alcohol or drug impairment in any one railroad em-
ployee, much less an entire train crew."''
25
Although the R.L.E.A. court invalidated the regulations because
the requirement of individualized suspicion was not met, it proceeded
to assess the reasonableness of the search as conducted. The court
found that the drug test was reasonably related in scope to the pur-
pose of the test, because although drug tests cannot detect current
drug intoxication and impairment, they may deter drug use on the
job. 126 In addition, the court found that the tests were not overly
intrusive in scope, or unreasonable in manner, because they were per-
formed in medical facilities by medical personnel. 27
Some courts have validated drug testing programs that are pre-
mised on individualized suspicion without reviewing other circum-
stances surrounding the search. In Division 241 Amalgamated v.
Suscy,'2 8 the Seventh Circuit upheld drug testing of bus drivers after
serious accidents, because the court considered that these accidents
provided the basis for reasonable suspicion of misconduct. 2 9 The
Seventh Circuit's definition of individualized suspicion directly con-
flicts with that of the Ninth Circuit in R.L.E.A., which interpreted
individualized suspicion to mean that the employer must actually
have observed signs of drug impairment in the conduct of the particu-
lar employee.
b. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Under the totality of the circumstances approach, a court will
not invalidate all drug tests absent individualized suspicion, but rather
will consider all factors relating to the reasonableness of the test. The
Fifth Circuit employed this approach in upholding drug testing of
123. RLEA, 839 F.2d at 587.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 588-89.
127. Id. at 589.
128. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
129. Id. at 1267.
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Customs Service workers in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab.30 In National Treasury Employees, the Customs Service
mandated drug testing of employees tentatively approved for transfer
to positions that "directly involve the interdiction of illicit drugs,
require the carrying of a firearm, or involve access to classified infor-
mation."'' The program applied to transfers to all levels of posi-
tions, including the level of clerical workers, if one of the requisite
elements was present. 3 2 The court's holding that the program did
not violate the fourth amendment was based on the following series of
conclusions that the court made about the circumstances surrounding
the search. The scope, manner, and place of the search were reason-
able because the program was minimally intrusive. 33 The Customs
Service had demonstrated a strong need for the search based on the
dangerousness of the positions and the risk of compromise. 134 The
test was for administrative rather than criminal purposes. 135 In addi-
tion, the program was, "to some extent, consensual,"'' 3 6 in that it
applied only to individuals who "voluntarily" sought to transfer to
specific types of positions, and an applicant could avoid the drug test
by withdrawing his application without any negative consequences,
apart from the loss of the transfer.'37 Moreover, the government
could reasonably require consent to drug testing as a condition of
transferring to sensitive positions.' 38 The court found that less intru-
sive measures were not available, because background checks and
observation of job performance before the transfer request would not
provide sufficient evidence of drug use or tendency toward drug
use. 39  Finally, the court concluded that the deterrent effects of drug
testing made the search reasonably effective, even though employees
received five days notice, and the test usually fails to detect drugs used
more than five days before testing.140
Because the drug-testing program at issue in National Treasury
Employees was so narrowly tailored, it was not difficult for the court
130. 816 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
131. Id. at 173.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 177.
134. Id. at 178.
135. The court stated that the "need for protection against governmental intrusion
diminishes if the investigation is neither designed to enforce criminal laws nor likely to be used
to bring criminal charges against the person investigated." Id. at 179.
136. Id. at 178.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 180.
140. Id.
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to find that the search was reasonable as conducted, once it had
decided as a threshold matter that individualized suspicion was not an
essential element of the program. 4 ' Although the court did not sepa-
rately explain its reason for dispensing with the requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion, it emphasized the consent element of the
program. ' 42 It is true that if the subject of a search gives his consent,
141. Id. at 178-79; see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445
(D.D.C. 1987) (upholding random drug testing of employees in "sensitive positions" in the
Department of Transportation). Other courts have not required that government employers
have individualized suspicion before drug testing employees who are directly responsible for
the safety of others. See McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding
urinalysis testing of prison guards). The McDonell court held that a uniform test could be
applied constitutionally absent individualized suspicion, because the guards had regular
contact with prisoners in medium or maximum security prisons. Id. at 1308-09 (citing Spence
v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding random drug testing of prisoners
because prisoners have "a limited expectation of privacy" in their prison cells)). McDonell was
a radical extension of Spence in that the testing program in McDonell applied to guards, not
prisoners. In Jones v. McKenzie, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld drug testing of a
school bus attendant without individualized suspicion because attendants' duties brought them
into direct contact with young school children and made them responsible for their physical
safety, and the testing was conducted as a part of a routine employment-related medical
examination. 833 F.2d 335, 339-41 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf O'Halloran v. University of
Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (upholding drug testing of university
student athletes absent individualized suspicion)..
In Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), the Supreme Court articulated the regulated
industry exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements. The Court held that a
warrant may not be required constitutionally when Congress reasonably has determined that
warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme, and the very existence of the
federal regulatory program has diminished the privacy expectations of those in the industry.
In such cases, the government may undertake inspections of the premises occupied by
regulated industries without any degree of individualized suspicion. Applying Donovan, the
Third Circuit upheld random urinalysis testing of jockeys in Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d
1136, 1142-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986). The Shoemaker court balanced the
legitimate governmental interests in maintaining the integrity of the racing industry against the
jockeys' expectations of privacy. Id. at 1142. The court found that the jockeys had a
diminished expectation of privacy given the heavy regulation of the industry, and held that the
drug-testing program was reasonable even absent individualized suspicion. Id. at 1143; see also
Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1524-25 (D. Neb. 1987) (relying on
Shoemaker in upholding random drug testing of personnel who had unescorted access to
"protected areas" of a nuclear power plant), aff'd, No. 87-1441 (8th Cir. Apr. 14, 1988).
Similarly, military personnel have a reduced expectation of privacy, and are subject to
searches without individualized suspicion. Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d
466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975). "Such searches are appropriate and necessary, for 'no military
organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable
in a civilian setting.' " American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726,
737 n.10 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 426 U.S. 296, 300 (1983)).
142. National Treasury Employees, 816 F.2d at 178. Other courts in drug-testing cases have
held that the government cannot require consent to an otherwise unreasonable search as a
condition of continued employment. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839
F.2d 575, 589 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[W]hen a search has been determined to be constitutionally
unreasonable, the consent feature cannot save it."); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.
Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[A] search otherwise unreasonable cannot
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the warrant and probable cause requirements do not apply. 14 3 In one
sense, the Customs employees in National Treasury Employees con-
sented to the search in that they voluntarily placed themselves in a
circumstance in which they knew the government would conduct a
search. But the Customs workers consented to the search only
because the government required consent to drug testing as a condi-
tion of the transfer. The validity of the employees' consent therefore
hinges on whether the government was entitled to require consent as a
condition of employment in this case.
Citizens do not give up all of their constitutional rights when
they enter into an employment relationship with the government.'"
Yet the government can place reasonable conditions on public
employment. 45 In determining whether the condition is reasonable,
courts weigh the employee's interest in retaining the right, against the
state's interest in conditioning employment on relinquishment of the
right.1 46 The court in National Treasury Employees found that the
government could reasonably require consent to drug testing as a con-
dition of transfer, because "[i]t is not unreasonable to set traps to keep
foxes from entering hen houses even in the absence of evidence of
prior vulpine intrusion or individualized suspicion that a particular
fox has an appetite for chickens."' 47  Of course, the inherent flaw in
the court's metaphor is that although foxes commonly have an appe-
tite for chickens, it cannot be said that Customs workers commonly
have an appetite for drugs. Indeed, the drug tests at issue in National
Treasury Employees did not detect drug use by any Customs worker,
be redeemed by a public employer's exaction of a 'consent' to the search as a condition of
employment."); Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of N.J., Local 318 v. Township of Washington,
672 F. Supp. 779, 789 (D.N.J. 1987) (A public employer cannot require consent to an
unreasonable search as a condition of continued employment.); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland,
661 F. Supp. 578, 593-94 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (same); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 736-37 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (consent was coerced rather than
voluntary, because of the threat of termination); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 249
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (same).
143. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
144. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
145. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (a teacher may not con-
stitutionally be compelled to relinquish right of free speech); cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309
(1971) (the government may require recipients of welfare benefits to give up fourth amendment
right to deny "home visits").
146. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. In Pickering, the Supreme Court held that the state
could not constitutionally compel a teacher to relinquish his right to speak on issues of public
importance. Id. at 574. The court noted that a different result might be warranted for
positions in which the state's need for confidentiality is great. Id. at 570 n.3.
147. National Treasury Employees, 816 F.2d at 179.
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and even the Commissioner described the Customs Service as "largely
drug free."' 148
It is important to separate Customs' need for a drug-free
workforce from Customs' choice of drug testing as a means toward
this end. Customs has a legitimate interest in minimizing the risk that
drug users will be placed in sensitive positions, but this does not nec-
essarily legitimate a requirement of drug testing as a means of further-
ing that interest. Mandatory drug testing does not merely require
transfer applicants to refrain from drug use; it also requires them to
relinquish their fourth amendment interests in privacy and personal
security. The Fifth Circuit concluded that reasonable alternatives to
drug testing were not available because background investigations and
observation on the job before transfer were not sufficiently informa-
tive. Other commentators have suggested that training supervisors to
detect signs of drug impairment may actually be more effective than
drug testing.' 49 The federal government has recognized the viability
of this alternative by authorizing railroads to drug test based on "spe-
cific, personal observations that the [trained] supervisory employee
can articulate concerning the appearance, behavior, speech or body
odors of the employee. '"150 Ultimately, the reader's conclusion about
the integrity of the holding in National Treasury Employees will rest
on a judgment as to whether drug testing is an acceptable and neces-
sary means of ensuring that employees in sensitive positions are not
drug-impaired.
3. COMMENT
R.L.E.A. and National Treasury Employees are inconsistent
because they applied different standards under the fourth amendment
to determine the reasonableness of drug testing of government
employees in sensitive positions. In R.L.E.A., drug testing was a con-
dition of continued employment, but in National Treasury Employees,
drug testing was a condition of transfer. At first, this distinction
appears to be a critical one in determining whether a government
employer may require consent to drug testing as a condition of
employment. It is not difficult for a court to find that applicants for
sensitive positions have consented to drug testing as a condition of
employment or transfer. Employees who submit to drug testing as a
condition of continuing their employment, however, have not acted
voluntarily if disciplinary action is the only alternative. For appli-
148. Id. at 173.
149. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at A-3 (Jan. 2, 1987).
150. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2) (1987).
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cants, the validity of consent depends on whether the government
employer was reasonable in requiring drug testing as a condition of
employment. Of course, this final step only brings the analysis full
circle, back to the questions of whether the drug test was reasonable
in its inception, and as conducted. Thus, R.L.E.A. and Von Raab are
irreconcilable, because they are divided as to whether individualized
suspicion is an essential element of employee drug testing under the
fourth amendment. As National Treasury Employees illustrates, a
well tailored drug-testing program is likely to survive judicial scrutiny
absent a requirement of individualized suspicion.
C. The Fifth Amendment
The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self." '5 Despite the plain language of the amendment, the privilege
is not confined to criminal cases, but may be invoked in any circum-
stance in which a government official seeks to compel a person to tes-
tify in a manner that might tend to subject that person to criminal
responsibility in a subsequent prosecution.' 52 In California v.
Byers,"' the Supreme Court of the United States established that the
person asserting the privilege must show "substantial hazards of self-
incrimination" from the compelled disclosure.'54 This requirement
has proved to be a significant hurdle for plaintiffs in drug testing
cases. In Burka v. New York City Transit Authority,'55 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that the fifth amendment was not applicable to drug testing of trans-
portation workers, because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the
results of the drug tests would be used in a criminal investigation.', 6
Similarly, in Amalgamated Transit Union v. Sunline Transit
Agency,' the United States District Court for the Central District of
California considered another fifth amendment challenge to drug test-
ing of transportation workers, and concluded that "a penalty for com-
pel[ling] disclosure short of criminal sanction ... does not implicate
151. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the fifth amendment applies only to the federal
government, the privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted against the states because
it is incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
152. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
153. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
154. Id. at 429.
155. 2 IER Cas. (BNA) 1625 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
156. Id. at 1641-42.
157. 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the Self-Incrimination Clause."' 58 In National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab,'59 the Fifth Circuit upheld a requirement that
employees fill out forms detailing their use of medication as well as
any legitimate contact with illicit drugs, because the fifth amendment
prohibits compelled disclosure of incriminating information, and "not
information that is merely private."' 6 ° The court reasoned that in
most cases the forms would not elicit incriminating information, 16
but it reserved decision on whether an individual employee could
invoke the privilege to refuse to fill out the forms. 162
A second barrier to a successful fifth amendment challenge in
drug-testing cases is the distinction that the Supreme Court has made
between testimonial and physical evidence. 163  The Court has rea-
soned that because the privilege against self-incrimination is testimo-
nial in nature, it does not extend to physical evidence.' 64  As such,
the fifth amendment "is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from [the accused], not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."'165
Because of this distinction between physical and testimonial evidence,
public employees have not succeeded in persuading the courts that
testing urine for the presence of drugs violates the privilege against
self-incrimination. 166
In Schmerber v. California, 67 the Supreme Court considered
whether police officers who directed a physician to take a blood sam-
ple from a driver for alcohol testing violated the driver's privilege
158. Id. at 1571.
159. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
160. Id. at 181.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1528 (D. Neb.
1987) (requiring employee to list medications taken did not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination because no criminal sanction would result), aff'd, No. 87-1441 (8th Cir. Apr. 14,
1988).
163. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-65 (1966).
164. See, e.g., id. at 764; (blood tests); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973)
(voice exemplars); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (handwriting analysis);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967) (lineup identifications).
165. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (Holmes, J.).
166. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); Walters v. Secretary of Defense, 725 F.2d 107, 108
n.l (D.C. Cir. 1983); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663
F. Supp. 1560, 1570-71 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758, 762
(D.D.C. 1954); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985);
Hampson v. Satran, 319 N.W.2d 796, 800 (N.D. 1982); City of Wahpeton v. Johnson, 303
N.W.2d 565, 566 (N.D. 1981); City of Wahpeton v. Skoog, 300 N.W.2d 243, 244-45 (N.D.
1980).
167. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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against self-incrimination.16 The Court held that the result of the
alcohol test was not testimonial evidence because it did not relate to
some communicative act or writing of the accused. 1 69 Thus, the fact
that the state had compelled the petitioner to submit to the blood test
and that incriminating evidence resulted was not sufficient to support
the petitioner's claim of a fifth amendment violation. 7 ° Because of
the similarities between blood and urine- testing, most courts have
applied Schmerber to find that drug testing of urine does not violate
public employees' privilege against self-incrimination. 1 ' These courts
have concluded that chemical analysis of urine samples, like blood
samples, results in evidence of physiological rather than communica-
tive facts.'72 For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 173 the Fifth Circuit rejected a fifth amendment challenge to
drug testing of Customs' workers, stating that urine samples merely
reveal physical characteristics, rather than any knowledge the person
tested might possess. 174
Schmerber may not dispose of the testimonial evidence issue in
all drug testing cases, however, because the Court alluded to two pos-
sible limitations of its holding. First, in some circumstances, compel-
ling a suspect to furnish physical evidence might produce testimonial
byproducts. 175 For example, the Court stated that a person who was
opposed to blood tests on religious grounds, or was terrified of the
pain of the needle's intrusion, might make an incriminating statement
or even choose to confess to the charge rather than submit. 176 The
Court hypothesized, without resolving the question, that the fifth
amendment might prohibit the government from relying on these tes-
timonial byproducts. 17 7  Second, the Court implied that the privilege
against self-incrimination may prohibit the government from using a
mere refusal to submit to testing as evidence of alcohol intoxica-
tion.178  Applying this reasoning to the drug-testing context, a court
may find that the government may not rely on confessions or other
168. Id. at 760-61.
169. Id. at 765. The Court acknowledged that the line between testimonial and physical
evidence is not always clear. "Some tests seemingly directed to obtain 'physical evidence,' for
example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial." Id. at 764.
170. Id. at 764-65.
171. See supra note 166 (collecting cases).
172. Id.; see Bible, supra note 45, at 340-41.
173. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
174. Id. at 181.
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statements of employees that are byproducts of compulsory drug test-
ing, and that the government cannot treat an employee's statement of
refusal to submit to drug testing as itself evidence of drug use. Yet, in
Burka v. New York City Transit Authority,'79 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York held that a govern-
ment employer could treat a refusal to submit to drug testing as an
admission of drug use, because this refusal did not constitute testimo-
nial evidence.18 0 Although Burka appears to be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's discussion in Schmerber on this point, it may be
explained by the fact that the employer in Burka did not rely on any
statement or testimony of the employee, but rather on his action in
refusing to submit to a drug test.
The requirement of proving criminal consequences, and the
dichotomy between testimonial and physical evidence have insulated
public employers from fifth amendment challenges to drug testing.
At best, the fifth amendment may provide public employees with pro-
tection against an employer's adverse use of any testimonial byprod-
ucts of drug testing.
D. The Penumbral Right of Privacy
Public employees have challenged drug-testing programs under
the constitutional right of privacy because most drug-testing pro-
grams reveal personal physiological information. 1s Although the
Constitution "does not explicitly mention any right of privacy," '182 it
does extend protection to two types of privacy interests: The individ-
ual interest in autonomy in making certain important decisions, and
the individual "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." 18 3
The privacy interest associated with important decisionmaking exists
in fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"'8 # and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."'85 To date, the Supreme Court has recognized a right of pri-
vacy in "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
179. 2 IER Cas. (BNA) 1625 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175-76 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988). Similarly, blood tests may disclose whether
an employee has venereal disease or schizophrenia. See Chapman, supra note 29, at 57, 58.
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
183. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
184. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).




family relationships, and child rearing and education."' 86 Similarly,
the privacy interest in limiting public disclosure of personal matters
has been construed to apply to intimate facts of a personal nature
such as patient prescription information a7 and employee medical
information. 8 "
A public employee alleging that drug testing violated the funda-
mental right of privacy must show that the employer has invaded a
fundamental liberty.8 9 A public employee who sues under the the-
ory of privacy interest in personal matters must show that the drug
test disclosed personal physiological information other than the pres-
ence of illicit drug traces in the employee's system.
1. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The Supreme Court first recognized the fundamental right of pri-
vacy theory in Griswold v. Connecticut.'90 In Griswold, the Court
held that a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives
violated the fundamental right of privacy of married persons.191 The
Court found that certain amendments to the Constitution established
penumbral "zone[s] of privacy,"' 92 which create a right of privacy in
citizens to be free from government action that invades the "area of
protected freedoms."' 93 The Court stated that because the marriage
relationship was "intimate to the degree of being sacred,"' 94 it fell
within a protected zone of privacy as a fundamental liberty. 91 The
Court concluded that the statute violated this fundamental liberty 96
because it sought to achieve its purpose of preventing extramarital
186. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
187. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593.
188. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
189. See infra notes 190-218 and accompanying text.
190. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
191. Id. at 484-86.
192. Id. at 485.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 486.
195. Id. at 484-86. Justice Goldberg, concurring, emphasized the importance of the ninth
amendment. Id. at 487. The ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Justice Goldberg stressed that the purpose of the ninth amendment
was to indicate that the first eight amendments do not provide an exhaustive list of the
individual rights protected under the Constitution. 381 U.S. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan, concurring, did not state a theory of fundamental liberties, but reasoned that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the marital relationship as one of
the "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' " Id. at 500 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
196. 381 U.S. at 485-86.
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relations' 97 by unnecessarily invading the privacy interests of married
couples. 198
Relying on Griswold,'9 9 the Court held in Roe v. Wade 21 that
the fundamental right of privacy includes the right of a woman to
terminate her pregnancy.20 ' In Roe, the Court struck down as
unconstitutional a Texas criminal abortion statute that excepted from
criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother.20 2
The Court reasoned that the concept of liberty in the fourteenth
amendment and the reservation of rights to the people in the ninth
amendment were "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. '"203 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court applied a two-step analysis that considers, first, the
privacy interests of the mother, 2° and second, whether the state has a
sufficiently compelling interest to invade the privacy interest at
205issue.
In analyzing the mother's privacy interest in her decision to ter-
minate her pregnancy, the Court in Roe found that the risk of harm to
the mother from a complicated pregnancy, the mother's inability to
care for a child born out of wedlock, and the physical and psychologi-
cal distress that accompanies an unwanted pregnancy 20 6 were suffi-
cient reasons to establish a woman's interest in terminating her
pregnancy as a fundamental liberty.20 7 In the second part of the anal-
ysis, the Court stated that this right is not absolute,20 8 because the
state has an interest in protecting both the mother's health and the
197. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 485-86.
199. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The Court remarked that in the past it had
recognized that certain amendments protect privacy interests that are not expressly contained
in the language of the amendments. 1d; see, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68
(1969) (the first amendment includes the right to possess obscene matter in one's home); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (the fourth amendment limits stop and frisk action by police);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (the fourth amendment protects against
electronic eavesdropping); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (the fourteenth
amendment includes the right to teach a foreign language in school).
200. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
201. Id. at 153.
202. Id. at 164.
203. Id. at 153.
204. Id. at 153-54. The Griswold Court engaged in the same type of analysis to determine
whether a privacy interest rises to the level of a fundamental liberty. Griswold, 381 U.S. at
484-86.
205. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.





potential for human life.20 9 At some point, the state's interest
becomes "compelling" and can intrude upon the privacy interest of
the mother in her decision to undergo an abortion. 20 This state inter-
est, however, "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake."2 1 ' The Court found that the point at which
the state's interest becomes compelling is at the end of the first trimes-
ter, as the woman approaches term.21 2 The Court held that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional because it unnecessarily invaded an area of
fundamental liberty, the mother's decision to terminate her preg-
nancy, by prohibiting abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy.21 3
Because courts have limited the scope of fundamental liberties to
family matters, a court is unlikely to find that the use of illicit drugs,
even in the privacy of the home, constitutes a fundamental liberty. As
such, it is doubtful that the fundamental right of privacy would pro-
vide a successful ground for challenging drug testing per se. In lim-
ited circumstances, however, a court may find that drug testing
impermissibly infringes on a fundamental liberty when it reveals per-
sonal physiological information beyond the presence of illicit drugs. 214
As the Fifth Circuit noted in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab :2 15
Urine testing may disclose not only the presence of drug traces but
much additional personal information about an employee-
whether the employee is under treatment for depression or epi-
lepsy, suffering from diabetes, or, in the case of a female, pregnant.
Even tests limited to the detection of controlled substances will
reveal the use of medications prescribed for relief of pain or other
medical symptoms.216
In the right of privacy context, drug tests that reveal information
about pregnancy may interfere with a woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. A woman who risks losing her job because of preg-
nancy may challenge drug testing on the ground that it impermissibly
influences her to terminate the pregnancy. Moreover, if the woman is
married, drug testing may violate the fundamental right of privacy
surrounding the marital relationship,21 7 in that the employer's knowl-
edge of a woman's pregnancy may interfere with the married couple's
209. Id. at 162.
210. Id. at 162-63.
211. Id. at 155.
212. Id. at 162-63.
213. Id. at 164.
214. See supra notes 190-206 and accompanying text.
215. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
216. Id. at 175-76.
217. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86.
19881
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:553
decision of whether to have children. 218
2. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN PERSONAL MATTERS
A drug test that reveals personal physiological information may
also violate the right of privacy protecting against the disclosure of
personal information. In Whalen v. Roe,2 19 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the privacy implications of a New York statute requiring the
collection of patient information. 220 The statute required physicians
to disclose a patient's name, address, age, and prescribed drug and
dosage when prescribing certain classes of dangerous, but legitimate,
drugs.2 21 The purpose of the statute was to prevent stolen prescrip-
tions, and to prevent doctors from improperly prescribing or over-
prescribing dangerous drugs.22 2 The state used safeguards that
minimized the risk of subsequent public disclosure of patient informa-
tion, thereby reducing the intrusion into the patient's privacy interest
in the personal information.223 The Court held that this reduced risk
of subsequent public disclosure, together with the state's interest in
preventing the distribution of dangerous drugs, outweighed the
patient's privacy interest in the personal information at issue.
2 2 4
Similarly, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
218. The Court has recognized "that the decision of whether to undergo or forego an
abortion may have profound effects on the future of any marriage, effects that are both
physical and mental, and possibly deleterious." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 70 (1976). In Planned Parenthood the Court further acknowledged the husband's interest
in the issue by stating: "We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and interest that a
devoted and protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and
development of the fetus she is carrying." Id. at 69. For a general discussion of the right of
privacy, see Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1986).
219. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
220. Id. at 589, 590.
221. Id. at 593. The statute also required that the physician provide his name and the name
of the dispensing pharmacy. Id. The dangerous but legitimate drugs to be recorded included
opium and opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and methaqualone. "These
drugs have accepted uses in the amelioration of pain and in the treatment of certain diseases
such as epilepsy, narcolepsy, hyperkinesia, schizo-affective disorders, and migraine
headaches." Id. at 593 n.8.
222. Id. at 592. The statute also sought to prevent drug users from obtaining more than one
prescription. Id.
223. Id. at 594.
The receiving room is surrounded by a locked wire fence and protected by an
alarm system. The computer tapes containing the prescription data are kept in a
locked cabinet. When the tapes are used, the computer is run "off-line," which
means that no terminal outside of the computer room can read or record any
information.
Id.
224. Id. at 598.
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tion,22 5 the Third Circuit balanced the state's interest in occupational
health and safety against the employees' right of privacy in personal
information contained in medical records.226 In Westinghouse, the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) sub-
poenaed employee medical records from Westinghouse to conduct a
health hazard investigation in the Westinghouse plant.2 27 The court
employed a balancing test to determine whether the intrusion into the
employees' privacy interests was necessary. 228 The court considered
the following factors:
[T]he type of record requested, the information it does or might
contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual
disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which
the record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and
whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public
policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward
access.
229
In applying this test, the court emphasized that "information con-
cerning one's body has a special character, ' 230 because it contains
information about one's body and state of health that is not ordinarily
made public. 231 Additionally, employee medical records usually con-
tain far more personal information than the prescription records at
issue in Whalen.232 Although the court in Westinghouse conceded
that the information revealed by x-rays, blood tests, pulmonary tests,
and hearing and visual tests was private, it was not persuaded that the
information could be "regarded as sensitive." '33 Moreover, NIOSH
provided certain security measures that were intended to minimize
the risk of subsequent public disclosure of the information, 3 thereby
225. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
226. Id. at 580.
227. Id. at 573.
228. Id. at 580.
229. Id. at 578.
230. Id. at 577.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 579.
234. The Court stated:
The excerpted data which is retained by NIOSH is maintained in locked
cabinets, inside the Medical Section of the agency, in rooms locked during non-
office hours. Material from small studies is not placed on computers . . ..
NIOSH has represented that no outside contractors are used for small studies,
such as the one in issue here, and when such contractors are used, they are bound
to nondisclosure by their contract with NIOSH ....
Id. at 580.
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reducing the intrusion into the privacy interest.235 Again, as in
Whalen, the reduced risk of subsequent public disclosure, together
with the public's interest in facilitating research to enhance occupa-
tional safety, outweighed the employee's privacy interests.236 For
these reasons, the court ordered the release of the employee medical
records to the agency.237
The factors considered in the Whalen and Westinghouse balanc-
ing test can be subsumed into three categories: The type of informa-
tion revealed, the risk of subsequent public disclosure, and the state's
reason for requesting access. 238  This balancing test can be applied to
determine the degree to which drug testing may intrude upon the pri-
vacy interests of employees.
Under the balancing test, a court would first consider the type of
information revealed. 23 9 The Westinghouse court held that employees
have a privacy interest in the information contained in their medical
records.24 ° Similarly, employees have a privacy interest in personal
information contained in urine samples, beyond the presence of illicit
drugs. 24 1 A drug test may reveal information that is not already con-
tained in an employee's medical records. This information may not
be posted in medical records because it relates to a new medical con-
dition, or it may be of such a personal nature that the employee has
not even informed his physician about it. 242 In this regard, drug test-
ing may be more intrusive than the mere inspection of an employee's
medical records.
The second factor in the balancing test is the risk of subsequent
disclosure. 243 The attendant safeguards associated with drug-testing
235. Id. at 579-80.
236. Id. at 578-80.
237. Id. at 580. The Court recognized that certain medical records may contain sensitive
personal information unrelated to employment. Id. As such, it required NIOSH to notify
employees that an inspection of their medical records was planned, in order to allow the
employees to raise privacy claims to protect their interests in the sensitive information. Id. at
581.
238. The Westinghouse balancing test subsumes the balancing test of Whalen. Whalen
balanced the state's public policy interest against the patient's privacy interest, and then
applied the safeguard factor as the decisive element in the test. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
239. See supra note 238.
240. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.
241. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 175.
242. Medical records may not reveal information on pregnancy or self-medication. These
work-related medical records also may not reveal whether an employee is using marijuana for
medical purposes, such as alleviating eye pressure from glaucoma or controlling vomiting from
chemotherapy. Gampel, Marijuana and Health Update, I DRUG L. REP. 46, 47-48 (1983); see
supra notes 225-40 and accompanying text. In addition, researchers have detected the AIDS
virus in urine samples. Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 16, col. 2.
243. See supra note 238.
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programs vary, and therefore, so does the risk of subsequent disclo-
sure of personal information. 2" Tests that focus on identifying spe-
cific illicit drugs eliminate the possibility of subsequent public
disclosure of personal information.245 Yet most drug tests are not so
narrowly tailored, and all tests are subject to chain-of-custody
errors.
246
The third factor is the state's interest in gaining access to the
information requested. 247 The purpose of drug testing is to identify
drug-impaired employees and deter illicit drug use by employees.248
Employers do not use drug tests to prevent the distribution of danger-
ous drugs249 or to address public health concerns. 25" A strong public
policy in favor of drug testing may be reflected by President Reagan's
Executive order mandating a drug-free federal workplace and author-
izing drug testing toward this end.25 Yet at least seven states have
enacted statutes that limit the right of public employers to drug
test.252
Even if an articulated public policy in favor of drug testing exists,
some drug-testing programs may violate the right of privacy in per-
sonal matters because of inadequate safeguards minimizing the risk
of subsequent public disclosure of the information.253 Under the
Whalen and Westinghouse balancing test, the employee's right of pri-
vacy in the personal information revealed by drug testing may out-
weigh the employer's need to test if the government employer lacks a
244. See supra notes 41-64.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See supra note 238.
248. Because drug tests cannot measure levels of intoxication, test results do not identify
drug-impaired workers, but only those who have used illicit drugs. See supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text. Nonetheless, employers institute drug testing programs in order to
identify employees who use drugs, and to deter illicit drug use by employees.
249. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589, 592. One authority, however, has related an instance of
an employer discharging a union employee who was convicted of selling drugs, because "the
return of the grievant to the work force could do serious damage to the new and needed
[employee assistance] program." T. DENENBERG & R. DENENBERG, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS:
ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 32 (1983) (citing Joy Mfg. Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 697 (1977)
(Freeman, Arb.)).
250. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 570, 579-82; see also Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood
Serv., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). In Rasmussen, an AIDS victim requested the names and
addresses of blood donors in an attempt to identify the specific blood unit that transmitted the
disease. Id. at 534. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the privacy interests of blood
donors outweighed the interest of the AIDS victim in discovering this information. Id. at 538.
251. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301 app. at
133-135 (West Supp. 1 1987).
252. See supra notes 667-68 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 219-51 and accompanying text.
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strong state interest and sufficient safeguards to minimize the risk of
disclosure.
3. COMMENT
An allegation that drug testing violates the fundamental right of
privacy would probably fail in most cases because it is difficult to link
drug testing to a fundamental liberty.254 The right of privacy protect-
ing against the disclosure of personal information may, however, pro-
vide a viable ground for challenging drug testing in some cases. 255 As
Whalen and Westinghouse illustrate, 256 the determinative factor in the
balancing of interests is likely to be the presence or absence of safe-
guards257 that minimize the risk of subsequent public disclosure of the
personal information revealed.
E. Due Process
Mandatory drug testing of government employees implicates the
constitutionally guaranteed protections of substantive and procedural
due process. The due process rights of federal employees stem from
the fifth amendment, 258 and the due process rights of state and local
government employees are derived from the fourteenth amend-
ment.259 Both the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitu-
254. The courts have been reluctant to expand the list of fundamental rights. See, e.g.,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846, 2847 (1986) (refusing to expand the concept of
fundamental rights to include consensual adult homosexual sodomy).
255. See supra notes 216-53 and accompanying text. The courts have not distinguished
properly between the two privacy interests in drug testing cases. In Amalgamated Transit
Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, for example, the court appeared to merge the
analysis of the fundamental right of privacy with the right of privacy in personal information.
663 F. Supp. 1560, 1571 (C.D. Cal. 1987). The plaintiff argued that the employer's disclosure
of off-duty conduct that was unrelated to employment violated his right of privacy. Id. The
court rejected this argument because the plaintiff failed to link the privacy invasion to a
fundamental liberty. Id. at 1572. In Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d
575, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit held that a cause of action based on a violation
of the right of privacy would not accrue until a breach of confidentiality actually had occurred.
Cf Pepe, Employee Privacy Issues Involved in AIDS and Polygraph Testing in the Workplace, in
LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 8-20 (1987) (public disclosure is a necessary element of a cause
of action for invasion of privacy based on public disclosure of private facts).
256. See supra notes 219-53 and accompanying text.
257. For example, the scientific and technical guidelines for federal drug-testing programs
of the Department of Health and Human Services mandate some form of protection for
employee records. The guidelines state: "The contract and the Privacy Act System shall have
specific provisions requiring that employee records are maintained and used with the highest
regard for employee safety." 52 Fed. Reg. 30,638, 30,643 (1987).
258. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
259. The due process language of the fourteenth amendment is substantially the same as
that of the fifth amendment, but it is directed towards the states: "IN]or shall any State
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tion explicitly prohibit the government from depriving persons of
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law." '26 The con-
cepts of procedural and substantive due process are closely related.2 6'
Procedural due process acts as an institutional check on arbitrary
governmental action by imposing procedural limitations on the gov-
ernment's power to deprive citizens of protected inter-
ests.262 Substantive due process prohibits governmental officials
from depriving individuals of protected interests through arbitrary
and capricious governmental action.263
1. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Courts considering an employee's claim of denial of procedural
due process apply a bifurcated test. The court must first determine
whether a property or liberty interest is at stake.264 If a protected
interest is found, the court must determine the process due when a
government employer seeks to deprive an employee of that interest.265
Procedural due process is required only when the government
seeks to deprive a person of a protected interest.266 When state law
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . U .S. CONST.
amend. XIV § 1.
260. See supra notes 258-59. Violations of substantive and procedural due process are
actionable as civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F.
Supp. 1018, 1023 (D. Mass. 1985); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)
(Public officials are liable under section 1983 for deprivation of rights only if the plaintiff has
been deprived of a constitutional right.). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
261. Although procedural and substantive due process are closely related, they are distinct
causes of action. In procedural due process claims, courts focus on "the adequacy of al-
ternative state remedies. In substantive due process claims, courts focus on the nature of the
injury." Bibbo, 621 F. Supp. at 1023 n.3.
262. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 667 (1988). "[D]ue
process is such process as may be required to minimize 'substantially unfair or mistaken
deprivations' of the entitlements conferred by law upon private individuals or groups." Id.
(quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972)).
263. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1525 (D. Neb. 1987), affd,
No. 97-1441 (8th Cir. Apr. 14, 1988).
264. The Supreme Court has distinguished between the task of identifying interests
protected by the Constitution and assessing the process that is due. See, e.g., Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-78 (1972) (analyzing the nature of the interest at stake
prior to analyzing the due process requirements that may apply).
265. Id. at 576.
266. Due process protection does not extend to every interest that an individual may
possess. "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of
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creates an expectation of tenure in one's job, the constitutional guar-
antee of due process governs the manner in which tenure can be
ended.2 67 Tenured government employees, therefore, possess a prop-
erty interest in their jobs, and the Constitution protects this interest
by requiring the government to provide procedural due process of law
in case of deprivation. Employees testing positive for drug use are
subject to a variety of employer actions that may impinge on this pro-
tected property interest in employment, ranging from mandatory
enrollment in employee assistance programs to immediate ter-
mination.
a. Drug Testing and Protected Property Interests
Public employees who work in such areas as police and fire pro-
tection,268 public utilities,269 and public school transportation 270 have
interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.
But the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite." Id. at 569-70.
The Supreme Court's analysis of property interests worthy of due process protection has
varied in recent years. Under the positivist view, protectable interests are only those that are
independently based in substantive legal relationships found in federal or state law. See, e.g.,
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974) ("[An] employee's statutorily defined right is
[such] a guarantee against removal without cause . . . as enforced by the procedures which
Congress has designated for the determination of cause."); see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 344 (1976) ("[T]he sufficiency of [a] claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to
state law."). In Bishop, a police officer claimed that he had either an express or an implied
right to continued employment based on the negative implication of a city ordinance
prescribing dismissal for substandard work. Id. at 344-47. In rejecting this argument, the
Court held that in the absence of a statute or ordinance conferring a liberty or property interest
in continued public employment, no procedural protections were required under the due
process clause. Id. at 350.
Under the constitutional test of procedural due process, the range of interests entitled to
protection as property or liberty has been interpreted more expansively than under the
positivist view. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-63 (1969) (the statutory
entitlement to welfare benefits is protected by procedural due process); see also Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (reliance on employment policy creating protected
interest). In Perry, the state had employed a teacher for ten years under a series of one-year
contracts. Id. at 594. No formal tenure system existed, and the state decided not to renew the
teacher's contract after he became involved in a public controversy with the Board of Regents.
Id. at 594-95. The Court stated: "A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for
due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support
his claim of entitlement to the benefit ...." Id. at 601. The Court held that the teacher had
an entitlement in continued employment based on the policies and practices of the institution.
Id. at 602-03.
267. See Mazo, Yellow Rows of Test Tubes.- Due Process Constraints on Discharges of Public
Employees Based on Drug Urinalysis Testing, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1637 n.98 (1987)
(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972)).
268. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 876 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(firefighters); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) (firefighters
and police department employees).
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challenged certain aspects2 7 ' of mandatory drug-testing programs on
procedural due process grounds. In analyzing these claims, courts
have found protected property interests in public employment arising
both from positive state law and from implied understandings be-
tween the government and the public employee. In Capua v. City of
Plainfield,272 a federal district court in New Jersey found that city
firefighters possessed a cognizable property interest in public employ-
ment that their government employer could not abrogate without pro-
viding due process of law.2 73 In so finding, the court noted that
under the New Jersey civil employment statute, public employees pos-
sessed a reasonable expectation of continued employment "unless and
until just cause [was] established for their termination. ' 274  The stan-
dard of just cause for dismissal thus created a protected property
interest in public employment requiring procedural due process of law
before the government could deprive the firefighters of that interest.275
In Allen v. City of Marietta,276 a federal district court in Georgia
decided that employees who had been discharged after mandatory
drug testing possessed a protected property interest in their jobs as
269. See Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 484 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (electric utility
workers).
270. See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd and vacated in
part on other grounds, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (school bus attendant). In Jones, the
allegations of drug use stemmed from one, unconfirmed positive EMIT drug test. Id. at 1503.
271. Although procedural due process challenges cannot eliminate mandatory drug testing
of public employees, strict adherence to the requirements of procedural due process can help to
control the discretion that governmental entities exercise when implementing drug-testing
programs.
272. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
273. Id. at 1520.
274. Id. at 1520 (quoting the "just cause" requirement for suspension, removal, fine, or
reduction of rank in the New Jersey statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:14-19 (West 1980)).
275. Similarly, in Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, a federal district court in Tennessee
found that firefighters had a property right in their jobs which activated the constitutional
requirement of due process of law. 647 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (citing Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). In Roth, the Court found a protectable property
interest, and stated that these interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law ......
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
The potential for adverse personnel action in connection with mandatory drug testing of
public employees, which can deprive employees of a protected property interest, is analogous
to the situation presented by mandatory polygraph examinations of public workers. The
protection of procedural due process has been found to apply to polygraph examinations of
public employees. In Hester v. City of Milledgeville, city firefighters and police officers were
required to submit to polygraph examinations because of suspected drug use. 598 F. Supp.
1456, 1458-59 (M.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 777 F.2d 1492 (1 lth Cir. 1985).
The court found that the public employees had a property right in their jobs that was protected
by the due process clause. Id. at 1472-73.
276. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
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public utility workers.277 The court predicated its finding on an
examination of the meaning behind the municipal rules regarding
safety that were given to every employee, and concluded that these
employees could only be dismissed for good cause.278  The court rea-
soned that the good cause requirement created a protectable property
interest in employment for public utility workers.279 Similarly, in
Jones v. McKenzie, 280 a school bus attendant working under tempo-
rary employment status was terminated from her job on the basis of
one, unconfirmed EMIT test that revealed signs of marijuana use.28'
Her employer, the District of Columbia school system, unsuccessfully
argued that it had not intended to create a property interest in
employment for temporary personnel.282 Nonetheless, the employ-
ment rules prohibited "arbitrary or capricious" adverse action by the
employer.283 The court equated the arbitrary or capricious standard
with a for cause requirement for dismissal, which conferred tempo-
rary employees with a protected property interest requiring due pro-
cess of law. 84
b. Drug Testing and Protected Liberty Interests
Mandatory drug testing of public employees also raises proce-
dural due process issues when a constitutionally protected liberty
interest is found. The Supreme Court examined the concept of a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest in reputation in Paul v. Davis.2"'
In Paul, a newspaper reporter sued the chiefs of police in Louisville
and Jefferson County, Kentucky, for representing to local merchants
that he was a shoplifter. 286 The reporter claimed that this representa-
tion caused injury to his reputation, thereby infringing upon his inter-
ests under the fourteenth amendment.287 The Court held that
reputation alone did not rise to the level of a liberty interest within the
meaning of the due process clause, but that it must be coupled with a
277. Id. at 494.
278. Id. at 492.
279. Id.
280. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd and vacated in part on other grounds, 833 F.2d
335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
281. Id. at 1503.
282. Id. at 1504-05.
283. Although the temporary employee was classified under "Wages As Earned," the
Board of Education's employment rules did not distinguish between employees in this category
and full-time employees. Id.
284. Id.
285. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
286. Id. at 694-96. The chiefs of police had distributed the newspaper reporter's name and
photograph to local merchants, describing him as a shoplifter. Id.
287. Id. at 697.
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more substantial interest such as employment. 8  The Court reasoned
that any harm to reputation was not sufficient to change the individ-
ual's status under state law; it could not be equated with loss of a
specific job.289 In drug-testing cases, however, this holding is limited
by the rule that public employees possess a liberty interest in their
ability to secure future employment.2 90 This liberty interest is impli-
cated when a termination is based on allegations of drug use, and may
therefore support an action for denial of procedural due process when
public employees are discharged in conjunction with mandatory drug
testing.29' Courts have found the constitutionally protected interest
in liberty applicable to the drug-testing context. In both Capua v.
Plainfield and Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, the courts identified
liberty interests in reputation that could not be denied without due
process of law.292 Thus, for public employees who lack protectable
property interests, a liberty interest in reputation may provide an
alternative predicate for procedural due process protection in drug
testing cases.
288. Id. at 708-12.
289. In order for the court to find that a liberty interest entitled to due process safeguards
exists, a plaintiff must connect the injury of defamation with the state's alteration or
extinguishment of a right previously protected by state law. Id. Paul requires that a person
claiming violation of a liberty interest show defamation plus loss of status such as a specific
job. Id.
290. Comment, Discharge of Employees Within the State Personnel System: The Due
Process Requirements for the Deprivation of Property and Liberty, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
413, 413 (1984).
291. See Mazo, supra note 267, at 1648. In Doe v. Department of Justice, an employee who
had been discharged for allegedly unprofessional and dishonest conduct successfully claimed
that she had been deprived of liberty without due process of law because the charges
stigmatized her and effectively precluded her from future government employment. 753 F.2d
1092, 1096-1104 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A liberty interest requiring procedural due process
protection may also be implicated when an employee is forced to choose between termination
and enrollment in an employee assistance program (EAP) as a condition of continued
employment. Mazo, supra note 267, at 1649-50.
292. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 876 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(firefighters); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986) (firefighters
and police officers). In Hester v. City of Milledgeville, a district court found a protectable
liberty interest for a police officer and a firefighter who had been subjected to a polygraph
examination to determine whether they had used and distributed illegal drugs. 598 F. Supp.
1456, 1472-73 (M.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 777 F.2d 1492 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
The court reasoned:
Disciplining or discharging any plaintiff employee in whole or in part on account
of a polygraph examiner's opinion of deceptiveness, or on account of a refusal to
submit to a polygraph examination, will impose a stigma or other disability on
the disciplined employee that will affect his current employment with defendants,
and possibly foreclose his ability to take advantage of other, prospective
employment opportunities.
Id. at 1473.
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c. Mandatory Drug Testing: Determining What Process Is Due
Once a court finds that an individual possesses a protectable
property or liberty interest, it must determine whether the govern-
mental action that effected a deprivation of that interest was consis-
tent with the requisites of procedural due process.
i. The Constitutional Requirements
The governing principle of procedural due process is that notice
and opportunity to respond must be given "at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. '293 The Constitution generally governs the
type and extent of procedures that must accompany the deprivation of
a protected interest. 94 In Mathews v. Eldridge,29 5 the Supreme Court
formulated a balancing test that relies on constitutional principles in
determining the procedures governing the deprivation of a protected
interest.296 The constitutional analysis considers three interests:
293. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
294. The Supreme Court has, in the past, considered the positivist approach to procedural
due process. Analysis of the positivist approach to determining what process is due provides a
more exacting perspective of the constitutional approach to procedural due process. In Arnett
v. Kennedy, the Supreme Court considered the process due a federal civil servant who was
deprived of a property right in employment. 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion). In
Arnett, a federal civil servant in the Office of Economic Opportunity was dismissed for
allegedly making false and defamatory statements about his supervisor. The federal regulation
governing dismissal provided for a full evidentiary post-termination hearing. See 5 C.F.R.
§ 752.202 (1973). The opportunity for a pretermination hearing was limited in scope to an
informal proceeding. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 142-46. In his plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist
stated that the statute creating the protected interest also defined the extent of the process due.
According to Justice Rehnquist, the protection to be accorded a liberty or property interest
flowed from the positive law that initially created the protected interest, rather than from the
Constitution. "[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the
limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant...
must take the bitter with the sweet." Id. at 153-54. In other words, the right provided was the
right as limited by the grantor of the right.
Six Justices refused to accept Justice Rehnquist's due process analysis, finding instead that
the Constitution, rather than state law, determines the process due by balancing the competing
interests of the government and the individual. Id. at 167 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring); id. at 177-86 (White, J., concurring); id. at 209-11 (Marshall, Douglas & Brennan,
JJ., dissenting). The Justices reasoned that the right to procedural due process "is conferred,
not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee." Id. at 167 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined Justice Rehnquist's plurality
opinion. Six Justices agreed with the result that a pretermination hearing was not required in
order to remove a nonprobationary employee from the federal civil service because post-
termination hearing procedures adequately protected the liberty interests of the federal
employees in avoiding wrongful stigma from administrative charges. Id. at 156-58 (Rehnquist,
Burger & Stewart, JJ.) (plurality opinion); id. at 167-71 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring);
id. at 186-96 (White, J., concurring).
295. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
296. Id. at 334-35. In Mathews, a person whose social security disability benefits had been
terminated challenged the constitutionality of the administrative procedures employed in
EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fis-
cal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 97
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,298 the Court
reaffirmed the Mathews balancing test and defined the procedures due
to discharged government employees. 299  The procedures required
under Loudermill are applicable when a government employer wishes
to terminate an employee who has tested positive for drug use. In
Loudermill, the Court stated obliquely that " 'something less than a
full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative
action.' "" At a minimum, however, prior to termination, govern-
ment employees must be given oral or witten notice of the charges
against them, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an
opportunity to present their position in person or in writing.3",
ii. Applying Procedural Due Process to Drug Testing
Mandatory drug testing of public employees implicates all three
of the interests identified in the Mathews balancing test of procedural
due process. The purpose of the Mathews test is to provide holders of
protected interests with significant procedural protection. Assessing
the interests of individual public employees requires an inquiry into
the harshness of the consequences that follow from deprivation of the
protected interest. For employees subjected to mandatory drug test-
ing, these consequences may include mandatory enrollment in reha-
bilitation programs, suspension, termination, and limited ability to
procure future employment.302 The governmental interests to be con-
determining whether a continuing disability existed. The Court held that the termination of
social security disability benefits without a prior evidentiary hearing did not violate procedural
due process. Id. at 340-41.
297. Id. at 335. The Mathews balancing test is the standard judicial means for determining
the requirements of procedural due process for the deprivation of a life, liberty, or property
interest. Comment, supra note 290, at 429.
298. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
299. Id. at 542-48.
300. Id. at 545 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343).
301. Id. at 545-46. In balancing the competing interests, the Loudermill Court found that
the employee had a significant interest in retaining employment, and providing the employee
with notice and an opportunity to be heard could reduce the risk of erroneous action, but that
the governmental interest in immediately terminating employees outweighed the interests of
the individual. Id. at 543-45.
302. Mazo, supra note 267, at 1648-50.
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sidered in determining the process due an employee discharged for
alleged drug use are the speedy removal of drug-impaired employees
and the cost of the proceedings. The interest in speedy removal is
based on the government's concern as an employer in protecting the
safety, efficiency, and security of the workplace from the threat of
compromise by drug-impaired workers.3"'
Analysis of the risk of erroneous deprivation of property or lib-
erty interests within mandatory drug testing centers on the accuracy
and reliability of the drug testing methods and procedures.3 "4 The
court must therefore determine whether use of additional or alterna-
tive procedures would have yielded greater accuracy, and thereby
reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation. One of the most widely
used drug testing techniques, the EMIT, has encountered criticism for
its tendency to yield false positive results of drug use.30 5 Given the
harsh consequences of falsely labeling a public employee an illicit
drug user, it has been argued that personnel actions based on urinal-
ysis results should require a higher standard of proof than the EMIT
can offer.30 6 This criticism can be met by confirming positive EMIT
results with the GC/MS test, which is more accurate than the
EMIT.30 ' The GC/MS test is, however, more expensive to adminis-
ter, which diminishes its desirability to employers.30 8
In drug-testing cases, the courts have relied on Loudermill3°9 to
determine the extent of procedures necessary to comport with due
process and to determine whether procedures are required before or
303. Id. at 1641; see also Comment, supra note 290, at 433 (noting that the governmental
interest in minimizing administrative costs has a limited weight in the due process balancing
test); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (discounting the weight of the government's
interest in low administrative expenses).
304. At least one court has held that a single, positive drug test using the EMIT is reliable
enough to justify disciplining prison inmates. See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 756 (8th
Cir. 1986); cf Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (double EMIT testing
of prison inmates held sufficient to satisfy due process). The court in Peranzo applied the
Mathews balancing test, stating:
[T]he risk that double EMIT testing will result in erroneous deprivations of
inmates' liberty interests has not been shown to be so significant that additional
testing procedures can be required at this stage of the proceedings as a matter of
due process, regardless of the incremental benefits that additional procedures
might yield or the burdens which such procedures may impose.
Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1514.
305. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
306. Mazo, supra note 267, at 1645-46.
307. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
309. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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after termination of the interests.31° In Capua v. Plainfield,3"' the lack
of procedural safeguards contributed to a finding that mandatory
drug testing denied firemen due process of law.3" 2 The court found no
evidence of any "regulation promulgated establishing the basis for
such testing and prescribing appropriate standards and procedures for
collecting, testing, and utilizing the information derived."3"3 In addi-
tion, requiring the firemen to submit to drug testing under threat of
immediate discharge was found to be a flagrant violation of due pro-
cess rights.314 Relying on Loudermill, the court in Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga 315 upheld a drug-testing program because of the proce-
dural framework for review of drug-testing results and the adminis-
tration of discipline.31 6 This framework included pretermination
hearings and extensive post-termination hearings.317 Further, state
law created a right to appeal the result of the post-termination hearing
in state court.318 Similarly, in Jones v. McKenzie, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia relied on Loudermill to
find that a school bus attendant who failed a drug test and was dis-
charged without benefit of a pretermination hearing had not been pro-
vided procedural due process of law.319 The court did recognize,
however, that the governmental interest in the safety of school chil-
dren might justify temporary reassignment or even suspension pend-
ing confirmation of a positive EMIT test and a hearing.320
310. See, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1986);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1521 (D.N.J. 1986).
311. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
312. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1521. In Capua, the employees were not given advance notice
of the plan to test them for drugs, and they did not have the opportunity to seek legal advice
prior to testing. The governmental authority conducting the drug tests also failed to protect
the confidentiality interests of the firefighter. Id.
313. Id. at 1512.
314. Id. at 1521.
315. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
316. Id. at 883.
317. Id.
318. Id.; see Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D. Ga. 1986). In Bostic, a
federal district court in Georgia found that a former municipal court clerk and police officers
who were discharged after testing positive for marijuana use had not been denied due process.
Id. at 251. The public employees had continued to receive full pay pending an appellate
hearing, and also had been given the opportunity to appear before the Personnel Board of
Appeals before their employment was terminated. Id.
319. 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'dand vacated inpart on other grounds, 833
F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
320. Id. An employer temporarily may reassign or suspend an employee who is suspected
of drug use if a hearing is held promptly. Id. If a confirmatory test indicates that the initial
test yielded a false positive result, the employee is entitled to fair compensation for losses
attributable to the reassignment or suspension. Id. In Allen v. City of Marietta, however, the
court found that utility workers who had not been given notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to their termination had not been deprived of procedural due process, because they had
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At a minimum, public employees testing positive for drug use are
entitled to a pretermination hearing in order to hear the charges
against them and to present their arguments.32' One commentator
has proposed expanding the boundaries of the pretermination hearing
to include the elements of a full evidentiary hearing.322 This expan-
sion would give the employee an opportunity to impeach the accuracy
of test results. 323  Because the risk of erroneous deprivations based
on drug testing can be substantial, the expansion of the pretermina-
tion hearing could also serve the governmental interest in cost-
effectiveness by identifying inaccurate test results at an early stage of
the administrative process.
2. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process is required only when the government
seeks to deprive the plaintiff of a protected interest.32 4 When a gov-
ernmental entity subjects its employees to mandatory drug testing,
deprivation of individual property interests in employment may occur
through disciplinary procedures. An individual who is deprived of a
liberty or property interest as a result of arbitrary and capricious gov-
ernmental actions may claim denial of the right to substantive due
process.325
always been subject to immediate dismissal for certain kinds of conduct which threatened the
health or safety of other employees or the general public. 601 F. Supp. 482, 493-94 (N.D. Ga.
1985); cf. Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that suspension of a
firefighter without pay prior to the benefit of a hearing violates procedural due process).
321. In Loudermill, the statute provided an opportunity for a full post-termination hearing
with the attributes of a trial. This statutory provision was a strong factor in the Court's finding
that notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to adverse administrative action were
sufficient procedural safeguards. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46; see also Copeland v.
Philadelphia Police Dep't, 2 IER Cas. (BNA) 1825 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that oral notice,
followed by written notice only after dismissal, did not violate procedural due process).
322. Although a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination is not constitutionally
required, the employee should be given the opportunity to present evidence, given the inherent
unreliability of some testing methods, and the strong individual interests of subject employees.
Mazo, supra note 267, at 1651.
323. Testing of a new specimen would not be sufficient to rebut the results of the original
positive test result for drug use. In order for the employee to have the opportunity to impeach
the accuracy of test results, original positive specimens should be uniformly preserved for
retesting. Employees also should have the opportunity to produce evidence that they lack the
character traits that typically accompany a drug problem, such as inefficient work habits, a
tendency toward excessive absenteeism, and a tendency to create safety violations. Id. at 1649,
1651.
324. Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (D. Mass. 1985). For a discussion of the
constitutionally protected property and liberty interests possessed by governmental employees,
see supra notes 268-92 and accompanying text.
325. See L. TRIBE, supra note 262, at 566. As early as 1885, in Barbier v. Connolly, the
Supreme Court warned that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prevented
arbitrary deprivations of common law liberty. 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); see also Rushton v.
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a. Arbitrary and Capricious Governmental Action
The constitutional protection of substantive due process shields
individuals from arbitrary and capricious governmental action.326
Courts have refined the arbitrary and capricious standard within the
context of adverse personnel actions.3 27 For the challenged action to
survive scrutiny, a direct nexus must exist between the articulated
grounds for adverse action and some legitimate interest of the govern-
ment employer, such as ensuring that government employees are able
to accomplish their duties satisfactorily.3 28 Absent this nexus, "the
adverse action must be condemned as arbitrary and capricious for
want of a discernible rational basis.- 329
Although the categories of legitimate governmental interests are
not discrete, in deciding claims that drug testing violates substantive
due process, courts have found that government employers possess
legitimate interests in job performance, 33 ° safety, 33 1 and security.332
The legitimate governmental interest in job performance can serve "to
minimize unjustified governmental intrusions into the private activi-
ties of federal employees. ' 333  The nature of the employee's position
and the conduct justifying the action are important factors in deter-
mining whether adverse governmental personnel actions are
rational.334  An employer's safety and security needs typically pre-
clude a successful claim based on allegations of arbitrary and capri-
cious conduct. 335 In Everett v. Napper,336 a federal district court in
Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1525 (D. Neb. 1987) ("Substantive due process
provides a shield against arbitrary and capricious deprivations of liberty" within the drug-
testing context.), aff'd, No. 87-1441 (8th Cir. Apr. 14, 1988).
326. See L. TRIBE, supra note 262, at 566.
327. See, e.g., Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
328. Id. at 272 n.20.
329. Id. at 272.
330. Id. In Doe v. Hampton, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim based on a finding that
the governmental interest in the job performance of a clerk/typist was sufficiently related to
the employee's mental condition. Id. at 268-76. Mental examinations of the employee
specifically had found that she was not fit for duty. Id.
331. See Borsari v. FAA, 699 F.2d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir.) (termination of air traffic
controller convicted for sale and possession of illegal drugs), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983).
332. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 178 (5th Cir.
1987) (Hill, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988) ("Use of controlled substances
by employees of the Customs Service may seriously frustrate the agency's efforts to enforce the
drug laws," and "employees involved in field operations ... endanger the safety of their fellow
agents, as well as their own, when their performance is impaired by drug use.").
333. Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 272 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
334. Id.
335. An employer generally will take adverse action against employees who either refuse to
submit to drug testing or who test positive for drug use.
336. 632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, 833 F.2d 1507 (1 th
Cir. 1987).
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Georgia held that the actions of the Bureau of Fire Services in sus-
pending and ultimately terminating a city firefighter who refused to
submit to mandatory drug testing did not constitute arbitrary and
capricious governmental conduct. 337  The Service was found to have
a strong interest in protecting the public safety by ensuring that its
employees were fit to perform their jobs as firefighters. 38 Given the
legitimate governmental interest in fire safety, suspected drug use by a
fireman was a sufficiently rational justification for requiring him to
submit to urinalysis. 3 9
When a government employer lacks an interest in safety or secur-
ity, substantive due process claims that focus on the interest in job
performance in the context of mandatory drug testing may yield some
success. 340 Unlike alcohol tests, drug tests do not measure intoxica-
tion or impairment levels of employees testing positive for drug use, 34 1
and therefore they cannot relate the presence of drugs to employees'
job performance. 342 As such, adverse personnel action following posi-
tive drug test results is based solely on the presence of drugs traces,
rather than on any relationship to job performance. Moreover, it is
difficult to prove that even the threat of drug testing will improve job
performance by reducing drug use. In the absence of a nexus between
the means of drug testing and the end of acceptable job performance,
the governmental action may be condemned as arbitrary and capri-
cious, thereby supporting a substantive due process claim.343
337. Id. at 1485-86.
338. Id. at 1485.
339. Id.
340. Courts generally have been quite sensitive to the governmental interests in safety and
security. Adverse personnel action taken to preserve these interests ordinarily defeats a
substantive due process claim regardless of job performance See, e.g., Borsari v. FAA, 699
F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding dismissal of an air traffic controller reasonable based on
possession and sale of marijuana and cocaine notwithstanding outstanding ratings for job
performance), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983).
341. Courts have validated drug testing of employees in sensitive positions even without
evidence of job impairment. See Borsari, 699 F.2d at 110-11.
342. It is instructive to compare this situation with the events in Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d
265 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Hampton, the court found the employee to be mentally incompetent,
and unable to perform her assigned duties prior to discharge. Id. at 268-69. Conversely, a
positive drug test under current methods cannot be considered a specific finding of job
impairment. See supra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
343. Cf Borsari, 699 F.2d at 110-11 (air traffic controller's conviction for drug sale and
possession was incompatible with successful air traffic control). In Borsari, the Second Circuit
held that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which prohibits employment discrimination
that is based on conduct not adversely affecting job performance, was not designed to alter the
"efficiency of the service" standard for removal of employees. Id. at I I 1-12.
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b. Substantive Due Process and the Reliability of Drug Testing
Employers who decide to implement mandatory drug testing can
choose from several types of drug-testing techniques. Drug-testing
techniques vary in their reliability and accuracy. 3" If a drug test or
program is so unreliable as to constitute arbitrary and capricious con-
duct, then the employer has violated substantive due process. Deter-
mining whether the employer's drug testing method is sufficiently
accurate depends on a balancing of the statistical probability of accu-
rate results and the strength of the individual interest at stake. Drug-
testing programs that are found to be unreliable when measured
against the strength of the individual interest at stake may constitute
another form of arbitrary and capricious governmental action in vio-
lation of substantive due process.345
There are several ways for a plaintiff to prove that a drug-testing
program is unreliable. The testing technique itself may be inherently
unreliable because it tends to yield false positive results of drug use.34 6
The employer may use inadequate chain-of-custody procedures for
collecting and handling samples or inadequately maintain quality con-
trol over independent drug testing laboratories. Substantive due pro-
cess, however, does not require exactitude in drug testing.347 In
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,34 the Fifth Circuit
held that confirmation of EMIT drug tests of Customs Service
employees using the GC/MS technique was "not so unreliable as to
violate due process of law" even though some false positive test results
might have occurred.349 The court based its conclusion that Cus-
344. The major criticism associated with the EMIT test concerns its propensity to yield
false positive results. See supra notes 45-54. The GC/MS test is the most accurate of the tests
used to confirm EMIT results. See supra note 55.
345. For a discussion of the reduced level of reliability required for drug testing of prison
inmates, see supra notes 304-08 and accompanying text. For a discussion of substantive due
process protection from arbitrary and capricious governmental action, see supra notes 324-43
and accompanying text.
346. The unreliability of a particular drug testing technique can be mitigated by confirming
results with a more accurate test. Mazo, supra note 267, at 1645.
347. See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The requirements of due
process are flexible and depend on a balancing of interests affected by the relevant government
action.").
348. 816 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072
(1988).
349. Id. at 181-82. The requirements of due process vary with the relative weight of the
interests. Lower accuracy rates are tolerated when prison inmates are the subjects of the
governmental drug testing because their liberty interests are diminished. Peranzo v. Coughlin,
608 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The use of the EMIT, followed by confirmation
using a second EMIT test, is not so unreliable as to violate substantive due process of law when
used as evidence of narcotics use at inmate disciplinary proceedings. Spence v. Farrier, 807
F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1986); Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1511-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (inmates
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toms Service workers had been afforded due process on several fac-
tors: (1) "elaborate chain-of-custody procedures" minimized the risk
of false positive readings; (2) employees could resubmit a positive
specimen to the laboratory of their choice for independent testing;
and (3) "quality assurance features," including the use of control sam-
ples, were a regular part of the testing program.3 50
Even minor variations between otherwise similar drug-testing
programs can markedly affect the reliability of drug testing. Cursory
analysis and blanket approval of drug testing programs are inappro-
priate in the context of substantive due process challenges given the
constitutional interests at risk of deprivation. Courts deciding sub-
stantive due process claims should therefore scrutinize the procedures
and safeguards that relate to the reliability of the drug testing pro-
gram at issue.
3. COMMENT
Individuals employed in the private sector generally do not enjoy
the constitutional protections afforded their governmental counter-
parts.35' Yet courts may be "consciously or unconsciously swayed by
constitutional considerations" when reviewing private employer drug-
testing programs.352 One commentator has therefore suggested that
private employers design drug-testing programs that would meet the
standards placed on government employers.35 3 Another commenta-
tor, however, has concluded that it is appropriate to impose higher
standards on a government employer "when it deprives a citizen of a
state-created interest. '3 54
Courts have viewed drug-testing challenges based on procedural
due process grounds with more favor than those based on substantive
due process.355 In a sense, the reliability requirements of substantive
not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief). The strong governmental interests in institutional
safety and correctional goals also may increase the margin of acceptable error.
350. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 181-82.
351. For a discussion of the state action nexus theories under which constitutional
limitations may be applied to private employers, see supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
352. Comment, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Private Sector Employers, 65 N.C.L.
REv. 832, 834 (1982).
353. Id.
354. The basis for requiring a higher standard for government employers who test
employees for drugs is the special relationship between the government and individuals.
Mazo, supra note 267, at 1652.
355. Drug-testing programs in the public sector that courts have found to violate due
process of law generally have been predicated on procedural, rather than substantive, due
process grounds. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986)
(rejecting substantive due process claim; finding procedural due process violation).
Substantive due process has declined steadily as a viable cause of action since its peak in the
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due process can be equated with the interest in reducing the risk of
erroneous deprivation considered in the Mathews balancing test of
procedural due process. As a result, the success of a claim that drug
testing violates both substantive and procedural due process may turn
on the interest balancing test of procedural due process, rather than
the amorphous standards of substantive due process.
IV. THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The economic and human costs associated with illicit drug use
have caused employers in the unionized private sector to implement
employee drug-testing programs. 3 6 An employer's power to test
unionized workers for drug use may be limited, however, by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement 357 and the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).358  On September 24, 1987, the general counsel35 9 to the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a memorandum clas-
1930's. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("The doctrine ... that
[substantive] due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the
legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded."); cf. Garfield, Privacy,
Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 352
(1986) ("[S]ubstantive due process still lives, but ... its continued life has not been adequately
acknowledged or justified.").
356. Flannery, Unilaterally Instituted Drug Screen Tests in the Unionized Private Industry.-
An Appropriate Response?, 38 LABOR L.J. 756, 756 (1987); see supra notes 23 & 48 and
accompanying text; see also OSHA Oversight Hearings, supra note 16, at 6. This section
addresses unionized private sector employment and does not address the constitutional
protections relied upon by unionized public sector employees.
357. Collective bargaining is the process of negotiation that affords both the union and the
employer the opportunity to exchange promises and commitments to reach an agreement on
employment matters. See T. COLOSI & A. BERKELEY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: How IT
WORKS AND WHY 3 (1986); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 540 (1976).
Collective bargaining produces a written agreement between the union and the employer
governing the parties' relationship, ordinarily for a number of years, with a view "toward an
indefinite period of continued dealing in the future." R. GORMAN, supra, at 540. The
collective bargaining agreement commonly is read beyond the parameters of the "written and
executed document" to include plant customs, industrial practices, and informal agreements
and concessions that occurred at the bargaining table, but were not reduced to writing. Id.
358. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1982).
The [National Labor Relations Act then defines the terms] it uses, including the
terms "commerce" and "affecting commerce." It creates the National Labor
Relations Board and prescribes its organization. It sets forth the right of
employees to self-organization and to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. It defines "unfair labor practices." It lays
down rules as to the representation of employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1937) (citations omitted) (quoting
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1982)).
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 to establish and maintain
"industrial peace," and "to preserve the flow of interstate commerce." Firit Nat'l Mainte-
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sifying drug testing as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining for
both unionized employees and applicants for employment.360 The
nance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). Section 1 of the Act states in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encourag-
ing the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or. protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
A central theme in maintaining industrial peace is the recognition, acceptance, and "pro-
motion of collective bargaining as a method of defusing and channeling conflict between labor
and management." First Nat' Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 674. The Court in First National
Maintenance further stated:
Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of
employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of indus-
trial peace. Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific
causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor distur-
bances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of
instances.
Id. at 674 n. 11 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 42 (upholding the
constitutionality of the Act)); see also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498-99 (1979)
("The basic theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments,
and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open discussions leading, it
was hoped, to mutual agreement.") (quoting H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103
(1970)).
Section 8(a)(5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provi-
sions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
Section 8(b)(3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents ... to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representa-
tive of his employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (1982).
Section 159(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
359. The general counsel's powers are described in section 153(d), which states that the
general counsel "shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the
investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 160 of this title, and in
respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board . 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)
(1982).
360. The memorandum states the general counsel's position:
(1) [D]rug testing for current employees and job applicants is a mandatory
subject of bargaining under Section 8(d) of the Act; (2) in general,
implementation of a drug testing program is a substantial change in working
conditions', even where physical examinations previously have been given, and
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memorandum further provides that if a union chooses to waive its
right to bargain over drug testing, it must do so in clear and unmis-
takable terms.361  Because the NLRB is an independent agency
charged with promulgating and enforcing national labor policy,3 62 the
memorandum speaks with considerable force. The import of the
memorandum is that it effectively prevents an employer from unilat-
erally3 63 implementing a drug-testing program for unionized employ-
ees by classifying drug testing as a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, thereby creating a statutory right to bargain over drug
testing that is not available in permissive subjects of bargaining.364
This statutory right to bargain over drug testing cannot be relin-
quished without a clear and unmistakable waiver by the union.
Employers and unions are now obligated under the NLRA to bargain
over drug testing during contract negotiations, 365 and during the term
of an existing agreement.366 Moreover, the current NLRB policy of
deferring contract disputes and unfair labor practice claims to arbitra-
tion367 forces the parties to address drug testing as it arises midterm,
even if established work rules preclude the use or possession of drugs in the plant;
(3) the established Board policy that a union's waiver of its bargaining rights
must be clear and unmistakable is to be applied to drug testing; (4) normal Board
deferral policies under Dubo and Collyer will apply to these cases; however, if
Section 10(j) relief is otherwise warranted, deferral will not be appropriate.
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-1 (Sept. 24, 1987) (citing Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142
N.L.R.B. 431 (1963); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971)).
361. Id.; see R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 466-69.
362. Section 6 of the Act states: "The Board shall have authority from time to time to
make, amend, and rescind in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act,
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter."
29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
363. The general counsel's classification of drug testing as a mandatory subject of
bargaining does not prevent unilateral employer action with respect to drug testing in all
circumstances. An employer can implement a drug-testing program unilaterally after reaching
impasse with the union over the issue of drug testing. See R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 445-
50; see infra notes 417-21 and accompanying text.
364. For a discussion of permissive subjects of bargaining, see infra note 370.
365. For a discussion of the bargaining rights and obligations created during the negotiation
stage with respect to drug testing, see infra notes 403-26 and accompanying text.
366. For a discussion of the bargaining rights and obligations created during the term of an
existing agreement with respect to drug testing, see infra notes 427-50 and accompanying text.
367. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (1971). The Board will defer to an
arbitral award if all of the following conditions are met: First,"the contractual issue is
factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue." Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574
(1984). Second, "the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the
unfair labor practice." Id. Third, the award is not "palpably wrong," or stated differently, is
susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the NLRA. Id.
For a general discussion of the Board's deferral policy and union waiver of statutory
rights, see Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way
Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23, 28 (1985). The author, Harry
T. Edwards, is a United States Circuit Judge in the District of Columbia Circuit.
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or wait until the expiration of the existing agreement and address the
issue during negotiations. 368  Both choices mandate resolution of the
drug testing issue through the collective bargaining process.3 69
Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are defined under
section 8(d) of the NLRA as "wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment. ' 3 0  The phrase "other terms and conditions
368. See infra notes 402-50 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 357. "A system of unfettered collective bargaining is essential for the
continued economic well-being of this nation, and we will oppose, any action that impedes or
interferes with that process which is otherwise unnecessary to.protect the national interest."
FIRST ANNUAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INSTITUTE 187 (1985) (Address by Francis
X. Lilly, Solicitor of Labor, United States Department of Labor).
370. The scope of mandatory collective bargaining is defined in section 8(d), which states:
"For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The Supreme Court has stated that when
Congress adopted the open-ended language of "other terms and conditions of employment," it
gave the NLRB discretion "to define those terms in light of specific industrial practices." See
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981). For a discussion of the
scope of mandatory bargaining subjects, see Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to
First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447
(1982). Section 8(d) also requires that the parties exercise good faith in bargaining. For a
discussion of good faith in the context of mandatory bargaining, see Cox, The Duty to Bargain
in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
Permissive subjects of collective bargaining are not defined statutorily. See NLRB v.
BASF Wyandotte Corp., 798 F.2d 849, 853 n.l (5th Cir. 1986). Permissive subjects fall into
two groups: Those dealing with the relationship of the employer to third parties, and those
dealing with the relationship between the union and its members. See R. GORMAN, supra note
357, at 523. The first category includes the employer's relationship with its retirees with
respect to insurance benefits. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179-82 (1971). A "ballot clause" calling for a prestrike vote by union
members falls into the second category of permissive bargaining-union member relations.
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958).
The Supreme Court has held that although the employer and the union can propose
permissive subjects, neither party may insist on its position to impasse or use economic
weapons such as strikes or lockouts to back its position. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at
181-82. Either party can implement unilateral changes on a subject of permissive bargaining
or refuse to bargain over the permissive subject without unfair labor practice sanctions under
the Act. Id.
The NLRB and the courts have interpreted "wages" under section 8(d) to include hourly
pay rates, overtime pay, incentive pay, merit pay, severance pay, group health insurance plans,
pension plans, and some forms of bonuses. See NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377 F.2d
964, 970 (8th Cir. 1967) (hourly pay rates); Tom Johnson, Inc., 378 F.2d 342, 343 (9th Cir.
1967) (overtime pay); Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (stock
purchase plans), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956); NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523,
524 (6th Cir. 1954) (profit-sharing plans); NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84, 86
(2d Cir. 1953) (incentive and merit pay); NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713, 714
(2d Cir. 1952) (bonuses); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949)
(group health insurance); Armour & Co., 280 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 1986 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
18,612 (June 24, 1986) (severance pay); Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1216 (1951)
(pension plans). "Hours" includes both hours of the day and days of the week. See
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of employment" has been construed expansively to mean any subject
that "settle[s] an aspect of the relationship ' 37' between the employer
and employees or their union representative.372 Thus, drug testing is
Amalgamated Meal Cutters, Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 727-28
(1965).
371. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 178.
372. See R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 503. The NLRB has held that work rules are
conditions of employment and are therefore mandatory subjects of bargaining. Murphy Diesel
Co., 184 N.L.R.B. 757, 765 (1970) (rules governing absenteeism are a condition of
employment and thus mandatory subjects of collective bargaining), enforced, 454 F.2d 303
(7th Cir. 1971); see also Womac Indus., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 43 (1978) (plant rules requiring
doctor's excuse for absences are a condition of employment and thus mandatory subjects of
bargaining). The Board has considered safety rules conditions of employment and therefore
mandatory subjects of bargaining. See Gulf Power Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 622, 625 (1966); see also
Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 824 (1976) (safety rules and employee discipline
rules are conditions of employment and thus mandatory subjects of bargaining). These work
rules and safety rules are considered "terms and conditions" that settle an aspect of the
employment relationship. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 182. In Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB, the Supreme Court held that the price of in-plant vending machine food was a
condition of employment, because it related to the availability of food during a worker's eight-
hour shift. 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979). The Court in Ford discussed the reasons for concluding
that food prices are a mandatory subject of bargaining:
It is not suggested by petitioner that an employee should work a full 8-hour shift
without stopping to eat. It reasonably follows that the availability of food during
working hours and the conditions under which it is to be consumed are matters
of deep concern to workers, and one need not strain to consider them to be
among those "conditions" of employment that should be subject to the mutual
duty to bargain. By the same token, where the employer has chosen, apparently
in his own interest, to make available a system of in-plant feeding facilities for his
employees, the prices at which food is offered and other aspects of this service
may reasonably be considered among those subjects about which management
and union must bargain.
Id.
In Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Court
held that third party retirees' benefits were not mandatory subjects of bargaining because they
did not "vitally affect" the employment terms and conditions of active employees. 404 U.S.
157, 182 (1971). The Court concluded that retirees were not included in the term "employees"
and were not members of the bargaining unit. Id. at 168. The Court held that the collective
bargaining obligation extends only to "terms and conditions of employment" for active
employees. Id. at 180. Moreover, the employer is not obligated to bargain over anything that
does not "vitally affect" terms and conditions of active employees' employment. Id. at 182.
Because retirees' benefits did not "vitally affect" bargaining unit employees' "terms or condi-
tions of employment," this subject did not fall within the meaning of section 8(d)'s "terms or
conditions" language, and therefore the employer was under no duty to bargain over them. Id.
Similarly, in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., the Court held that "bal-
lot clauses" and "recognition clauses" were not terms and conditions because they governed
the employee-union relationship. 356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958). In Borg-Warner, the "ballot
clause," which required the employees to vote on the employer's last offer prior to strike, dealt
only with the relationship between the employees and the union, as opposed to employer-
employee relations, which fall within the scope of mandatory bargaining. Id. To make it
subject to mandatory bargaining would allow the employer to deal directly with employees,
which would weaken the independence of the union representative, and thereby contravene the
purpose of the statute. Id. Similarly, labelling the "recognition clause," which excludes the
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a mandatory subject of bargaining if it falls within the confines of the
phrase "terms and conditions of employment."
in interpreting this phrase, the Supreme Court has held that a
management decision made for purely economic reasons does not fall
within the language of other terms and conditions of employment,
and therefore is not a mandatory subject of bargaining.373 In
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB 314 and First National
union as a party to the contract, as a mandatory subject would allow the employer to bypass
the union representative in contravention of the policy of the statute. Id. For these reasons,
the Court held that both clauses fell outside the protected language of section 8(d). Id.
Because neither the retiree's benefits in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, nor the ballot and recognition
clauses in Borg-Warner, settled an aspect of employment between the employer and the
employee, they were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at
178; Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 350.
373. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981). In First National
Maintenance, the employer supplied cleaning and maintenance services to commercial
customers. Id. at 668. One of the employer's contracts for the maintenance of a nursing home
became unprofitable. Id. at 669. The employer discontinued its services to the nursing home
and terminated those employees who serviced that contract. Id. at 668-69. The Court held
that the decision to terminate the nursing home contract was made "purely for economic
reasons," and therefore was "not part of § 8(d)'s 'terms and conditions of employment' over
which Congress has mandated bargaining." Id. at 667. The Court did hold that the employer
would be required to bargain about the effects of its decision. Id. at 681.
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, the employer operated a manufacturing
plant and employed unionized workers. 379 U.S. 203, 205 (1964). The maintenance
operations performed by unionized employees became costly. Id. at 206. In an effort to reduce
costs, the employer contracted out the maintenance operations and terminated its own
maintenance employees. Id. at 207. The Court held that the decision to contract out
maintenance operations was not made purely for economic reasons. Id. at 213. The
company's basic operation was not altered; the maintenance work still had to be performed at
the plant. Id. Therefore, the decision was within the scope of the "terms and conditions of
employment" under section 8(d) and was subject to mandatory bargaining. Id. at 215.
For an analysis of the application of Supreme Court precedent on mandatory subjects of
bargaining to drug testing of professional football players, see Lock, The Legality Under the
National Labor Relations Act of Attempts by National Football League Owners to Unilaterally
Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 28-36 (1987).
374. 379 U.S. at 203 (1964). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion influenced the Court's
decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Justice Stewart
stated that many management decisions have an indirect and uncertain effect on employee job
security. Id. at 223. He further remarked:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to
bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment
capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to
terminate employment. If, as I think clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a
limited area subject to the duty of collective bargaining, those management
decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise
or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded
from that area.
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Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,375 the Court concluded that employers
are free to make certain unilateral decisions affecting the profitability
and direction of the business, even though these decisions might affect
the employee relationship.376 The Court stressed that only certain
management decisions that turn on the profitability and direction of
the business are exempt from mandatory bargaining.3 77 The NLRB
further refined the First National Maintenance Court's reasoning in
Otis Elevator Co. 3 78 In Otis, the Board held that a managerial decision
is excluded from mandatory bargaining if it turns on a fundamental
change in the nature and direction or scope of the business-including
selling a business, restructuring, consolidating, subcontracting, or
investing in labor-saving machinery-as long as the decision does not
turn on a reduction of labor costs. 3 79
An employer who wishes to make a management decision to
implement drug testing without bargaining would have to prove that
the profitability of the business was declining as a result of drug abuse,
and that drug testing would provide a viable solution to the prob-
lem.380  Because these extreme circumstances rarely occur, 381 an
375. 452 U.S. at 666. Referring to Fibreboard, the Court divided management decisions
into three categories. Id. at 676, 677. The first category addresses management decisions
"such as choice of advertising and promotion, product type and design, and financing
arrangements . I..." Id. This first area is not subject to mandatory bargaining. The second
category of management decisions encompasses "the succession of layoffs and recalls,
production quotas, and work rules...." Id. The second category is subject to mandatory
bargaining. The final category of management decisions addresses "a change in the scope and
direction of the enterprise . I..." Id. It is in this area that "bargaining over management
decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be
required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business." Id. at 678, 679.
376. First Nat7 Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 676-79 (citing Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 223).
377. Id. at 666-79.
378. 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 895-900 (1984). In Otis, the employer relocated the elevator
operations of the company without bargaining with the union. Id. at 892.
379. Id. The Board also outlined other factors: speed, flexibility, and the need for
confidentiality. Id.; see also Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. No. 32,
1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,899 (July 31, 1987) (subcontracting work in an effort to reduce
labor costs is subject to the duty to bargain); Century Air Freight, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 85,
1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,933 (June 30, 1987) (same); DeSoto, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. No.
114, 1986 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17,793 (Feb. 28, 1986) (plant relocation that does not turn on
an effort to reduce labor costs is not subject to the duty to bargain); Garwood-Detroit Truck
Equip., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 113, 114 (1985) (employer's decision to contract out work
previously performed by union employees was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because
it did not turn on labor costs but rather on a change in the nature and direction of the
business); Mack Trucks, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 711 (1985) (same); GHR Foundry Div. of Dayton
Malleable, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 707 (1985) (same); Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 339
(1985) (same).
380. Cf Otis, 269 N.L.R.B. at 892. If the employer believed that a drug problem was
causing a decrease in the community's confidence, and hence a decrease in clients and profits,
an employer might be justified in unilaterally implementing a drug-testing program. The
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employer will ordinarily be unable to justify unilateral implementa-
tion of drug testing as a management decision made to change the
nature and direction of the business, and would therefore be obligated
to bargain with the union before implementation.382
A. Drug Testing as a Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining
In classifying drug testing as a mandatory subject of bargaining,
the general counsel has reasonably concluded that drug testing is a
"condition of employment" protected under section 8(d) of the
Act. 383 Drug testing furthers work rules against drug use as a means
of enforcing compliance with these rules.3 84 Employees who test
positive for drug use and those who refuse to submit to testing are
subject to suspension, 385 discharge386 or other discipline, transfer, or
general counsel indicates, however, that an employer's implementation of a drug-testing
program unilaterally, is not the type of management decision embodied in First National
Maintenance. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-3 (Sept. 24, 1987); cf First Nat'l
Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677; Wayne State Univ., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 953 (1986) (Lipson,
Arb.) (upholding discharge of an employee drug abuser because of the adverse impact to the
university and its programs); Martin-Marietta Aerospace, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 695 (1983)
(Aronin, Arb.) (upholding employee discharge because of the damage to employer's
reputation, production, and employer's ability to discipline his employees).
381. But see Medicenter Mid-south Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 670 (1975). With regard to
whether polygraph testing was a mandatory subject of bargaining, Chairman Murphy of the
NLRB stated, "[T]he widespread sabotage and vandalism of the hospital facilities that were
occurring daily created an emergency situation excusing or justifying such unilateral action as
a temporary measure to try and bring that situation under control." Id. at 670 n.2 (Chairman
Murphy, adopting the administrative law judge's dismissal of the complaint).
382. See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677. The employer's action would be subject
to a two-step analysis. First, the employer must have made the decision for economic reasons
and second, the burden on the employer must outweigh the benefit to labor relations. Id. at
678, 679. The employer's unilateral implementation of drug testing would fail at the first level
of analysis. Id.; see Medicenter Mid-south Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 670, 670 (1975), Wayne State
Univ., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 953, 957 (1986) (Lipson, Arb.); Martin-Marietta Aerospace, 81
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 695, 698-99 (1983) (Aronin, Arb.).
383. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-1 (Sept. 24, 1987).
384. Cf Murphy Diesel Co., 184 N.L.R.B. 757, 763 (1970), enforced, 454 F.2d 303 (7th
Cir. 1971). The memorandum states that drug testing goes beyond a rule and becomes a
means of enforcing a rule. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-2 (Sept. 24, 1987).
Enforcement of workplace rules are conditions of employment. Murphy Diesel, 184 N.L.R.B.
at 763.
385. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1145, 1148 (1986) (Cohen, Arb.)
(reducing discharge to suspension for refusal to submit to a drug test); Union Oil of Calif., 87
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297, 298 (1985) (Boner, Arb.) (upholding suspension of employee for
positive test result); see also Vaughan v. Shop & Go, Inc., No. 4-86-2148, slip op. at I (Fla. 4th
DCA Nov. 25, 1987) (employee's refusal to submit to a polygraph test resulted in termination
without unemployment compensation expenses).
386. Roadway Express, Inc., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 224, 231 (1986) (Cooper, Arb.)
(upholding discharge of employee based on positive urinalysis result); Concrete Pipes Prods.
Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 601, 606 (1986) (Caraway, Arb.) (upholding employee discharge for
refusing to sign form evidencing receipt of drug-testing policy).
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rehabilitation. These consequences affect employment security,3"7
which is a "condition of employment" protected under section 8(d) of
the NLRA.388 Under this reasoning, even drug testing of applicants is
a condition of employment, because it is a prerequisite of employ-
ment 389 and affects active employees by altering the makeup of the
bargaining unit.390  This in turn affects the union's representative
duties toward its current members, which is also a subject of
mandatory bargaining.3 91
The general counsel's conclusion that drug testing of applicants
for employment may be a condition of employment, 392 subject to
mandatory bargaining, may create tension in the bargaining unit
between active employees and applicants for employment. Drug test-
ing of applicants for employment can be contrasted with the retirees'
benefits at issue in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v.
387. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
388. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
389. See Houston Chapter, Associated Gen'l Contractors of Am. 143 N.L.R.B. 409, 411-13
(1963), enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966).
390. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157,
171-73 (1971).
391. Id.
392. With respect to applicants for employment, the general counsel has stated:
The issue of whether drug testing of applicants for employment is also a
mandatory subject of bargaining is more difficult. However, since the issue is an
important one and since reasonable argument can be made that the subject is
mandatory, I have authorized complaints on this issue in order to place the
question before the Board. Arguably, a pre-hire drug test not only establishes a
condition precedent to employment for job applicants, it also settles a term and
condition of employment of current employees by vitally affecting their working
environment.
Regarding the first point, the Board has held that conditions of becoming
employed can constitute a mandatory subject. With court affirmance, the Board
held that both the agreement to use, and the internal operation of, a hiring hall
are mandatory subjects of bargaining... Most significantly, the Board's 1984
decision in Lockheed Shipbuilding, [273 N.L.R.B. 171 (1984)], specifically dealt
with the applicant issue and held that an employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act by unilaterally implementing new medical screening tests "for the purpose of
denying employment to new employees."
As to the second point, the Board has held that information regarding the
race and sex of applicants is presumptively relevant to a union's performance of
its representative duties toward current employees, because " 'an employer's
hiring practices inherently affect terms and conditions of employment.' " . . .
[J]ust as existing unit employees have a legitimate interest in working in a
racially and sexually integrated workplace, so too do they have a legitimate
interest in the issue of whether steps should be taken to screen out drug users
from employment, and what those steps should be.
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-1, D-2 (Sept. 24, 1987) (quoting White Farm Equip-
ment Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 1373, 1375 (1979)).
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Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.393 In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Supreme
Court held that third party retirees' benefits were not mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining because they did not "vitally affect" the employ-
ment terms and conditions of active employees. 394 The Court further
held that the collective bargaining obligation extends only to "terms
and conditions of employment" for active employees.3 95 Drug test-
ing of applicants for employment, however, may be a mandatory sub-
ject of collective bargaining, because it affects conditions of
employment of active employees by altering the makeup of the bar-
gaining unit. The Court's reasoning in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, when
applied to the general counsel's conclusion that drug-testing may be a
mandatory subject of bargaining for applicants for employment,
reveals a potential conflict of interest between active employees and
applicants for employment. The bargaining representative of active
employees may agree to drug testing of applicants in order to reach
agreement on a drug-testing program that is favorable to active
employees. 396 This tradeoff may be a product of inadequate represen-
tation of applicants for employment with respect to drug testing.
Of course, the collective bargaining process inherently creates
tension between active employees and applicants for employment.
Yet unions routinely bargain over subjects such as wages that may
create tension between these two groups. Similarly, the union would
be motivated to bargain over drug testing, because an employer's
action with respect to drug testing, unlike wages, is one step removed
from the bargaining unit. For example, applicants for employment
have already been admitted to the bargaining unit when the issue of
wages arises; the issue is merely one of wage rates of new members
versus wage rates of senior members. An employer's action in these
circumstances would not encroach on the union's position as the bar-
gaining representative of new members any more than it does for
senior members. An employer's action with respect to drug testing,
however, may constitute more of an encroachment on the union's rep-
resentative position, because drug testing occurs before applicants are
admitted to the union. This encroachment may be an attempt by the
employer to circumvent or undermine the union's representative
power.39 7 Moreover, as the general counsel's memorandum indi-
393. 404 U.S. at 176; see supra note 370.
394. 404 U.S. at 182.
395. Id. at 180, 182.
396. Cf Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 180; National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988) (upholding drug
testing of active employees but not addressing the issue as to applicants).
397. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-3 (Sept. 24, 1987); cf NLRB v. Wooster
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cates, adding a drug-testing requirement to an existing medical exam
constitutes a substantial change in the purpose of that examination,398
because the goal of the medical exam is to measure employee fitness,
whereas the goal of drug testing is to discover illicit drug use.3 99
B. Bargaining over Drug Testing
The rights and duties implicated by categorizing drug testing as a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining1 O arise in two situations:
During negotiations between the employer and the union over the
terms of a new labor contract, and during the term of an existing
agreement.4o
1. BARGAINING DURING THE NEGOTIATION
OF A NEW AGREEMENT
During contract negotiations, and after a contract has expired,
both parties are under an obligation to bargain in good faith over the
implementation of a drug-testing program.4 °2 The parties cannot
refuse to bargain over40 3 and the employer cannot unilaterally imple-
ment4 °4 a drug-testing program without risking unfair labor practice
claims under the Act. 4 5 Both parties may bargain to impasse and
back their positions on drug testing with a strike or lockout,
however." 6
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (Ballot clauses and recognition clauses, if
defined as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, would circumvent the union's
representative power.).
398. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-2 (Sept. 24, 1987).
399. Id. A drug test can only discover the presence of illicit drugs and cannot measure
intoxication. Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 & n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232, at A-I, A-2 (Dec. 4, 1987) (reporting that the Seventh Circuit, in a
dispute between an employer and a union under the Railway Labor Act, stated that "the
addition of a drug screen as a second component of the urinalysis [in physical exams]
previously required of all employees does not constitute such a drastic change in the
employees' routine medical examinations ....").
400. See infra notes 402-06 and accompanying text.
401. See R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 399-417, 455-66.
402. See supra note 370.
403. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1985); see also Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1216
(1951) (refusal to bargain over a mandatory subject violates the National Labor Relations'
Act), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
404. "A unilateral change as to a subject within this [mandatory] category violates the
statutory duty to bargain .... First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-75
(1971) (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962)).
405. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982).
406. See T. COLOSI, supra note 375, at 120.
It must be noted that often one party believes that negotiations have reached
impasse while the other party may not. As section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act
states, the obligation to bargain in good faith "does not compel either party to
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To fulfill the duty to bargain in good faith over drug testing, an
employer must disclose any information that the union has shown is
pertinent to its statutory power to represent employees on drug test-
ing as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Full disclosure
of pertinent data aids both parties in reaching agreement at the nego-
tiation stage.4 °7 Initially, the union may seek information as to the
employer's justification for instituting drug testing.4 °" The employer
may believe that drug testing will reverse a decline in productivity or
safety that he surmises is caused by illicit drug use." 9 The union's
second threshold concern is whether the consequences of drug testing
will be rehabilitative or punitive in nature. 410  The employer must
disclose what sanctions, if any, will apply after a positive screening
result, a confirmatory positive test result, or a refusal to test.41' The
employer must also disclose technical details such as the type of drug
tests it plans to use,4 12 the reliability of each test,413 and the quality
control procedures of the testing laboratory.414 A union can also
obtain information on a model program implemented by another
unionized company to use as an aid to setting procedures 4 5 and test
cutoff levels for specific drugs.4 16
The duty to disclose drug-testing information limits the
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Thus hard
bargaining-taking and strongly adhering to one position-may not be acting in
bad faith or creating an impasse per se.
Id.; see R. Gorman, supra note 357, at 498.
407. Id. In a recent survey, only 17.4 percent of unionized companies responding had
developed their drug-testing programs through collective bargaining. The employer's duty to
disclose key information to the union facilitates the use of the collective bargaining process in
the development of drug-testing programs. EXECUTIVE KNOWLEDGEWORKS, DRUG'
TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 150 (1987).
408. Id.
409. See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
410. A union would be more likely to support the implementation of a drug-testing
program that was rehabilitative in nature rather than punitive. See EXECUTIVE
KNOWLEDGEWORKS, supra note 407, at 148; see also Hanson, supra note 22, at 14
(questioning whether drug testing actually measures on-the-job impairment).
411. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1145, 1148 (1986) (Cohen, Arb.); Union
Oil of Calif., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 297, 298 (1985) (Boner, Arb.).
412. For a comparative analysis of drug tests and their reliability, see supra notes 41-79 and
accompanying text.
413. Id.
414. For a discussion of laboratory quality control procedures, see supra notes 41-65 and
accompanying text.
415. See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 409-15. The duty to disclose also exists
during the term of an agreement. Any unreasonable delay by the employer in disclosing
information constitutes a breach of the duty to bargain. Id.
416. For a discussion of cutoff levels and how they may reflect an employer's subjective
decision on the amount of drug use that will be tolerated in the workplace, see supra notes 42-
64 and accompanying text.
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employer's ability to implement a drug-testing program unilaterally
after impasse.41 7  For example, the employer may present a drug-
testing program with a ten-point agenda to the union. In response,
the union may request information on drug testing because it is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. After the employer complies,4"' the
parties may ultimately bargain to impasse. By requesting and receiv-
ing information on the various points of the employer's proposal, the
union has limited the employer to the confines of the proposed plan
should the negotiations reach impasse. Under these circumstances,
impasse does not provide an opportunity for the employer to alter the
terms of the proposed plan.419 If the employer's plan is complete
enough to implement,42 ° however, then unilateral implementation
after impasse is authorized.42 '
The union has the power to use economic tactics, both during
negotiations and after impasse, and can strike to support its bargain-
ing position over drug testing.422 The employer cannot discharge
employees for engaging in these activities, because section 7 protects
employees from such action.423 It can retaliate, however, by perma-
nently replacing employees.4 24 Alternatively, union employees can
engage in peaceful, concerted, unprotected activity such as refusing to
submit to drug testing, but the employer can respond by discharging
417. See supra note 405; see also R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 445-50.
418. See R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 409-15.
419. Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64 (1964). An employer's unilateral grant of a
wage increase may give it an advantage during bargaining, and because this increase cannot be
implemented until after impasse, an employer may attempt to precipitate an impasse. This
contrived impasse would be an unfair labor practice. In the drug-testing context, however, it is
unlikely that the employer would gain any advantage from its unilateral implementation. See
Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir.
1963), cert. denied sub nor. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NLRB, 375 U.S. 984 (1964).
420. For example, if the proposed plan did not include safeguards for chain-of-custody
errors, or a confirmatory test after initial screening, it would most likely be incomplete. Cf
Mandatory Guidelines on Federal Drug Testing Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 70, at
E-1 (Apr. 12, 1988).
421. Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. at 64.
422. See R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 431, 432.
423. Section 7 of the Act states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982); see R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 296-97.
424. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); Emerson Elec.
Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No.102 (Jan. 18, 1988) LEXIS, Labor library, NLRB file).
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or otherwise disciplining the participating employees without fear of
an unfair labor practice claim.425 As a practical matter, a union strike
during negotiations would likely be an arbitrable grievance that a
court could enjoin.4 26 Because the union faces the possibility of an
injunction, it will most likely negotiate rather than strike over drug
testing.
2. BARGAINING DURING THE TERM OF AN EXISTING AGREEMENT
Because drug testing is not yet a part of most collective bargain-
ing agreements,427 it will most likely surface as an issue during the
term of an existing contract when an employer attempts to implement
a drug-testing program unilaterally. Section 8(d) 428 of the NLRA
sets out three rules that govern the parties' bargaining duties during
the contract term.429 First, neither party has a duty to bargain over
the proposed modification of any term "contained in" the contract.
430
Therefore, midterm modification of any term contained in the con-
tract can only occur with the other party's consent.43' Second, even
if the term is not contained in the contract, if it is a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining, then the bargaining obligations that governed
during the negotiation stage continue to govern during the contract
term.4 3 2 Third, a party wishing to terminate or modify the contract
must give timely notice to the other party and to federal and state
mediation agencies, and must refrain from unilateral or economic
action such as strikes or lockouts for a specified time.433
425. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 492-95 (1960). The termination
of employees over these unprotected activities with respect to drug testing may not be valid
once it is addressed in grievance arbitration. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 231, at A-1
(Dec. 3, 1987) (questioning the validity of a drug-testing program and reinstating seven
employees who had been terminated after a positive urinalysis result, pending negotiations
over the program between the union and the employer).
426. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1970). In
Boys Markets, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the anti-injunction rule of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982). The Boys Markets Court ruled that a
court could grant an injunction to an employer seeking to enforce the union's contractual
obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than strike over them. Id. at 249-54.
427. Most collective bargaining agreements have rules prohibiting illicit drug use. S.D.
Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers' Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir.
1987) (dicta), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 497 (1987). For a sample drug and alcohol policy, see
Cathcart, Alcohol and Drug Use and AIDS in the Workplace. A Review of Current Issues, in
RESOURCE MATERIALS: LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 659, 682 app. A. (1986).
428. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).







An employer's unilateral midterm implementation of a drug-
testing program triggers the same bargaining obligations that apply to
the parties during the negotiation stage.4 34  Because drug testing is
not "contained in" the agreement at this time, the employer does not
need to obtain the consent of the union before implementing a drug-
testing program,435 but it must bargain to impasse before implement-
ing any changes.436 If the parties reach impasse437 in good faith, the
employer has an advantage because it can unilaterally impose its pro-
posed drug-testing program.438 Contriving or precipitating impasse is
an unfair labor practice under section 8(d), however, because it con-
stitutes a refusal to bargain.439 Similarly, the employer's refusal to
disclose drug-testing information before impasse would constitute a
failure to bargain in good faith by preventing full exploration of the
issue. If the employer contrives or precipitates impasse and then
unilaterally implements a drug-testing program, the union may file an
unfair labor practice claim with the general counsel"' and invoke its
own grievance arbitration procedures. The Board will typically defer
the unfair labor practice claim to the arbitrator, 41 however, as in dis-
putes hinging on contract interpretation.4 2 Although the union can
strike after the employer unilaterally initiates a drug-testing program
after bargaining to impasse, it is unlikely to do so. If the contract
provides for mandatory grievance procedures for dispute resolution,
and the unilateral implementation is an arbitrable grievance, then a
court may enjoin the strike pending arbitration. 4 3  Moreover, if an
unfair labor practice claim over drug testing arises, and it is cogniza-
ble under the grievance provision of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the NLRB may defer the claim to arbitration. 4 4
434. See supra notes 400-26 and accompanying text.
435. See supra note 429.
436. International Woodworkers of Am., Local 3-10 v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 628, 629 (D.C.
Cir. 1967). The employer may not make changes after impasse if drug testing is "contained
in" the contract. See R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 464-65.
437. For the factors used to determine impasse, see Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B.
475, 478 (1967), petition for review denied sub nom. American Fed'n of Television & Radio
Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
438. Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64-65 (1964).
439. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
440. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982).
441. See supra notes 367, 514-24 and accompanying text.
442. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1985); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837
(1971).
443. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249-54 (1970).
444. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-3 (Sept. 24, 1987). The memorandum
suggests that the regional offices need not defer to arbitration in contract interpretation cases
or in unfair labor practice cases if deferral would undermine a union's position as bargaining
representative, is "unlawfully motivated" or applied, or if drug testing is "highly invasive." Id.
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When a dispute arises over an issue that is not contained in the
agreement, an employer may take economically motivated action
without obtaining the union's consent.445 In Milwaukee Spring Divi-
sion of Illinois Coil Spring,"6 the employer relocated the assembly line
portion of its operation to a nonunion plant." 7 The contract did not
contain language preserving the right of the bargaining unit to work
at the union facility, and the parties stipulated that the relocation was
economically motivated.448 Even though the relocation decision was
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the Board held that
because the contract did not embody terms on work preservation, the
employer could relocate its operations without obtaining the union's
consent.4 9 This reasoning would most likely not aid an employer in
the unilateral implementation of a drug-testing program, because it
could not base its decision on economic factors, even though drug
testing was absent from the contract.45 °
3. TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT; MODIFICATION OF THE
AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE DRUG TESTING
Unilateral midterm implementation of a drug-testing program in
effect modifies the contract and thus triggers the notification require-
ments under section 8(d).45' An employer who wishes to modify an
existing contract to include drug testing must notify the union sixty
days before implementing a drug-testing program, or sixty days before
the contract expires.452 This cooling off period gives the employer
and the union time to resolve the drug-testing issue peacefully
through bargaining, and obviates the need to resort to economic tac-
tics or unilateral changes.4
53
The employer must bargain with the union over drug testing
even if the collective bargaining agreement has expired.454 The
agreement marks the status quo at the date of expiration. If the sta-
tus quo did not include a drug-testing program, the employer must
445. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring, 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee Spring
II), affid sub noin. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
446. Id. This decision reversed the Board's decision in Milwaukee Spring Division of
Illinois Coil Spring, 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee Spring 1).
447. Milwaukee Spring, 268 N.L.R.B. at 601.
448. Id. at 602.
449. The employer did propose a plan for relocation which the union rejected. The Board
concluded that this proposal satisfied the employer's bargaining obligation. Id. at 601.
450. See supra note 382.
451. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. NLRB v. Southwest Sec. Equip. Corp., 736 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985).
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wait to implement drug testing until the parties negotiate a new agree-
ment that contains provisions on drug testing, or reach a good faith
impasse over the issue.455 Similarly, the employer must arbitrate
grievances that arise under the collective bargaining agreement even
after the contract expires.456 The employer's unilateral implementa-
tion of a drug-testing program is subject to grievance arbitration after
the term of the contract has ended.
C. Waiver of a Statutory Right
The parties can forego bargaining over mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining by waiving their right to bargain.457 The
courts45 and the NLRB459 have found that during the collective bar-
gaining process, a union may relinquish its right to bargain over cer-
tain mandatory subjects during the term of the agreement in exchange
for benefits from the employer.4 60 Waiver of a statutory right will not
be "lightly inferred," however, but will be found only if made in
"clear and unmistakable" terms.461
Unions commonly bargain away the statutory right to strike by
accepting a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement in
exchange for other rights.4 62 Waiver of a statutory right can occur by
455. NLRB v. Carilli, 648 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Peerless Roofing Co. v.
NLRB, 641 F.2d 734, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1981)).
456. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 1987 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 18,748
(May 29, 1987).
457. Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953, 956 (1958).
458. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 707 (1983); International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers Local 1466 v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 150, 155-56 (D.C. Cir. 1986); American Freight
Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v.
NLRB, 687 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Marine Optical, Inc., 671 F.2d 11, 16 (1st
Cir. 1982); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
459. Beacon, 121 N.L.R.B. at 956; Press Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 976, 977-78 (1958).
460. See R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 466-80.
461. See Beacon, 121 N.L.R.B. at 956.
462. See Metropolitan Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 705; NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956); NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 343 (1939). Although strikes are protected economic activity
under the Act, the employer can discipline an employee for engaging in strike activity as a
breach of contract. See Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. at 343-44. In Sands, the union's refusal to
work under the terms of the contract constituted a breach of contract and justified the
employer in discharging unionized employees. The Court held that the terms of the contract
were valid and the employees' discharge was not an unfair labor practice. Id. at 344. The
Court has also held, however, that a union cannot waive rights that would impair the selection
of the employees' bargaining representatives. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 705-06. A
waiver of the employees' choice of bargaining representative would seriously dilute section 7
rights. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974) (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956)).
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express language in a collective bargaining agreement or by conduct
of the parties.46 3 Waiver by express language, or waiver by contract,
occurs when the union adopts language in the contract that clearly
and explicitly waives the union's right to bargain over a specific sub-
ject.46 4 The Supreme Court explained the clear and unmistakable
waiver standard in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB.465 In Metropol-
itan Edison, the Court considered whether the employer was justified
in imposing harsher penalties on a union official than on rank and file
members for participating in an unlawful strike.46 6 The question
turned on whether the union official had a duty to attempt to prevent
strikes.467 The Court held that the no-strike clause in the collective
bargaining agreement did not impose an explicit contractual duty on
the union official to attempt to enforce its terms, but merely required
that he refrain from participating in a strike.468 The court found no
evidence that the union had clearly and unmistakably waived the offi-
cial's statutory rights under the Act, and thus found that the harsher
penalties constituted an unfair labor practice.469
1. WAIVER BY CONTRACT
Before drug testing is incorporated into the contract, the only
way that the employer can bring drug testing within the "contained
in" language of the agreement is to assert that the union clearly and
unmistakably waived its right to bargain over drug testing. ° The
most common methods of union waiver occur through zipper
clauses4 7 and management rights clauses472 in the contract. Ordina-
rily, the zipper clause brings drug testing into the "contained in"
terms of the contract and closes out bargaining over drug testing, but
only during the term of the contract.473 It does not authorize the
employer to implement drug testing unilaterally.474 Similarly, a
management rights clause may authorize the employer to implement
463. See Chesapeake & Potomac, 687 F.2d at 636.
464. Id.; see Beacon, 121 N.L.R.B. at 956.
465. 460 U.S. 693, 709 (1983).
466. Id. at 697.
467. Id. at 700.
468. Id. at 708-10.
469. Id. at 709-10.
470. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 693.
471. "A zipper or integration clause purports to close out bargaining during the contract
term and to make the written contract the exclusive statement of the parties' rights and
obligations." R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 471.
472. A management rights clause authorizes the employer to take unilateral action over
specific subjects without bargaining with the union. Id. at 469.
473. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
474. See R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 463-64.
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drug testing without bargaining with the union.4" 5 The general coun-
sel avoids this differing result, however, by stating that waivers
through zipper clauses and management rights clauses must specifi-
cally address the issue of drug testing in order to be effective.476 To be
effective as a waiver, a zipper or management rights clause must recite
in clear and unmistakable terms the union's intent to waive the
employees' statutory rights or to relinquish privileges to management.
For example, in New York Mirror,4"' the NLRB found that a union
that had accepted a zipper clause waiving the union's right to bargain
over subjects outside the contract had not waived the union's right to
receive notice and negotiate to impasse the employer's decision to
shut down and sell the assets of the business.478 Similarly, in NLRB
v. C & C Plywood Corp.,47 9 the Supreme Court held that a union that
had accepted a management rights clause that expressly reserved to
the employer the power to pay higher rates for specialized employees
had not waived its right to bargain over the employer's unilateral
change in wages for an entire job classification.48 ° Nor does a man-
agement rights clause authorize unilateral employer action unless it
identifies the specific subject of unilateral employer action. As such,
the NLRB has found that a broad management rights clause that gave
an employer the right to change wage rates did not authorize an
employer to set unilateral wage rates for new job positions.48'
The requirement of a specific waiver of a statutory right through
zipper clauses and management rights clauses conflicts with the posi-
tion of the courts and the Board, which is that general waivers by
zipper clauses and management rights clauses are sufficient to waive
the right to bargain. 482 The general counsel will not infer a union
waiver from generally worded483 management rights clauses,484 zipper
475. See supra note 472.
476. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-2 (Sept. 24, 1987).
477. 151 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
478. Id. at 840.
479. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 431 (1967).
480. Id. at 430-31.
481. LeRoy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1431 (1964).
482. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a general waiver
through a management rights clause was sufficient to waive the union's right to bargain over
the employer's plant relocation); LeRoy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. at 1432 (finding that a
management rights clause authorizing the employer to. determine "qualifications" for
employment gave management the right to initiate physical exams for employees with records
of absenteeism).
483. See supra note 476 and accompanying text.
484. See Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals Div., 264 N.L.R.B. 1013, 1017 (1982) (management
rights clause was not sufficient to waive the union's right to bargain over an employer's
unilateral change in absentee policy).
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clauses,4 85 or from contract silence on the subject.4 86 The D.C. Cir-
cuit, in UAW v. NLRB,487 held that a management rights clause con-
stituted a general waiver of the duty to bargain and was sufficient to
bring the subject of plant relocation into the "contained in" language
of the contract.488  The management rights clause precluded the
union from bargaining over the plant's relocation.489 In LeRoy
Machine Co.,4 90 the NLRB held that a generally worded management
rights clause,491 which authorized the employer to determine qualifi-
cations for employment, gave the employer the right to conduct phys-
ical exams for employees with records of absenteeism.4 92
Because the courts and the Board have previously construed gen-
eral waivers as "clear and unmistakable" waivers of the union's right
to bargain and grounds for unilateral employer action, the extent of
requisite specificity of waiver in the drug-testing context is unclear.
Drug testing encompasses a multitude of issues including the justifica-
tion493 and purpose of testing,494 the type of test,4 95 the reliability of
the tests and laboratory, 496 and test cutoff levels. 497 Thus, inclusion of
the term "drug testing" in a zipper clause or management rights
clause without reference to these details may not be sufficiently spe-
cific to constitute a waiver of the union's right to bargain over unilat-
eral employer implementation on particular drug-testing issues. For
example, if a mere mention of "drug testing" in a management rights
clause operated as a blanket waiver, the employer could unilaterally
determine many issues within the program such as the cutoff levels for
the test. Cutoff levels have a direct correlation to the results of an
initial screening in terms of a positive or negative test result. If the
485. See Suffolk Child Dev. Center, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 1345, 1350-51 (1985).
486. Elizabethtown Water Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 318, 320 (1978) (Silence in the contract on
the negotiation of a retirement plan, which expired midterm, did not waive the union's right to
bargain over this subject.). The Board decision in Milwaukee Spring H, however, indicates that
an employer can circumvent the requirement of union consent if the contract does not contain
terms on the issue in question, and the bargaining requirements are met. 268 N.L.R.B. 601
(1984), aff'd sub nor. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985). If this interpretation of
Milwaukee Spring H is correct, the absence of a term on a disputed issue functions as a quasi-
waiver by the union. Id. at 602.
487. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
488. Id. at 184.
489. Id. at 181-83.
490. Leroy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
491. Id.
492. Id. at 1432.
493. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
494. See supra note 410 and accompanying text.
495. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 412-14 and accompanying text.
497. See supra note 416.
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cutoff level is too low, the employee risks a false positive test
result.498 Without bargaining over this specific aspect, the union
runs the risk that a member who tests positive may be disciplined or
rehabilitated on the basis of a false positive test result. The specific
waiver requirement may prevent indirect relinquishment of the
union's statutory right to bargain and thus promote discussion of the
numerous and often technical issues of drug testing. Waiver by con-
tract will most likely surface as an issue after the parties integrate
drug testing into their collective agreement.4 99
2. WAIVER BY CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES
The second category of waiver, conduct of the parties, includes
the parties' past practices, bargaining history, and action or inac-
tion."° A waiver based on past practices must clearly encompass the
program at issue. 0 1 Thus, the Board has found that a union that had
previously acquiesced to numerous employer changes regarding work
rules had waived its right to bargain over changes in the tardiness
policy. 0 2 In contrast, the NLRB held that a union had not waived its
right to bargain over the implementation of an employee purchase
plan even though the union had acquiesced to previous employer
changes in the program, because the new plan was not discussed at
the bargaining table." 3 Union inaction has operated as a waiver of
the right to bargain over an employer's decision to relocate to a more
modern facility, because the union knew about the plans to relocate
but failed to request bargaining.1°4 A union's waiver by conduct over
drug testing is likely to arise as an issue during the term of an existing
agreement. The union may receive notice of bargaining, then bargain
to impasse.50 5 The employer will then unilaterally implement its pro-
posed plan after impasse. In light of the Board's policy requiring spe-
cific waivers, it is unlikely that the Board or an arbitrator would find
union conduct other than an express waiver, specific enough to consti-
498. Id.
499. See supra note 431.
500. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1982).
501. See Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953, 957 (1958).
502. Continental Tel. Co. of Calif., 274 N.L.R.B. 1452, 1453 (1985). The contract also
contained a management rights ciause indicating that the parties had agreed that management
had the unilateral right to revise work rules such as the attendance policy. Id.
503. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 1986 NLRB Dec.. (CCH)
18,499 (Jan. 5, 1986).
504. Inland Steel Container Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 929, 938 (1985), review denied sub nom.
Local 2179, United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 822 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1987).
505. The notice must be given sufficiently in advance of implementation of a drug-testing
program to allow the union a reasonable opportunity to bargain over the issue. Ciba-Geigy
Pharmaceuticals Div., 264 N.L.R.B. 1013, 1017 (1982).
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tute a waiver on the issue of drug testing.50 6
The past practice waiver directive also requires that drug testing
be specifically addressed prior to waiver. 57  Because the subject of
drug testing is virtually absent at the negotiation stage, an employer
cannot rely on the union's acquiescence to drug testing and unilater-
ally initiate a drug-testing program. 5°8  The Board has held that a
union acquiesced to an employer's unilateral changes to a work rule
by failing to question the employer's actions.50 9 But the mere fact
that the contract does not mention drug testing does not operate as a
waiver by past practice.510 Prior submission to a physical exam that
did not include drug testing, or acceptance of rules that prohibit drug
use does not work a waiver of the union's right to bargain over drug
testing. Acquiescence that does not go specifically to the issue of drug
testing511 cannot justify amending existing rules or practices without
bargaining. 12 Similarly, assent to drug testing "for cause" does not
waive the union's right to bargain over random or mass drug test-
ing.5' 1 3 In essence, the general counsel's limitations mean that no
waiver will be found unless the union clearly and unmistakably
intended to consent to the employer's unilateral implementation of
drug testing during the term of the contract.
D. Board Deferral Policy of Contract Disputes and Unfair Labor
Practice Claims
Determining whether drug testing is "contained in" the agree-
ment depends upon interpreting the contract to assess the specificity
of the zipper or management rights clause. The NLRB routinely
defers issues of contract interpretation to the parties' grievance proce-
dure or arbitration.5 4  The Board's position is that because of the
frequency of disputes, the contractual nature of the agreement, and
506. See supra notes 493-99 and accompanying text.
507. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-2 (Sept. 24, 1987).
508. Murphy Diesel Co., 184 N.L.R.B. 757, 763 (1970) (holding that unilateral changes of
shop tardiness rules that were not discussed at the bargaining table did not constitute a waiver
by the union even though the union had acquiesced in these changes), enforced, 454 F.2d 303
(7th Cir. 1971).
509. Continental Tel., 274 N.L.R.B. at 1453.
510. Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals Div., 264 N.L.R.B. 1013, 1016 (1982) (holding that
silence in the contract over absenteeism does not authorize the employer, through the
management rights clause, to set absenteeism policy unilaterally without bargaining with the
union).
511. See Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953, 959-60 (1958).
512. Id. (holding that a waiver must encompass the program at issue).
513. See supra note 360.
514. In re Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 706 (1943), enforced, 141 F.2d
785 (9th Cir. 1944).
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the varying context of the agreement,515 the parties themselves are
best situated to give meaning to their collective bargaining
agreement. 516
In case of a dispute, the general counsel's memorandum directs
the Board to defer to arbitration as outlined in Collyer Insulated
Wire.517 In Collyer, the union alleged that the employer unilaterally
changed wages and working conditions in violation of section 8(a)(5)
of the Act.518 After the union rejected a proposed wage increase, the
employer increased wages twenty cents an hour.519 The contract
empowered the employer to adjust wages and provided that grievance
arbitration machinery was "the exclusive forum for resolving contract
disputes. ' 520 Because contract interpretation was at the center of the
dispute, the Board deferred the dispute to arbitration. 2 ' It empha-
sized the "special skill and experience ' '15 2 of arbitrators that made
them more adept and efficient than the Board in deciding grievances
under collective bargaining agreements.523 Under the Collyer defer-
515. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840-43 (1971).
516. The Board, in addressing the widespread acceptance of arbitration, stated: "The
reason for its success is the underlying conviction that the parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement are in the best position to resolve, with the help of a neutral third party if necessary,
disputes concerning the correct interpretation of their contract." United Technologies Corp.,
268 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1984). In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), the Supreme Court expressed its support for deferral to
arbitration:
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of
private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solution
in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the
parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a
vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining
agreement.
Id. at 581.
517. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842-43 (1971).
518. Id. at 837.
519. Id. at 838.
520. Id. at 839.
521. Id. at 842.
522. "In our view, disputes such as these tan be better resolved by arbitrators with special
skill and experience in deciding matters arising under established bargaining relationships than
by the application by this Board of a particular provision of our statute." Id. at 839.
523. Id. Under labor policy, private grievance arbitration is preferable to involvement of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). Section 173(d)
states in full:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The Service is
directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available in the
settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional
circumstances.
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982); see also Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S.
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:553
ral standard, arbitrators may address unfair labor practice claims in
addition to contract interpretation issues.5 24 This deferral policy has
the effect of channeling contract issues and unfair labor practice
claims into arbitration, in effect limiting Board review of drug testing.
E. Comment
The general counsel's conclusion that drug testing is a
mandatory subject of bargaining significantly changes the bargaining
relationship between the employer and the union by giving the union
a voice in bargaining with the employer over drug testing. The
mutual duty to bargain inherent within mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining compels the employer and the union to consider and settle on
the particulars of a drug-testing program before implementation.5 25
A refusal to bargain over drug testing by either party violates the duty
397 (1976) (The method agreed upon by the parties is the preferred method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment.). Courts have expressed this same preference for private grievance resolution on ques-
tions of contract interpretation when faced with union petitions for injunctive relief from
railroad drug-testing programs. See Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge
16 v. Burlington N. R.R., 802 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1986); Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 659 F. Supp. 325, 330 (N.D. Il.), aff'd, 833 F.2d 700 (7th Cir.
1987). In Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way, 802 F.2d at 1017; Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 659 F. Supp. at 330, the courts denied injunctive relief, stating that the dispute over drug
testing was a minor dispute and cognizable under the collective bargaining agreement. The
union's petition for the maintenance of status quo with no drug testing was referred to the
National Railway Adjustment Board, because the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over minor
disputes. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that railroad drug-testing programs are
not minor but major disputes. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Burlington N. R.R.,
838 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988) (the use of sniffing dogs to detect the presence of illicit drugs was
not cognizable under the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore a major dispute). The
Burlington Northern court also found that mandatory urinalysis of train crews involved in
human factor accidents was not expressly or impliedly cognizable under the collective bargain-
ing agreement, and therefore was a major dispute. As a major dispute, the court had jurisdic-
tion to enjoin the drug-testing program. Id.
Arbitrators are likely to be faced with several issues, ranging from the legality of drug
testing, including whether it was reasonable to administer a drug test, to the technical aspects
of each test, the laboratory accuracy, and the nexus between off-duty drug use and workplace
impairment. For a discussion of arbitration issues in drug testing, see Denenberg &
Denenberg, Employee Drug Testing and the Arbitrator: What Are the Issues?, ARB. J., June
1987, at 19, 19. For a discussion of the arbitration of drug abuse cases, see Hopson, Alcohol
and Drug Abuse Cases in Arbitration, in SECOND ANNUAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
INSTITUTE 275 (1986), and DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 407, at 264-80.
524. See Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 837 (1971). For a discussion of the Collyer deferral
factors, see supra note 367.
525. The general counsel's memorandum extends the bargaining obligation to the
particulars of drug testing in the same manner as a physical exam. The parties must discuss
the purpose of the test, the results of such testing, the specifics of each type of test, and the
mechanics of the laboratory involved. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D- I (Sept. 24,
1987). The duty to disclose on drug testing issues is likely to be very broad, as more
information will be needed to integrate this issue into the collective bargaining agreement.
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to bargain under section 8(d) of the Act.526 The employer and the
union can bargain to impasse, and back their respective positions on
drug testing issues with a strike or lockout.527 Unilateral implemen-
tation of a drug-testing program is permissible only if the union has
waived its right to bargain over drug testing. 2 8  But any waiver of
the statutory right to bargain over drug testing must be made in clear
and unmistakable terms.5 29
The general counsel's memorandum, however, goes beyond cre-
ating a statutory right to bargain over drug testing. It reveals the
transitory nature of the issue of drug testing within private sector
unionized employment. Because most collective bargaining agree-
ments do not contain terms on drug testing,53 ° drug testing will most
likely surface as an issue during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement. If the employer and the union cannot reach agreement
over the employer's implementation of a drug-testing program
midterm, the union can strike to support its position on the issue.
This type of activity is likely to be enjoined by the courts because the
dispute arises out of an arbitrable grievance.53 The dispute will then
proceed to arbitration as an issue of contract interpretation. The
employer, however, will likely face an unfair labor practice claim filed
by the union. Again, the dispute will be deferred to arbitration.
Moreover, the limited duration of labor contracts53 2 may deter the
employer and the union from addressing this issue midterm. The par-
ties may wait until the contract expires and then negotiate the terms
of drug testing in the new agreement. By relying on the Board's
deferral policy, the general counsel has forced management and labor
to privately order their rights and obligations through their own
grievance machinery in a grass roots approach to the problem of
526. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962).
527. See T. COLOSI, supra note 375, at 120; R. GORMAN, supra note 357, at 431-32.
528. See Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 705-06.
529. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 709 (1983).
530. The agreements may contain rules prohibiting the use of drugs in the workplace. See
S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers' Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir.
1987). As the general counsel noted in the memorandum, "[A] drug test is not simply a work
rule; ... it is a means ... of enforcing compliance with a rule." See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 184, at D-2 (Sept. 24, 1987).
531. If the grievance is not covered within the collective bargaining agreement, it may not
be arbitrable, and therefore may not be enjoined by a court. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249-53 (1970). The issue becomes more complex when
the collective bargaining agreement contains a no strike clause, and the employer has
implemented a drug-testing program unilaterally, after bargaining to impasse with the union,
during the term of the agreement.
532. Most collective bargaining agreements are three years in length. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2065, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, Table 1-4 (1980).
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workplace drug abuse and its attempted solution through drug test-
ing."' The general counsel's guidelines go further, however, in that
they stonewall any true analysis of drug testing by the Board and
implicitly express the Board's desire to avoid the controversy over
drug testing until the parties incorporate specific terms on drug test-
ing into collective bargaining agreements. Once drug testing is inte-
grated into collective ag1teements and becomes part of the "contained
in" language, the employer cannot implement drug testing without
the consent of the union.534 This should protect unionized workers as
drug testing becomes a common subject in collective bargaining
agreements. 35 Ultimately, this private rights model may prove to be
more successful than the nonnegotiable federal mandate of drug test-.
ing of public employees.
V. FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES
In certain cases, employees in the public and private sectors may
be entitled to protection under two federal antidiscrimination statutes.
If a drug-testing program discriminates against members of a minor-
ity group, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is implicated.53 6
In addition, "otherwise qualified" drug abusers may invoke the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973-37 to oppose a drug-testing program.
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In limited circumstances, an employee may successfully chal-
lenge the discriminatory purpose or effect of a drug-testing program
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees or applicants for
employment on the basis of their "race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. '' 538 Because the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate the histor-
533. Moreover, by requiring the NLRB to defer to grievance arbitration, the general
counsel has preserved the policy and goal of the National Labor Relations Act, which is to
ensure the private resolution of disputes, and prevent industrial strife. For the relevant
sections of the Act, see supra note 358.
534. See R. GORMAN, supra note 429 and accompanying text.
535. See supra notes 402-16 and accompanying text.
536. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
537. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
538. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). The statute specifically describes prohibited employer
actions:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
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ical barriers that have excluded minorities from employment opportu-
nities,53 9 courts have held that Title VII prohibits both intentional
and unintentional acts of discrimination. 540  Intentional discrimina-
tion, or "disparate treatment," can manifest itself in two ways: (1) an
employer may adopt an employment policy that overtly discriminates
against a minority group; or (2) an employer may use an apparently
neutral employment policy as a mere pretext to discriminate against
members of a minority group.54 Unintentional discrimination
occurs when an employer implements a facially neutral employment
policy that has a discriminatory effect, or "disparate impact," on
minority groups, even though the employer did not intend this
result.54 2  "Disparate impact" means that the effect of the policy is to
deny employment opportunities to a disproportionately high number
of qualified minority applicants relative to the qualified applicant
pool.5
43
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id. For a general discussion of the scope of Title VII, see Comment, Title VII Today: The
Shift Away from Equality, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 525 (1987).
539. In Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court discussed the
objective of Congress in enacting Title VII:
It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
"freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30.
540. The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether unintentional discrimination
was within the scope of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs,
black job applicants challenged a requirement that employees have graduated from high school
or passed a standardized intelligence test. Id. at 424. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that
the employer had adopted the employment policy in order to discriminate overtly against
blacks. Id. The Court held that the plaintiffs could still maintain a cause of action for
unintentional discrimination under Title VII, because the purpose of the Act is to eliminate
barriers to employment resulting from intentional and unintentional discrimination. Id. at
431-36; see also Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972) ("Title
VII is aimed at the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.").
541. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
542. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). For an analysis of the
foundation of the theory of disparate impact, see Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title
VII. An Objective' Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299-1311 (1987).
543. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Intelligence testing and
minimum educational requirements are common examples of facially neutral job requirements
that may have a disparate impact on minorities. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) (invalidating job requirement that employees have a high school diploma or pass a
standardized intelligence test); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1973) (invalidating job requirement of high school diplomas).
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Most employers adopt drug-testing programs to identify drug-
impaired employees or job applicants. It is conceivable, however, that
an employer who suspects that members of minority groups are more
likely to use drugs may attempt to use a drug-testing program as a
means of intentionally discriminating against them. Yet proving
intentional discrimination can be an insurmountable hurdle. 5 " As
such, an employee or job applicant would probably not challenge a
drug-testing program on the basis of disparate treatment. If Title
VII becomes a vehicle for challenging drug testing, disparate impact
will likely be the most viable theory for such an action.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ," the Supreme Court of the United
States established a burden-shifting test for disparate impact claims
under Title VII.P46 A plaintiff alleging disparate impact must first
make a prima facie showing that the challenged policy has a discrimi-
natory effect on a minority group.5 47  Once the plaintiff makes this
showing, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by statistical evi-
dence that the challenged condition of employment is "job
related. ' 548  Some courts have obviated the need for statistical evi-
dence or otherwise lightened the defendant's burden in proving job
relatedness for positions that require a high degree of skill, pose a
high degree of risk to third persons, or involve high economic risks.549
544. Cf UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE
1980's: DISMANTLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 8 (1981) ("Although open and
intentional prejudice persists, individual discriminatory conduct is often hidden and sometimes
unintentional."); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 266 (1971)
(An "admission is, of course, unlikely, especially where social mores disapprove of the conduct
prohibited by the law.").
545. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
546. Id. at 432.
547. A plaintiff must show that the employment policy results in an employee pool that has
a "racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants." Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
548. Id. at 431; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (1987) (detailing the requisite statistical
evidence to prove disparate impact). For a discussion of the employer's burden of proving job
relatedness, see Rutherglen, supra note 542, at 1312-29; Note, Business Necessity: Judicial
Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376 (1981). For a discussion
of the use of statistics in Title VII cases, see Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases:
Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1984).
549. In Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972), a black applicant
challenged the requirement that a flight officer have a college degree and earn at least 500 flight
hours. The court held that the defendant had a slight burden of proving that the job
requirement was job related because of the public's safety interest in having qualified pilots as
well as the airline's financial interest in protecting their multimillion dollar investment. Id. at
219; see also Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir. 1984)
(requiring employer to meet a substantial burden in demonstrating that the requirement of
supervisory experience for the position of supervisor of a housekeeping department was job
related because the employer failed to show that high risks were inherent in the job).
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A court may refuse to invalidate a drug-testing program under
Title VII even if the plaintiff has made a sufficient showing of dis-
parate impact. Drug-testing programs are a means of enforcing a
condition of employment that employees or applicants refrain from
drug use. Even under the more stringent Griggs requirement of statis-
tical proof,"' ° an employer may easily show that the prohibition
against drug use is job related if drug use affects job performance,
absentee rates, and job safety. 551 In New York Transit Authority v.
Beazer,152 employees and job applicants who were receiving metha-
done treatment challenged the New York City Transit Authority's
firing of employees and refusal to employ applicants who were receiv-
ing methadone treatment for heroin addiction. 3 The petitioners
argued that the rule against methadone use had a disparate impact on
blacks and Hispanics, but the court found that the statistical evidence
did not substantiate their position.554 The Court stated, in dicta, that
even if the petitioners had established a showing of disparate impact,
the policy would have been valid under Title VII, because it served
the "legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency.- 555
550. See supra note 545-47 and accompanying text.
551. For a discussion of the impact of employee drug use on productivity and safety, see
supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
552. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
553. Id. at 576.
554. Id. at 585. The plaintiffs proffered the following statistical evidence: First, 81 percent
of the employees who were referred to the Transit Authority's medical director for suspected
use of narcotics were black or Hispanic; second, 63 percent of the individuals receiving
methadone treatment in public programs were black or Hispanic. Id. at 584-85. The Court
rejected the first figure because the database was not limited in scope to methadone users. Id.
The second figure was misleading because it did not accurately reflect the racial composition of
Transit Authority job applicants and employees receiving methadone treatment. Id. at 585.
In Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 647 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ohio 1986), rev'd, 838 F.2d
138 (6th Cir. 1987), a class of police officer cadets argued that a drug-testing program
unlawfully discriminated against them because the tests "may misidentify ...melanin as
cannabinoids." Id. at 277. The viability of this theory remains uncertain, however, because
the court merely decided whether discovery was warranted under a consent decree, and did
not reach the merits of the case.
555. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31. But cf Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 483
(D.N.M. 1986). In Toledo, the court held that an employer's refusal to hire a truck driver who
used peyote twice per year in religious ceremonies discriminated against him on the basis of his
religion, and therefore violated Title VII. Id. at 485-86. After the employee brought suit, the
employer offered to accommodate the employee's use of peyote in religious ceremonies by
allowing him to take a day off after using the peyote, and providing supervision on the days
after he used the drug to ensure that he would not drive a truck while under the influence of
peyote. Id. at 492. The court held that these accommodations were reasonable. Id.
It is interesting to note that in defending the Title VII action, the employer argued that it
would suffer undue hardship by hiring a known drug user because of the potential for tort
liability. Id. at 491. The court, however, rejected this argument, because the employee did not
need to be scheduled for work the day after his use of peyote. Id. For a discussion of employer
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At least one court has indicated that drug testing may not serve a
legitimate employment goal when it reaches off-duty drug use. In
Drayton v. City of St. Petersburg,5"6 black job applicants challenged a
police and fire department rule permitting employers to reject job
applicants who were found to have used marijuana within a six-month
period preceding application.55 The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida found that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate statistically that the "six months clean time rule" had a
disparate impact on black applicants.5 Yet the court noted that
"there would seem to be no logical nexus whatever between recent
marijuana usage and employment as a Firefighter .... " 55 9 Thus, the
court stated that if the applicants had proved disparate impact, they
might have established a violation of Title VII.5 60 The court indi-
cated, however, that a logical nexus would exist between marijuana
use and fitness as a police officer.561
The Drayton court did not indicate the reason for distinguishing
between a firefighter and a- police officer, but the rationale may be
found in Davis v. City of Dallas.5 62 In Davis, black applicants for posi-
tions as police officers challenged various job requirements, including
a rule against "recent or excessive marijuana use."'5 63 The court held
that the rule against marijuana use was job related because the police
department had a "compelling interest in enforcing existent criminal
laws, ' '5 64 and because a police officer who used marijuana himself was
less likely to enforce the laws prohibiting such use.5 65
Courts may apply Beazer to invalidate drug testing in those lim-
ited circumstances in which off-duty drug use is not job related.5 66 A
tort liability for negligent hiring and negligent retention of employees who are drug users, see
infra notes 827-51 and accompanying text.
556. 477 F. Supp. 846 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
557. Id. at 851.
558. Id. at 855. The statistical evidence established that 49 percent of the black applicants
and 51 percent of the white applicants had passed a polygraph examination concerning recent
use of marijuana. Id. at 855 n.14.
559. Id. at 855.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116 (1986).
563. Id. at 223.
564. Id. at 225.
565. Id. at 224-25; see also Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 647 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ohio
1986) (holding that drug testing of police cadets was job related), rev'd on other grounds, 838
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1987).
566. For a discussion of cases brought under state handicap discrimination statutes holding
that employees who were drug abusers were able to perform their jobs satisfactorily, see infra
notes 603-09 and accompanying text.
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drug test cannot measure levels of intoxication, 567 and some drugs
remain in the bloodstream weeks after their intoxicating effects have
subsided. 68 Consequently, an employer who implements mass or
random drug testing can effectively monitor employees' off-duty drug
use even though such use may not relate to the employees' responsi-
bilities. 69 As such, under Beazer, a court will invalidate a drug-
testing program under Title VII if the program has a disparate impact
on a minority group and the employees' use of drugs has no relation
to their job performance.
In addition, under Drayton, an employer cannot use drug testing
to screen applicants for employment who have used drugs in the past
unless past drug use will affect future job performance and safety.
Thus, drug testing that is used to screen job applicants for secretarial
or administrative positions may not be permissable under Title VII if
a disparate impact on a minority group results. Conversely, an
employer may be able to drug test job applicants for positions involv-
ing law enforcement or the interception of drugs into the country,
despite any disparate impact on minority groups.
B. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Considering the prevalence of illicit drug use and the increasing
use of drug testing in the workplace, it is inevitable that employees
with drug abuse problems will be among those testing positive for
drugs.5 7 ° Many employers react to positive drug test results by
demoting, discharging, or taking other adverse action against the
offending employees.57" ' The Rehabilitation Act of 197372 is one
vehicle for protecting certain employees who are addicted to drugs.5 73
567. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
568. Zeese, supra note 48, at 26.
569. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 732 n.5
(S.D. Ga. 1986) ("Because the test can yield positive results days and even weeks after drug
use, they in effect allow the employer to control the employee's off-duty behavior ....").
570. For a discussion of the prevalence of illicit drug use and the increasing use of drug
testing in the workplace, see supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text. Conservative
estimates place the number of workers who have drug abuse problems at 6 to 7 percent.
CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING SUBSTANCE ABUSE 1I (H. Axel ed. 1986). For
a discussion of alcohol and drug abuse issues in the workplace, see generally W. SCANLON,
supra note 33, and T. DENENBERG & R. DENENBERG, supra note 249.
571. See supra note 42.
572. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
573. For a discussion of drug abuse handicaps under the Rehabilitation Act, see Comment,
Hidden Handicaps: Protection of Alcoholics, Drug Addicts, and the Mentally Ill Against
Employment Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Wisconsin Fair
Employment Act, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 725, 725-32. Some state handicap discrimination laws
also may provide protection for employees who are addicted to drugs. For a discussion of
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Courts agree that drug abuse constitutes a handicapping condition.57 4
The Act prohibits certain classes of employers from discriminating
against handicapped persons on the basis of their handicaps,575 pro-
vided that they are able to perform their jobs and do not pose a safety
threat to others.576 A claim of employment discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act is based on four elements: (1) the employer is
subject to the Act;577 (2) the employee has a handicapping condi-
tion;57 8 (3) the employee is an "otherwise qualified" handicapped per-
son; 579 and (4) the employer has not reasonably accommodated the
employee's handicap.58 °
1. EMPLOYERS SUBJECT TO THE ACT
Congress included three types of employers, each governed by a
separate statutory section, within the scope of the Act. Section
501581 prohibits federal employers from discriminating against handi-
capped persons in all facets of employment 582 and requires them to
take affirmative action in the "hiring, placement, and advancement"
of handicapped persons.583  Section 503584 prohibits government
state antidiscrimination statutes, see Flaccus, Handicap Discrimination Legislation: With Such
Inadequate Coverage at the Federal Level, Can State Legislation Be of Any Help?, 40 ARK. L.
REV. 261 (1986). Protection also may be found under the Vietnam Era Veterans'
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 for employees who are Vietnam veterans. See 38 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2014 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). This statute requires government contractors and
subcon'tractors who have federal contracts equal to or in excess of $10,000 to "take affirmative
action to employ and advance in employment qualified special disabled veterans and veterans
of the Vietnam era." 38 U.S.C. § 2012(a) (1982). The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 provides additional
protection for formerly alcoholic federal employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-I (Supp. 11 1984).
The Act states that "[n]o person may be denied or deprived of Federal civilian employment...
solely on the ground of prior alcohol abuse or prior alcoholism." 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-l(c)(1)
(Supp. 11 1984). This section does not, however, "prohibit the dismissal from employment of
a Federal civilian employee who cannot properly function in his employment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 290dd-l(d) (Supp. H 1984). For a discussion of employers' role in assisting employees who
are addicted to drugs, see Spencer, The Developing Notion of Employer Responsibility for the
Alcoholic, Drug-Addicted or Mentally Ill Employee: An Examination Under Federal and State
Employment Statutes and Arbitration Decisions, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 659 (1979).
574. See infra note 592 and accompanying text.
575. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1987).
576. See infra note 599 and accompanying text.
577. See infra notes 581-87 and accompanying text.
578. See infra notes 588-96 and accompanying text.
579. See infra notes 597-632 and accompanying text.
580. See infra notes 633-47 and accompanying text.
581. 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West Supp. 1987).
582. Id. § 791(a) (West Supp. 1987).
583. Id. § 791(b) (West Supp. 1987). "Section 501 was intended to make the federal
government a 'leader' or 'model employer' of the handicapped." Whitlock v. Donovan, 598
F. Supp. 126, 130 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d
964 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Federal employees have a private right of action to enforce their right to
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contractors from discriminating against handicapped job applicants
or employees who are involved with carrying out government con-
tracts or subcontracts, and requires contractors to take affirmative
action "to employ and advance" qualified handicapped individuals.1
85
Finally, section 504586 prohibits employers who receive federal funds
from discriminating against handicapped persons in all facets of
employment.5 87
receive affirmative action. Milbert v. Koop, 830 F.2d 354, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Prewitt v.
United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 302-03 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981); 29 U.S.C.
§ 794a(a)(1) (1982).
584. 29 U.S.C.A. § 793 (West Supp. 1987).
585. Id. § 793(a). This section applies to "[a]ny contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by
any Federal department or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal
services (including construction) for the United States." Id. This section also applies to
"any subcontract in excess of $2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any
contract for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including
construction) for the United States." Id.
Courts have held that section 503 does not create a private right of action against
employers for alleged discrimination. See, e.g., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d
1226, 1244 (7th Cir. 1980); Healy v. Bergman, 609 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (D. Mass. 1985); Doss
v. General Motors Corp., 478 F. Supp. 139, 141 (C.D. Ill. 1979). Contra Clarke v. FELEC
Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Alaska 1980).
586. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1987). This section is not limited in scope to
employment situations as it applies to "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service." Id.
587. Id. Congress recently passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, which provides
that employers are subject to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act if any program within their
organization receives federal assistance. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-259 (Mar. 22, 1988), 102 Stat. 28. This Act has the effect of overruling Grove City
College v. Bell, in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that students' receipt of
federal assistance did not mandate that an entire institution comply with a federal statute that
prohibited sex discrimination. 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984). The Act thus substantially expands
the scope of section 504. Under previous constructions of section 504, most courts held that
employers were subject to liability only when the particular program at issue received federal
assistance. See, e.g., Doyle v. University of Ala. in Birmingham, 680 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (1Ith
Cir. 1982) (holding that a university was not subject to liability under section 504 because
although the university received federal funds for some programs, the program at issue was not
federally funded); Foss v. City of Chicago, 640 F. Supp. 1088, 1090-96 (N.D. I11. 1986)
(holding that a city fire department was not subject to liability under section 504 because the
federally funded programs were not related to the plaintiff's employment), aff'd, 817 F.2d 34
(7th Cir. 1987).
At least ten circuits have held that section 504 creates a private right of action. See
Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1987);
Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Auth., 681 F.2d 1376, 1377 n.l (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); Miener v.
State, 673 F.2d 969, 973-74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Pushkin v. Regents,
658 F.2d 1372, 1376-80 (10th Cir. 1981); Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 131
(5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); NAACP v. Medical Center,
Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1979); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574
F.2d 1158, 1159 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Leary v. Crapsey,
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2. DEFINING A HANDICAPPING CONDITION
The primary purpose of the Act is to provide employment oppor-
tunities to handicapped individuals in order to promote their indepen-
dence and integration into society. 8 The Act defines an "individual
with handicaps" as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment. ' 589 By encompassing per-
sons who were previously impaired or are now regarded as being
impaired, the Act protects persons who are stigmatized by a history of
impairment or by erroneous public perceptions that they are
impaired. 9 ° Thus, it reflects Congress' general intent to protect the
handicapped, "not only from simple prejudice, but from 'archaic atti-
tudes and laws' and from 'the fact that the American people are sim-
ply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing]
individuals with handicaps.' "591
Courts have uniformly held that drug abuse is a handicapping
condition within the meaning of the Act.592 In 1978, Congress
amended the Act to reflect its intent to include drug abusers within
566 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-88
(7th Cir. 1977); cf Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (holding that a
plaintiff who alleges intentional discrimination may bring an action for backpay under section
504); Rhode Island Handicapped Action Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 718
F.2d 490, 493 (1st Cir. 1983) (assuming, but not deciding, the issue of whether a private right
of action exists under section 504). Yet this issue has not been resolved dispositively. For a
discussion of the controversy surrounding whether a remedy of damages exists under section
504, see generally Comment, Safeguarding Equality for the Handicapped. Compensatory Relief
Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 1986 DUKE L.J. 197.
588. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1129 n.10 (1987). The
Act states that its purpose is
to develop and implement, through research, training, services, and the
guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of
vocational rehabilitation and independent living, for individuals with handicaps
in order to maximize their employability, independence, and integration into the
workplace and the community.
29 U.S.C.A. § 701 (West Supp. 1987).
589. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
590. See Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1126-27.
591. Id. at 1126 (quoting S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6400).
592. See, e.g., Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 141
(8th Cir. 1987); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd without
opinion sub noma. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Burka v. New
York City Transit Auth., 2 IER Cas. (BNA) 1625, 1630 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (the Act only




the scope of protection.593 Although the Act as amended does not
expressly include drug abusers, it does include them by implica-
tion. The amendment provides that the term "individual with
handicaps"
does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser
whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual
from performing the duties of the job in question or whose employ-
ment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would con-
stitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.594
Thus, by explicitly excluding drug abusers who are unable to perform
their jobs or whose employment would threaten the safety of others,
Congress has implicitly included drug abusers who can perform their
jobs safely.5 9 5 Courts are unlikely to find that recreational drug users
593. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
594. Id. This limitation applies specifically to sections 503 and 504. Id. One court has
held that the limitation does not apply to section 501 because of the express language of the
statute, and the fact that the federal government has a greater affirmative duty to employ
handicapped individuals. Crewe, 834 F.2d at 142. In Crewe, an alcoholic employee claimed
that her employer discriminated against her because she was an alcoholic. Id. at 141. The
court held that her alcoholism was a handicapping condition, but that the employer would not
be able to exclude her from employment opportunities, even if her alcoholism rendered her
unable to perform the functions of the position, or posed a safety risk to others, because the
limitation contained in the amendment does not apply to section 501. Id. at 142. Yet the
court further held that the federal employer was justified in asking the employee to resign
because the employer could reject any applicant to "promote the efficiency of the service." Id.
at 142-43; see 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1987). The court also stated that the employer was
justified because the plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing that the employer could
have reasonably accommodated her handicap. Crewe, 834 F.2d at 143.
595. Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection Against
Employment Discrimination for Alcoholics and Drug Addicts, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 507, 518
(1979). In a recent handicap discrimination case brought under the Act, the Supreme Court of
the United States described the legislative purpose of the 1978 amendment:
There, Congress recognized that employers and other grantees might have
legitimate reasons not to extend jobs or benefits to drug addicts and alcoholics,
but also understood the danger of improper discrimination against such
individuals if they were categorically excluded from coverage under the Act.
Congress therefore rejected the original House proposal to exclude addicts and
alcoholics from the definition of handicapped individual, and instead adopted the
Senate proposal excluding only those alcoholics and drug abusers "whose current
use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of
the job in question or whose employment ... would constitute a direct threat to
property or the safety of others."
School Bd* of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1130 n. 14 (1987) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(7)(B) (1982) (current version at 29 U.S.C.A. 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1987))).
Although under the Act a drug abuser would be considered a handicapped person, it is
uncertain how the courts will define "drug abuse" for the purposes of inclusion or exclusion of
some drug users. Experts have adopted conflicting models of drug addiction. See generally
Visions of Addiction, 17 J. DRUG ISSUES 1 (1987) (collection of articles discussing theories of
addiction). If courts narrowly construe "drug abuse" as relating only to physical addiction, a
person who is "abusing" cocaine would not qualify under the Act because this drug is not
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fall within the scope of the Act, however, because courts may con-
sider that recreational drug users have more control over their use of
drugs, and that their impairments are temporary.5
96
3. DEFINING AN "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" HANDICAPPED PERSON
A person claiming discrimination under the Act must show that
he is an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person,5 97 meaning that he
would be able to perform his job if the employer reasonably accom-
modated his handicap.5 9s An employee who is handicapped by drug
abuse is not "otherwise qualified" if his addiction poses a threat to the
physically addicting. See McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation of a Dangerous
Drug, 2 DRUG ABUSE L. REV. 254, 269 (1972-73). This construction, however, may be incon-
sistent with the definition in the Act of "individual with handicaps." 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B)
(West Supp. 1987). This definition includes persons who are suffering from "a mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities." Id. Thus, a
court may find that psychological addiction constitutes "mental impairment." A broad defini-
tion of "drug abuse" would fulfill the essential purposes of the Act. See supra note 588 and
accompanying text.
596. "[T]he chemical-dependent person [does] not intend to lose control. He or she
probably [drinks] or [uses] drugs for the same effect that the social drinker or recreational drug
user seeks. The difference between the two ... is that one can stop at any point and the other
cannot." W. SCANLON, supra note 34, at 10; Miller, Hiring the Handicapped: An Analysis of
Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Against the Handicapped in Employment, 16 GONZAGA L.
REV. 23, 27-28 n.22 (1980) (" 'While the Act can be read to protect temporary impairments,
the legislative history and purpose of the Act indicate that protection should be provided only
to individuals with serious, permanent or long term impairments.' ") (quoting Memorandum
from James D. Henry, Associate Solicitor, to Regional Solicitors (Jan. 9, 1980)). For an
analysis of the concept of addiction, see Alexander, The Disease and Adaptive Models of
Addiction: A Framework Evaluation, 17 J. DRUG ISSUES 47 (1987).
If the recreational drug user is disabled by his use of drugs, he may argue that his use of
drugs has "substantially limit[ed] one or more of [his] major life activities." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1987). The recreational drug user who is not disabled by drug use but
tests positive for drugs may argue that he is stigmatized as a drug abuser. Cf Blackwell v.
United States Dep't of Treasury, 656 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D.D.C. 1986) (Transvestites have a
handicapping condition "because many experience strong social rejection in the work place as
a result of their mental ailment."). For a discussion of the Act's protection of individuals who
are stigmatized by their handicaps, see supra notes 589-90 and accompanying text.
It is an open question whether the Act protects employees who use marijuana to control
the nausea and vomiting that follow chemotherapy or alleviate the eye pressure associated with
glaucoma. At least thirty-three states have enacted statutes that permit cancer and glaucoma
patients to use marijuana as part of their treatment program. Gampel, supra note 242, at 47-
48.
597. Section 504 states that the Act protects "otherwise qualified handicapped
individual[s]." 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1987). Section 503 refers to "qualified
individuals with handicaps." 29 U.S.C.A. § 793(a) (West Supp. 1987). Section 501 merely
discusses "handicapped individuals." 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (West Supp. 1987). The regulations
accompanying this section, however, refer to "qualified handicapped person[s]." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.702(f) (1987). In this Survey, the term "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons will
be used for the purpose of uniformity.
598. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1987); see infra note 601 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42:553
19881 EMPLO YEE DRUG TESTING
safety of others.5 99
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,6' the Supreme
Court of the United States held that a handicapped student claiming
discrimination under the Act was required to show that, in spite of
her handicap, she was "otherwise 'qualified" to enter the school's
nursing program.6 ' Courts have applied Davis to determine
whether employees are "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons.6 °2
Recent decisions from the highest courts in two states illustrate that
an employee may be able to perform the functions of his job satisfac-
torily even though he is a drug abuser.60 3 In Consolidated Freightways
v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission,6°4 a salesman was dis-
charged from his job after entering an alcohol treatment center.60 5
The Supreme Court of Iowa held that "if the alcoholic remains sober
the disability should not prevent the individual from performing his
or her job in a reasonably competent and satisfactory manner. ' 60 6 In
Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc. ,607 an employee was discharged after
requesting a leave of absence to obtain treatment for alcohol and drug
addiction. 60  The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the employer
had discriminated against the employee, because he was able to per-
form his job, and thus he was otherwise qualified for the position.60 9
599. See supra note 595 and accompanying text. The regulations accompanying the Act
provide: " 'Qualified handicapped person' means with respect to employment, a handicapped
person who . . . can perform the essential functions of the position in question without
endangering the health and safety of the individual or others ...." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f)
(1987). Courts have adopted this definition as well. See, e.g., Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67,
68 (2d Cir. 1986); McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225, 228 (E.D.
Mich. 1985).
600. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
601. Id. at 414. In Davis, the Court held that an individual with a serious hearing disability
was not qualified for admission to the nursing program of a state community college because
the college was not required to lower its admission standards in order to accommodate the
individual's handicap. Id. at 413-14. In Alexander v. Choate, the Court stated that "while a
grantee need not be required to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to
accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make 'reasonable' ones." 469 U.S. 287,
300 (1985). For a discussion of reasonable accommodation, see infra notes 633-47 and
accompanying text.
602. See, e.g., Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir.
1982); Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1222 (W.D.
Wash. 1983), aff'd, 752 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1985).
603. These decisions construe state handicap antidiscrimination statutes modeled after the
Rehabilitation Act. For a discussion of forty-five state antidiscrimination statutes, see Flaccus,
supra note 573, at 268-72 & nn.40-47.
604. 366 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1985).
605. Id. at 525.
606. Id. at 528.
607. 496 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio 1986).
608. Id. at 479.
609. Id. at 480.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
If an employee proves that he is qualified to perform his duties
satisfactorily, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that the
employee cannot perform safely in the position.61° Federal courts
have adopted two conflicting legal standards to address the requisite
level of risk of harm that satisfies this burden and enables an employer
to terminate or deny employment to a handicapped person.6 ' Some
courts have held that an employer may refuse to hire a handicapped
person if he poses "any appreciable risk" of harm to others. 612  In
Doe v. New York University,6 13 the Second Circuit applied the appreci-
able risk standard to a medical student who was denied readmission
into a medical school. 614  The student claimed that she was a victim
of discrimination and merited protection under the Act because she
suffered from a personality disorder that caused self-destructive
behavior.61 5  The court held that if the handicapped student
presented "any appreciable risk" of harm to herself or others, she
would be unqualified for medical school under the Act.616 The court
stated that an "appreciable risk" of harm may be present when there
is less than a 50 percent chance that the employee will pose a safety
risk to herself or others.617
The court in Doe did not precisely delineate the exact boundaries
of the appreciable risk standard. The court's definition of "apprecia-
ble risk" as a risk occuring less than 50 percent of the time may be
interpreted to mean that a handicapped person is not otherwise quali-
fied if he poses a chance of risk of harm to others ranging from 1 to 49
percent. As one commentator has stated, under this standard,
employers have a light burden in proving that the handicapped
610. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov.
1981).
611. The few federal court decisions addressing the issue of whether an employee who is a
drug abuser can perform the functions of the position safely have little precedential value
because they are devoid of any legal standard reflecting the requisite level of injury that
justifies an employer in terminating or denying employment to a handicapped person. See,
e.g., Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a police officer was not a
qualified handicapped individual because he had admitted that his heroin addiction made him
unfit to serve as a police officer); Healy v. Bergman, 609 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (D. Mass. 1985)
(holding that an alcoholic employee who was hired as a fireman and maintenance worker was
not an unqualified handicapped individual per se).
612. See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981t See generally Note,
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Finally, A Legal Standard, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
147 (discussing standards courts apply in determining whether an employee is qualified under
the Act).
613. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).






employee poses a safety risk to others.6 18
Other courts have applied the "reasonable probability of substan-
tial harm" standard in deciding whether a handicapped individual
poses a safety risk to others.6 19 In Mantolete v. Bolger,62° the Ninth
Circuit explained the reasonable probability of substantial harm
standard:
[A]n employer must gather all relevant information regarding the
applicant's work history and medical history, and independently
assess both the probability and severity of potential injury. This
involves, of course, a case-by-case analysis of the applicant and the
particular job.621
Compared to the appreciable risk standard, the reasonable probability
of substantial harm standard places a heavier burden on the employer
to prove that the handicapped employee poses a safety risk to
others. 22 As such, the reasonable probability of substantial harm
standard is consistent with the purpose of the Act-to eradicate dis-
crimination in the hiring, placement, and advancement of handi-
capped persons.623
The Merit Systems Protection Board, an administrative author-
ity responsible for adjudicating federal employee discrimination
appeals, 624 has issued a number of decisions discussing whether
employees who have drug abuse problems are "otherwise qualified"
handicapped persons under the Act. In Green v. Department of the
Air Force, 625 a clinical nurse admitted that she had stolen drugs from
the nursing unit of an Air Force medical center and injected the drugs
while on duty.626 Although the nurse voluntarily entered a treat-
ment program, the employer discharged her, claiming that her drug
addiction would threaten patient safety. 627 Applying the substantial
618. Note, supra note 612, at 157. "A mere 'elevated risk' standard is not sufficient to
insure handicapped people's 'right to employment which complements their abilities.' "
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting S. REP. No. 48, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1974)).
619. See, e.g., id. at 1422 (applying the reasonable probability of substantial harm standard
to a job applicant who was an epileptic); Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927, 936
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (applying the reasonable probability of substantial harm standard in an
employment discrimination action brought under a state antidiscrimination statute).
620. 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
621. Id. at 1423.
622. See Note, supra note 612, at 157.
623. See supra note 588 and accompanying text.
624. A federal employee may appeal the Board's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit within thirty days after the date on which the employee
received notice of the final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(l)-(b)(1) (1982).
625. 31 M.S.P.R. 152 (1986).
626. Id. at 153.
627. Id. at 153-54.
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harm standard, the Board rejected the employer's argument and held
that the nurse was an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person
because she had received satisfactory reviews during the past five
years, notwithstanding her addiction, and the employer had no evi-
dence that the nurse endangered her patients' safety.
6 21
In Kulling v. Department of Transportation,629 the Board rejected
an air traffic controller's claim that he was an "otherwise qualified"
handicapped individual after he had tested positive for cocaine use.63°
Although the Board did not articulate a legal standard to address the
requisite level of risk of injury that justifies an employer in terminat-
ing or denying employment to a handicapped person, its decision
focused on the safety concerns of the position:
Air traffic controllers are responsible for the lives and safety of
thousands of people. The position entails awesome pressures and
requires split second decisions. Few, if any, positions demand
more alertness of mind and soundness of judgment and the stress
and strains of the controller are incalculable.631
Based on these safety concerns, the Board found that the air traffic
controller was not an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person.632
Kulling may indicate that in some dangerous industries, the gravity of
the potential harm is the most important factor in determining
whether a person who has a drug abuse problem is "otherwise quali-
fied" for a position. Of course, defining dangerous industries remains
an open question, as some courts may find that the nursing position at
issue in Green is equally dangerous.
4. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
In certain circumstances, the Act imposes a duty on employers to
reasonably accommodate an employee's handicap.633 An "otherwise
qualified" employee is someone who would be able to perform the job
if the employer reasonably accommodated his handicap.634 The issue
628. Id. at 156-57.
629. 24 M.S.P.R. 56 (1984).
630. Id. at 58-59. The employer required the plaintiff to submit to a urinalysis test because
he was asleep in an adjacent briefing room. Id. at 58 n.1. The employee also slurred his speech
and appeared ill. Id.
631. Id. at 59 (quoting Borsari v. FAA, 699 F.2d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 833 (1983)).
632. Id. at 59.
633. The employee must first make a prima facie showing that his handicap could be
accommodated, and then the burden shifts to the employer to show that it cannot
accommodate the employee's handicap. Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 137 (D.D.C.
1984), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
634. See supra note 598 and accompanying text.
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of reasonable accommodation is therefore relevant in two contexts:
First, reasonable accommodation may enable an employee to "per-
form 'the essential functions' of the job," '6 35 and second, reasonable
accommodation may eliminate any safety threat that an employee's
handicap might otherwise pose to others.636 In School Board of Nas-
sau County v. Arline,6 37 the Supreme Court of the United States
explained that "[a]ccommodation is not reasonable if it either imposes
'undue financial [or] administrative burdens' on [an employer]."638
Courts have further held that accommodation is not reasonable if it
requires "fundamental" or "substantial" alterations in the nature of
the program.63 9
An employer may identify an employee who is a drug abuser
through drug testing. The employer may then be required to take
certain steps to comply with the reasonable accommodation require-
ment of the Act if reasonable accommodation is feasible and not
unduly burdensome. For example, the employer might be obligated
to offer rehabilitative asssistance and sick leave if necessary for treat-
ment before taking disciplinary action against the employee for drug-
related misconduct.64 ° If the employee refuses to obtain assistance,
the employer might still be required to offer the employee a "firm
choice" between treatment and discharge.64' In Whitlock v. Dono-
van, 642 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that a federal employer's failure to offer a "firm choice" between
treatment and discharge before firing the employee violated the rea-
sonable accommodation requirement of the Act, even though the
employer had given the employee a "firm choice" in prior years, and
the employer had treated the employee's drug problem with "compas-
635. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1131 n.17 (1987).
636. Id. at 1131 n.16. For a discussion of reasonable accommodation under section 504, see
Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (1980).
637. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
638. Id. at 1131 n.17 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412
(1979)).
639. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985). Similarly, in Copeland v.
Philadelphia Police Department, the Third Circuit held that a police department was not
required to accommodate a police officer who was an illicit drug user, because accommodation
would "constitute a 'substantial modification' of the essential functions of the police
department and would cast doubt upon the integrity of the police force." 2 IER Cas. (BNA)
1825, 1831 (3d Cir. 1988).
640. See Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 137 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd without opinion
sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
641. Id. at 134.
642. 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984).
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sion and tolerance" for approximately six years.643
The duty of reasonable accommodation may include the duty to
make drug testing available as a means of monitoring an employee
who has completed a drug rehabilitation program. In Averill v.
Department of the Navy,644 a rehabilitated employee, working as an
equipment servicer, utilized drug testing to support his claim that he
was an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person.645 Offering to sub-
mit to and pay for regular urinalysis, the employee argued that the
employer's ability to monitor his progress through drug testing would
effectively guard against any perceived safety risk.646
Averill illustrates that a drug-testing program may ensure that a
rehabilitated employee is free from drugs, thereby reducing the
probability of harm to others.647 If an employer regularly tests
employees for drugs, the administrative costs of providing additional
drug tests are not burdensome. Paradoxically, although many
employees seek protection from drug testing, the employee who is a
drug abuser may utilize a drug testing program to support his claim
that he is "otherwise qualified" for a position.
VI. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
Private, nonunionized employees constitute the majority of the
American workforce, 648 and generally do not enjoy the same protec-
tions as other employees do under the Constitution of the United
States or collective bargaining agreements. Increasingly, these
employees are invoking state constitutional and statutory protections
to challenge drug-testing programs.
643. Id. at 134-36; see also Burchell v. Department of the Army, 679 F. Supp. 1393 (D.S.C.
1988) (adopting the reasoning of the court in Whitlock).
644. 30 M.S.P.R. 327 (1986).
645. Id. at 331.
646. Id.
647. This argument is bolstered by statistical evidence that reveals that drug testing is an
effective way to reduce substantially the total number of accidents occurring on the job. See
supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
648. See Comment, Urinalysis Drug Testing of Private Employees: A Callfor Legislation in
Pennsylvania, 91 DICK. L. REV. 1015, 1017 n.17 (1986) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986, at 424 (1986)). The majority of
employees work in the private sector and are nonunionized. Among the groups that have been
subjected to drug testing are lawyers, business school graduates, engineers, marketing
personnel, sales persons, construction workers, bus and truck drivers, railroad workers, and
athletes. Englade, supra note 42, at 22; Noble, When Walking Papers Lead to Court, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 4, at 10, col. 2 ("[S]eventy percent of American workers are not
covered by collective bargaining agreements or employment contracts .... ").
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A. State Constitutional Protections
Because few federal remedies exist for private employees chal-
lenging employer conduct, employees have attempted to seek safe har-
bor from drug testing in their state constitutions.649 Private
employers have challenged drug testing in state courts under the
express right of privacy.65° Ten state constitutions provide an
express right of privacy: Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, South Caro-
lina, Washington, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois, and Montana.
Of these ten states, the privacy provisions of the first five state consti-
tutions each appear to apply only to state action, and not to actions of
exclusively private entities.65' The privacy language embodied in the
constitutions of the latter five states is not limited to state action and
may broaden the privacy rights of individuals by limiting the actions
of private employers.652 In practice, only the California privacy pro-
vision has been construed to protect individuals from acts of private
entities, as well as governmental entities.653
Employees in California have invoked the privacy protection of
their state constitution to challenge compulsory drug testing.654  In
649. See Comment, supra note 648, at 1037 (citing Bamberger, Boosting Your Case with
Your State Constitution, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 49). Underlying these constitutional
claims is the venerated legal principle that although state constitutions may not afford
individuals a lesser degree of protection than the federal Constitution, they may extend greater
protection. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975) (refusing to follow the Supreme Court of the United States' construction of the fourth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and interpreting California's virtually
identical constitutional guarantee more broadly); cf Patchogue-Medford v. Board of Educ., 70
N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 510 N.E.2d 325 (1987) (holding random urinalysis of school
teachers unconstitutional under the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and article 1, section 12 of the Constitution of New York).
650. I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE TESTING, SUR-
VEILLANCE, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY 13-14 (1987).
651. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; see McGovern, supra note 59, at 1466.
652. McGovern, supra note 59, at 1466. This observation is similarly based on the express
language of the state constitutions. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1;
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art I, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
653. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829-30, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839, 842 (1976) (The privacy provision of the Constitution of California protects Californians
"not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right which may not be violated
by anyone."). State courts in Alaska and Montana have held that the right of privacy
provisions of their state constitutions provide the same degree of protection as the Constitution
of the United States. Comment, Development in the Law-Statutory and Other Limitations to
Drug Testing, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 573, 578 (1987).
654. See, e.g., Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. 843,230 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6,
1987) (judgment on special verdict); Price v. Pacific Ref. Co., No. 292,000 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. I1, 1987) (preliminary injunction); Mora v. 3M Co., No. 942,330 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 6,
1987) (permanent injunction).
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Price v. Pacific Refining Co.,655 employees of an oil refinery sued
under the state constitutional right of privacy to enjoin a random
drug-testing program.656 The court held that, in the absence of any
individualized suspicion of employee drug use, the compulsory testing
program was an unreasonable invasion of the employee's right of pri-
vacy.657 In so holding, the court applied a balancing test, weighing
the employee's privacy interests against the employer's interest in pre-
serving the safety of its employees and of the community surrounding
the oil refinery.658
The validity of drug testing under the California Constitution
was at issue again in Mora v. 3M Co. 659 In Mora, an employer pro-
posed a program to test twenty-five employees who would be ran-
domly selected by computer every week. 660  Employees who tested
positive for drugs or alcohol would be offered counseling and referral
to a rehabilitation program, and employees who tested positive a sec-
ond time would be subject to dismissal.661 The California trial court
preliminarily enjoined the random program on the grounds that it
655. No. 292,000 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 1987) (preliminary injunction).
656. The complaint, filed on behalf of the employees of Pacific Refining Company, alleged
that the compulsory urinalysis program violated the rights of the employees under the privacy
provision of the Constitution of California in several respects: First, requiring employees to
undergo drug testing as a condition of continued employment; second, mandating the
termination of employees who test positive; third, requiring employees to execute
authorization forms for the release of confidential medical information to the employer, its
agents, servants, and employees; fourth, implementing procedures for drug testing which
require employees to expose private parts of their bodies to lab technicians while giving a urine
sample; fifth, requiring employees to provide samples of bodily fluids; sixth, reporting the
results of drug tests to persons and entities not expressly authorized to receive the results;
seventh, subjecting employees to the possible scorn of coworkers, supervisors, potential
employers, and others because of positive test results; eighth, attempting to direct and control
the off-duty conduct of employees; ninth, attempting to control employees' off-duty conduct
without reasonable grounds to believe that the employees' job performance was impaired; and
tenth, intruding into the off-duty conduct of the lives of employees without a compelling need
to do so. See AMERICAN MANAGEMENT AssocIATION, DRUG ABUSE 77-78 (1987).
The state trial court granted the injunction, partly on the grounds that the drug-testing
program violated the privacy provision of the state constitution. In addition, the drug-testing
program was overbroad because it encompassed all employees, regardless of position, and it
failed to provide adequate guidelines, giving managers too much discretion to decide which
employees to test and determine the circumstances under which they would be tested. Id.
657. Price, No. 292,000 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. II, 1987) (preliminary injunction).
658. For an analysis of the balancing of interests test under the California right of privacy
provision, see Comment, Your Urine or Your Job. Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Testing
Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1451 (1986) (An individual's right of
privacy is protected from intrusions by government and business unless a compelling public
interest exists.).
659. Mora v. 3M Co., No. 942,330 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1987).
660. Enriquez, Court Enjoins 3M's Drug Screening of Camarillo Workers, L.A. Times, Jan.
7, 1987, 16, col. 4.
661. Id. at 3, col. I.
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violated the employees' right of privacy under the California Consti-
tution. 662  The court was not convinced that the drug-testing pro-
gram had reduced the drug problem at the plant, and therefore the
employer's need for the program was not sufficiently compelling to
outweigh the employees' privacy rights. 66
3
B. State Statutes
The right of privacy may prove to be an effective weapon for
employees to challenge mandatory drug testing. Yet California is the
only state that has made constitutional privacy protection available to
private employees. As such, over the past year, state legislatures have
begun to fill the void of protection by enacting statutes that regulate
compulsory drug testing of private employees. 664  Typically, these
statutes limit the power of private employers to test employees for
drug use, and regulate the testing procedures that private employers
may use.665 These state statutes provide employees with some mea-
sure of protection from the privacy intrusion that results from drug-
testing programs, but uniformity of protection may be provided if fed-
eral legislation addresses this issue in the future. 666
662. Id.
663. Id. The employer settled the case, and ultimately abandoned the random drug-testing
program. Doctoroff, Random 3M Drug Tests End, Court Test Avoided, L.A. Times, Feb. 22,
1987, pt. 2, at 6, col. 1.
In a highly publicized case against Southern Pacific Transport Company of San
Francisco, the plaintiff, Barbara Luck, alleged that Southern Pacific's administration of
mandatory employee urinalysis constituted an invasion of privacy under article I, section 1 of
the Constitution of California. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. 843,230 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Nov. 6, 1987) (judgment on special verdict). Southern Pacific administered urinalyses to
485 other employees on the day that Luck refused to cooperate, and terminated Luck for
refusing to provide a urine sample for urinalysis. Weinstein, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
664. Before 1987, no state had enacted legislation addressing drug testing in the private
sector. McGovern, supra note 59, at 1470.
665. These statutes typically prohibit the use of random drug testing in the workplace. The
statutes require employers to express their policies on drug testing in writing, permit
employees to confirm results of drug tests independently, and adopt employee assistance
programs to rehabilitate employees identified as drug users. See infra notes 667-89 and
accompanying text. Typically, these laws amend or supplement existing statutes regulating the
use of polygraphs in the workplace. See infra note 667.
Commentators have suggested that state legislatures are the best forum for balancing the
employee's privacy interests and the employer's interest in a drug-free working environment.
McGovern, supra note 59, at 1454 n.8 (citing McClenahen, The Privacy Invasion, INDUS.
WEEK, Nov. 11, 1985, at 50, 53 ("[S]tate-level action is preferable because it is 'closer to the
people ... where employers through their political arms . . . can have more of an impact on
what the state legislature is doing.' ")).
666. Many of the largest Fortune 500 companies and other employers that test workers for
drugs have a national workforce. As drug testing becomes an integral part of corporate
personnel policies, many more national employers will be faced with different rules of law in
different states, thereby preventing the achievement of coherent personnel policies. This lack
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Seven states have passed legislation that regulates drug testing in
the private sector: Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Utah. 667 All the state statutes except Utah limit
the employer's discretion to drug test employees. The Utah statute is
unique in that it expresses support, as a matter of public policy, for
the use of drug and alcohol testing by private employers.66' The Utah
legislature found that "in balancing the interests of employers,
employees, and the welfare of the general public.., fair and equitable
testing for drugs and alcohol in the workplace.., is in the best inter-
est of all parties. 669
All of the state statutes except Utah prohibit random drug test-
of uniformity among the states could have a disruptive effect on interstate commerce.
Congress has not yet enacted legislation that affords employees protection from the increased
emphasis on drug testing in the private sector. The House of Representatives is considering
legislation that would require private employers to have a reasonable suspicion of drug use
before requiring any individual employee to undergo drug testing. H.R. 691, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(b) (1987). The bill would prohibit employers from requiring employees to undergo
drug testing, unless: first, the employer has reasonable suspicion that the employee is using
drugs; second, the employee is engaged in a drug-sensitive occupation; or third, the employer
may require drug tests under a collective bargaining agreement covering the employee. Id. at
§ 2(b). The bill requires employers to post notices that the employer is prohibited from
requiring employees to submit to drug testing absent probable cause of drug use. Id. at § 4.
For an analysis of the differences between the standards of suspicion and probable cause in the
public sector, see supra notes 100-50 and accompanying text.
The potential impact of this legislation on drug testing of private employees is far
reaching. Because the provisions of the bill would apply to all private employers that either
directly or indirectly engage in or affect interstate commerce, the potential impact of the
legislation 'on private employers and employees is sweeping. For an illustration of the broad
range of activities affecting interstate commerce, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29
(1942) (An individual farmer's production of home grown wheat for his own consumption
affects interstate commerce under the national market theory.). Conversely, the bill is limited
in that it does not apply to job applicants. Some of the statutory procedures for drug testing of
employees provide useful guidelines for employers who plan to invite drug testing of
applicants. For example, under the proposed statute, if the results of a drug test indicate that
an employee has been using drugs, the employer may not disclose the test results to anyone
until a confirmatory test confirms the positive result. H.R. 691, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3
(1987). It would also be unlawful for an employer to discriminate or take disciplinary action
against any employee who has refused to submit to a drug test that is not based on reasonable
suspicion of drug use. Id. at § 2.
In the absence of federal statutes, several states recently have enacted legislation
addressing drug testing in the workplace. For a discussion of these statutes, see infra notes
667-89 and accompanying text. The complete absence of federal drug testing legislation is a
factor contributing to the continued challenges to private employment drug-testing in the state
arena. See generally Thompson, Battle over Drug Testing is Shifting to the States; Guidelines
are Stricter at Local Level, Wash. Post, June 19, 1987, at A4, col. I (discussing the movement
of employees' battle against drug testing from the federal courts to the state courts).
667. See 1987 Conn. Acts 551 (Reg. Sess.); 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5; MINN. STAT.
§ 181.950 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5 (1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-1 to 15 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 511-20 (1987).




ing of employees. The level of suspicion required for a drug test dif-
fers in these statutes, but all of them offer private employees
significant protection from unbridled drug testing.67° With limited
exceptions, 671 all of these statutes require an employer to have some
level of individualized suspicion before requiring an employee to sub-
mit to drug testing. In Connecticut and Minnesota, an employer
must have "reasonable suspicion" that an employee is under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol before administering a drug test. 67' Employ-
ers in Iowa and Vermont may not test employees for drug use unless
they have "probable cause" for believing that an employee is using or
is under the influence of drugs.673 The Montana and Rhode Island
statutes prohibit employers from administering drug tests to employ-
ees unless they have "reason to believe" that an employee is using
drugs.674
670. For a discussion of the application of the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
standards for drug testing in the public sector, see supra notes 100-50 and accompanying text.
671. In Connecticut, random testing is permissible only for employees in positions that the
commissioner of labor has designated as high-risk or safety sensitive, when conducted
pursuant to an employee assistance program in which an employee voluntarily participates, or
when authorized by federal law. 1987 Conn. Acts 551(7) (Reg. Sess.). The requirement that
employers place employees in employee assistance programs, rather than automatically
discharging them, manifests the underlying statutory policy favoring rehabilitation over
discharge. The goal of a personnel policy that includes drug detection and rehabilitation is to
maximize employee productivity, because rehabilitation may end the adverse effect of drug use
on employee productivity and absenteeism. See AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,
supra note 656, at 89 (Although the recognition and treatment of job impairment is grounded
in the notion of cost-benefits, corporate employment practices are reflecting a growing
emphasis on "human resources management."). For a discussion of employee assistance
programs and their role in the context of employee drug testing, see supra notes 22-40 and
accompanying text.
In Minnesota, employees in safety-sensitive positions are subject to random selection for
drug testing instead of an individualized suspicion standard. MINN. STAT. § 181.951(4)
(1987).
672. 1987 Conn. Acts 551(6) (Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 181.951(5) (1987).
673. In Iowa, employee drug testing is permissible only if all of the following conditions are
met: First, the employer has probable cause to believe that an employee's faculties are
impaired on the job; second, the drug impairment endangers the safety of the public and other
employees or violates work rules; third, the department of public health has approved the
testing facility; fourth, a positive test result is confirmed by an alternate testing method; fifth,
the employee is given a reasonable opportunity to explain or rebut the results of the drug test;
and sixth, the employer will not take disciplinary action against a first-time offender who
enters and successfully completes a substance abuse program provided by the employer. 1987
Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(3).
In Vermont, an employer may require an individual employee to submit to a drug test
only if: First, the employer has probable cause to believe that the employee is using or is under
the influence of drugs or alcohol on the job; second, the employer has made a rehabilitation
program available to the employee; and third, the employer does not terminate employees who
successfully complete an assistance program. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 513(c) (1987).
674. To complement the Montana polygraph statute, the Montana legislature has enacted a
statute that provides that an employer must have reason to believe that the employee's
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Conversely, the Utah statute expressly advocates testing of job
applicants and employees in the private sector on any basis, random
or otherwise, as a condition of hiring or continued employment.675
Moreover, because the statute broadly defines "drugs" for testing pur-
poses,676 employers in Utah are implicitly authorized to test employ-
ees for the presence of legal, as well as illicit, drugs.
The drug-testing statutes in Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, and Vermont apply to testing of job applicants and current
employees.677 In Minnesota and Vermont, an employer may require
applicants to submit to drug testing only after extending them job
offers.6 78 In these states, the fulfillment of the job offer is contingent
on the applicant receiving a negative drug test result.679 The Iowa
statute, with certain exceptions, 680 restricts an employer's power to
include drug testing as part of a preemployment physical examination
of job applicants.6"' Under the Montana statute, employers may not
require job applicants to submit to drug testing as a condition of
employment, "except for employment in hazardous work environ-
ments, or in jobs the primary responsibility of which is security, pub-
lic safety, or fiduciary responsibility." '682 The Connecticut statute
faculties are impaired on the job as a result of alcohol or drug consumption before requiring a
blood or urine test. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(l)(c) (1987).
An employer in Rhode Island may require employees to submit to drug testing only if:
First, the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is drug impaired;
second, the employer permits the employee to produce the test sample in private and
unattended; third, the testing is performed in conjunction with a rehabilitation program;
fourth, employees have the right to confirm a positive test result at an independent testing
facility at their own expense; and fifth, employees are given a reasonable opportunity to rebut
or explain the results. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1 (1987).
675. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-3 (1987). The Utah statute merely requires employers
to maintain written guidelines for the collection and testing of test samples. Id. at § 34-38-7.
676. The statute defines drugs as "any substance recognized as a drug in the United States
Pharmacopeia, the National Formulary, the Homeopathic Pharmacopeia, or other drug
compendia, or supplement to any of those compendia." UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-2 (1987).
The Utah statute gives employers immense latitude in drug testing of employees. Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at A-13 (June 3, 1987) (discussing the benefits accruing to
employers under the Utah statute, including protection from suit for mistakenly firing an
employee for using drugs as long as the employer has reasonably relied on two test results.).
677. See 1987 Conn. Acts 551(3) (Reg. Sess.); 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(7); MINN.
STAT. § 181.951(2) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(l)(b)-(c) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 512(b)(1) (1987).
678. MINN. STAT. § 181.951(2) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 512(b)(1) (1987).
679. MINN. STAT. § 181.951(2) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 512(b)(1) (1987).
680. The restriction on drug testing of job applicants does not apply to drug testing for
positions as Iowa peace officers or correctional officers, or to drug tests required by federal
statute or conducted pursuant to a policy statement of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(2).
681. 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(7).
682. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(l)(b) (1987).
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gives employers the most latitude in testing job applicants for drug
use, in that they need only inform applicants in writing that drug test-
ing is a condition of employment.683 All of the statutes that condition
employment on negative drug test results require confirmation of pos-
itive test results with an alternative testing methodology that is at
least as accurate as the initial methodology.684
The state statutes on drug testing confer private rights of action
upon job applicants and employees to challenge drug-testing policies
that contravene the statutory requirements.685 Statutes in Connecti-
cut, Iowa, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Vermont give aggrieved
employees and applicants the right to sue for damages and injunctive
relief when an employer violates the drug-testing statutes.686  In
addition, the Iowa statute expressly entitles aggrieved persons to the
equitable relief of reinstatement with backpay, or, in the case of appli-
cants, the right of employment.687 Of the six states that regulate
employee drug testing, only Montana does not give aggrieved employ-
ees or job applicants the right to sue for damages. Instead, an
employer who violates any provision of the Montana statute has com-
mitted a misdemeanor. 688
For job applicants and employees, state statutory guidelines for
the administration of employee drug testing are preferable to no regu-
lation at all. In the absence of state statutes, employees are dependent
on the employer's sensitivity to safety and personal privacy con-
cerns.689 Employees who lack state statutory protection are increas-
ingly resorting to common law tort theories to obtain redress and
limit the private employer's power to test employees for drug use.
683. 1987 Conn. Acts 551(3)(1) (Reg. Sess.).
684. The statutes uniformly require employers to confirm positive drug test results with the
gas chromatography/mass spectrometry technique. See 1987 Conn. Acts 551(2) (Reg. Sess.);
1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(3)(d); MINN. STAT. § 181.953(4) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-304(2)(E) (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1(12) (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-
6(5) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 514(6) (1987). For a discussion of drug-testing
techniques, see supra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
685. 1987 Conn. Acts 551(1 1)(a)-(b) (Reg. Sess.); 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(9); MINN.
STAT. § 181.956(2)-(3) (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1(F)(1)-(3); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§ 519 (1987).
686. 1987 Conn. Acts 551(11)(a)-(b) (Reg. Sess.) (entitling aggrieved persons to punitive
damages); 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(9); MINN. STAT. § 181.956(2)-(3) (1987); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-6.5-1(F)(1)-(3) (entitling prevailing employee to punitive damages); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21 § 519 (1987).
687. 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. § 730.5(9).
688. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304(5) (1987).
689. McGovern, supra note 59, at 1456.
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VII. COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS
Private employees challenging drug-testing programs have found
increasing success under common law theories of protection. The
most commonly invoked protections are wrongful discharge,69 ° and
tort actions691 for invasion of privacy and defamation, 69 2 and inten-
tional 693 and negligent infliction of emotional distress.6 9 4
A. Wrongful Discharge
If the term of an employment relationship is indefinite, or the
relationship is without term, the relationship is at will, and therefore
terminable by either party.695 This relationship is rooted in state com-
mon law and is known as the employment at will doctrine.6 96
Employees subject to the doctrine may be discharged for "good cause,
for no cause or even for cause morally wrong. ' '69 7 The employment at
will doctrine has been recognized uniformly in all jurisdictions,698 and
therefore affects the vast majority of private nonunionized employees
690. For a discussion of wrongful discharge and the doctrine of employment at will in the
context of mandatory drug testing, see infra notes 695-742 and accompanying text.
691. For public and private unionized employees, the issue of drug testing is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. See supra note 360 and accompanying text. These employees
are precluded from bringing tort claims against their employers because tort claims are
subsumed within the grievance arbitration procedures of their collective bargaining agreement.
Nonunion federal employees also may be precluded from seeking redress through tort claims
because of the bar to certain claims imposed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (1982). Claims against the federal government are barred if the government employee
committing the tort was "exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation," or
was exercising a "discretionary function." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1982). In addition, claims for
libel and slander are expressly barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). Even if tort liability is
imposed on the federal government, the recovery of punitive damages is barred. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2402 (1982).
692. For a discussion of defamation claims that may arise from compulsory drug testing in
the private sector, see infra notes 775-98 and accompanying text.
693. For a discussion of the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress that may
arise from compulsory drug testing in the private sector, see infra notes 799-807 and
accompanying text.
694. For a discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims arising out of
compulsory urinalyses in the private sector, see infra notes 808-10 and accompanying text.
695. See H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 271 (1981).
696. See A. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE 5 n.25 (1987).
697. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (overruled on other
grounds, by Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915)).
698. A treatise written in 1877 by Horace Wood, a New York lawyer, first articulated the
employment at will doctrine. The author proposed that an indefinite hiring constituted prima
facie proof of a hiring at will, and that the employee bear the burden of proving a term of
employment. See H. WOOD, supra note 695, at 271. For a treatment of the historical
development of the employment at will doctrine, see A. HILL, supra note 696, at 1-13.
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in the United States.69 9 In at will employment, a presumption exists
that all employment is terminable for any reason, unless the parties
clearly expressed their intent in the contract at the inception of the
relationship to provide for a definite term.7°
1. THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
Private employers in employment at will jurisdictions may use
the threat of discharge without cause to coerce employees' behavior.
Thus, at will employees who refuse to submit to drug testing may face
immediate discharge. Further, at will employees who submit to test-
ing may be discharged on the basis of one unconfirmed positive test
result, and have no recourse to challenge the results. At will employ-
ees have been discharged from their jobs under circumstances that
would otherwise be unlawful in states that regulate drug testing. In
Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc. ,7"' a Texas employee brought
a class action suit against his employer to enjoin the implementation
of a random, periodic drug-testing program. The court found that the
employment at will doctrine was applicable to the case, and held that
the program could not be enjoined because the employee would have
no cause of action against the eniployer after discharge.7 °2 The court
reasoned that in Texas, which follows the employment at will doc-
trine, an employer may terminate an employee for refusing to undergo
urinalysis, and the employee will have no grounds for a wrongful dis-
charge action.70 3
In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,704 an employee
was discharged after two urinalyses of the same specimen showed
signs of marijuana use. Subsequent to his termination, the employee
699. Comment, supra note 648, at 1046 n.263; see also Stieber, Recent Developments in
Employment-at-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557-58 (1985) (About 60 million employees are subject to
the employment at will doctrine.); Comment, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the
Workplace: A Proposal for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY L.J. 1011,
1023 (1986) (At will employees constitute "approximately [55] percent of workers in the
United States.") [hereinafter Comment, Use and Abuse]; Noble, supra note 648, § 4, at 10, col.
2 ("[S]eventy percent of American workers are not covered by collective bargaining
agreements or employment contracts .... ").
700. Murg & Scharman, Employment-at-Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23
B.C.L. REV. 329, 334-35 (1982) (citing Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will
Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGIS. HIST. 118, 126 (1976)).
701. Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., No. 409,151 (Tex. 1987), cited in
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 656, at 76.
702. Letter from Judge Joseph H. Hart, District Judge, 126th Judicial District Court of
Texas, to Mr. James C. Harrington, Texas Civil Liberties Union Foundation (May 23, 1987)
(on file at the Texas Civil Liberties Union, Austin, Texas) [hereinafter Letter from Judge
Joseph H. Hart].
703. Id.
704. Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1360 (D.S.C. 1985).
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brought a wrongful discharge action, alleging that the employer knew
or should have known that his urine sample had been mixed with
others in unlabeled bottles." 5  The trial court found that the
employee's at will status meant that he could be terminated at any
time without cause, and therefore he could not maintain an action for
wrongful discharge based on the drug-testing program.70 6
2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE
The employment at will doctrine is firmly grounded in both the
industrial revolution and the spirit of laissez faire capitalism. None-
theless, courts are beginning to recognize the plight of nonunionized
employees in the private sector, who lack both constitutional and col-
lective bargaining protections, and therefore suffer from inferior bar-
gaining power.7° Sympathy for these workers has led to a partial
rescission of the employment at will doctrine within the last two
decades. 7°8  Thus, changes in the the doctrine have inevitably
resulted from changes in the perception of the employment relation-
705. Id. The employee also sought recovery, unsuccessfully, under theories of breach of a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
invasion of privacy. Id.
706. Id. at 1362-63. In determining the employment status of the employee, the court
found that the employee's "hire notice," which stated the employee's position, salary, and start
date, made no mention of an employment contract or employment for a specific time period.
Id. at 1362. One commentator has also identified two early cases in which employers in
employment at will states successfully discharged employees in conjunction with compulsory
urinalysis. See Comment Use and Abuse, supra note 699, at 1023-26. In Finklea v. Tonsey, an
employee was discharged for using prescribed tranquilizers under the theory that the employee
was drug-impaired and unable to perform assembly line work safely. 317 Pa. Super. 553, 556-
57, 464 A.2d 460, 462-63 (1983). In New Orleans Public Service v. Masaracchia, an employee
was dismissed after one unconfirmed drug test showed positive signs of marijuana use. 464
So.2d 866, 867-68 (La. Ct. App. 1985). A coworker had implicated the employee in the drug
use. Id. at 867.
707. See AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 656, at 71 ("'The wrongful
discharge' suit . . . [is a] relatively contemporary legal animal [and] may turn out to be the
employee-at-will's equivalent to a union contract."); Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful
Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 5
(1984). One commentator has traced the rise of judicial intervention in the employment
relationship to the decline of the number of blue collar and unionized jobs in the workplace,
and the consequent decrease in the percentage of employees protected by grievance procedures
incorporated into most collective bargaining agreements. Murg & Scharman, supra note 700,
at 339.
708. See, e.g., Heshizer, The New Common Law of Employment: Changes in the Concept of
Employment at Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 95, 96 (1985) (Judicial weakening of the employment at will
doctrine can be traced back fifteen years, and "the social, economic, and legal frameworks of
the doctrine are under increasing criticism."); St. Antoine, The Revision of Employment-at-
Will Enters a New Phase, 36 LAB. L.J. 563, 563 (1985) ("The most significant development in
the whole field of labor law during the past decade was the growing willingness of the courts to
modify the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will.").
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ship. As a result, judicial intervention has established a modicum of
common law protection for the most vulnerable of American workers.
Increasingly, state courts have limited the effect of the employ-
ment at will doctrine by recognizing exceptions to the doctrine.7"9
These courts have carved out three broad exceptions to the employ-
ment at will doctrine, and accordingly have upheld claims of wrongful
discharge on any of three grounds: (1) the discharge violates public
policy; (2) an implied employment contract can be inferred;71 0 or (3)
the employer has breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.7 1' Both public and private employees may challenge drug-
testing programs based on exceptions to the employment at will doc-
trine, thereby somewhat decreasing the disparity of protections
between these two sectors of the workforce.71 2
a. The Public Policy Exception
Under the public policy exception to the employment at will doc-
trine, the common law recognizes that "an employee who acts to
uphold public policy, or who refuses to act in contravention of public
policy, should not be discharged for such acts or omissions and, if
terminated, will have a tort cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge." '713 At least thirty-seven states recognize the public policy
709. Estimates vary on the number of states that recognize at least one exception to the
employment at will doctrine. One commentator has identified ten states that do not recognize
any exceptions to the doctrine: Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont. See Comment, Use and Abuse, supra note 699,
at 1023 n.71 (citing Strasser, Employment at Will: The Death of a Doctrine?, Nat'l L.J., Jan.
20, 1986, at 1, col. 2.); see also I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at 91 (forty-six
states recognize one or more exceptions).
710. The two most widely recognized exceptions to the employment at will doctrine in the
state courts are the public policy and implied contract exceptions. See generally Lopatka,
supra note 707, at 6-26 (discussing the exceptions); Comment, Use and Abuse, supra note 699,
at 1022-27 (same). For a state-by-state survey of recognized exceptions, see I. SHEPARD & R.
DUSTON, supra note 650, app. A at 107-46. For a discussion of the public policy exception to
employment at will, see infra notes 713-27 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
implied contract exception to employment at will, see infra notes 728-33 and accompanying
text.
711. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been described as the implied covenant
exception to employment at will, under which an employee may only be discharged "for
cause." See I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at 95-96 (discussing the "good cause"
requirement for employee discharges); see also Murg & Scharman, supra note 700. at 330-3 1;
Comment, Use and Abuse, supra note 699, at 1022 n.69 (discussing the implied covenant
exception). For a discussion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see infra
notes 734-42 and accompanying text.
712. Comment, supra note 352, at 835.
713. Comment, Use and Abuse, supra note 699, at 1022 n.67 (citing Heshizer, The New
Common Law of Employment: Changes in the Concepts of Employment at Will, 36 LAB. L.J.
95, 101 (1985)). Depending on the jurisdiction, the limits that the public policy exception
imposes on an employer's discretion to discharge is based either in contract, wherein public
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exception to the employment at will doctrine.7 14  This broad excep-
tion comprises three categories of retaliatory discharges: (1) dis-
charges for refusing to commit an unlawful act; (2) discharges for
exercising or seeking to exercise a legal right or privilege; and (3) dis-
charges for complaining of employer wrongdoing, commonly known
as whistleblowing.71 5
Courts have sought to limit sources of public policy to constitu-
tional or statutory provisions so as not to unduly restrict employers'
discretion to discharge.716 In cases of statutory public policy, the
exception applies only when the mandate of public policy is clear and
the employee lacks alternative remedies.717 The public policy of a
state can normally be found " 'in the form of a legislative enactment
or may arise from the rulemaking authority of an administrative
agency,' "718 but only if the statute does not supply administrative
machinery for relief.719 Five statutes provide employees with reme-
dies for violations of the drug-testing statutes,7 2 0 and therefore do not
provide bases for the public policy exception to the employment at
will doctrine.
The public policy exception has provided employees with effec-
tive protection from invasive employer conduct. In Perks v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co.,72I an at will employee, who had been fired
policy limits an employer's motives for enforcing the at will contract, or in tort, wherein an
employee may recover for tortious discharge based on public policy. See Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (tort); Casebeer,
Teaching an Old Dog Old Tricks. Coppage v. Kansas and At- Will Employment Revisited, 6
CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 784 (1985) (citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974) (contract)).
714. Comment, Use and Abuse, supra note 699, at 1022 n.67 (citing Strasser, Employment
at Will: The Death of a Doctrine?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 1, col. 2). The public policy
exception is a popular challenge to the at will employment doctrine. Lopatka, supra note 707,
at 6 (citing Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy
Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931 n.5 (1983)).
715. Springer, The Wrongful Discharge Case, TRIAL, June, 1985, at 38, 40; see also
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, supra note 656, at 71-72 (discussing the public
policy exception).
716. See Lopatka, supra note 707, at 14.
717. See A. HILL, supra note 696, at 27 (discussing the lack of statutory relief that is a
prerequisite to the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine if the public
policy is statutorily based); I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at 93.
718. A. HILL, supra note 696, at 27 (quoting Mauk, A History and Analysis of the
Employment-at- Will Doctrine, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201, 229 (1985)).
719. A. HILL., supra note 696, at 26-27.
720. For a discussion of the private causes of action conferred by state drug-testing statutes,
see supra notes 685-88 and accompanying text.
721. 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (Pennsylvania public policy limits the use of polygraphs
in the workplace, and does not expressly provide for a private right of action, yet Perks implied
a cause of action in favor of employees who prove a causal relationship between the polygraph
test or refusal to submit to such a test, and their discharge).
~~~~. . . ...... ... :: .. ;
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for allegedly refusing to submit to a polygraph examination, sued the
employer, claiming that the discharge violated the " 'clear mandate of
public policy' " of the state of Pennsylvania.722 Although a Penn-
sylvania statute prohibits the use of polygraph examinations by
employers as a condition of hiring or continued employment, the stat-
ute does not provide employees with a private right of action.7 23  The
court concluded that the polygraph statute embodied a "recognized
facet of public policy" against polygraph testing, and thus reversed
the summary judgment granted to the employer in the trial court.7 24
The public policy exception may also provide protection to
employees who refuse to submit to mandatory drug testing. In Luck
v. Southern Pacific Transport Co. ,725 an employee who was discharged
after refusing to submit to a random drug test successfully claimed
that her dismissal was a wrongful discharge in violation of public pol-
icy based on California's constitutional protection against invasion of
privacy.7 26 Luck illustrates the future viability of such actions in
states where the public policy exception is based in policies that are
broader than the issue of drug testing itself.
In drug-testing cases in which a public policy is statutorily based,
the requirement of an absence of alternative remedies limits the scope
of the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine.7 2
7
Employees are caught in a classic Catch-22 situation, in that the util-
ity of the exception for challenging compulsory drug testing is strong-
est in states that have expressed a clear public policy against
unrestricted drug testing in statutes, which already provide employees
with private rights of action against employers. Rarely will a state
both express a public policy against unrestricted drug testing in a stat-
ute and omit a statutory remedy. Yet it is only in this rare situation
that the statutory public policy exception to the employment at will
doctrine is useful.
b. The Implied Employment Contract Exception
The second major exception to the employment at will doctrine
is based on an implied in fact contract term.7 28 An implied in fact
722. Id. at 1364 (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174
(1974)).
723. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7321(a) (1983).
724. Perks, 611 F.2d at 1366.
725. No. 843,230 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1987) (judgment on special verdict).
726. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 212, at A-2 (Nov. 4, 1987).
727. In Luck, for example, the public policy exception to employment at will was based on
California's constitutional protection against invasion of privacy. Id.
728. See Lopatka, supra note 707, at 17 (discussing the effectiveness of the implied in fact
contract exception, but noting that the public policy exception is more widely recognized);
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term is commonly inferred from written personnel policies and
employee handbooks. 729  Oral statements of policy or procedure,
assurances at the time of hiring, and business custom and usage have
also led the courts to find implied exceptions to the employment at
will doctrine.7 30  When a court finds that an implied contract term
exists, the employment relationship is removed from at will status,
and the parties are bound by the general principles of contract law
applicable to the implied term or terms.7 '
The implied in fact contract exception is of limited utility for
employees to challenge drug testing. By its nature, this judicially
created exception is fact specific and therefore yields precedent of lit-
tle value.73 2 In addition, the exception has no utility for job appli-
cants, because no implied contract of employment is yet in existence.
Courts may not find that an implied in fact contract term exists if
the employer has made a clear disclaimer of contractual commitment.
Even if the court finds that an implied contract term does exist, how-
ever, it must still examine the reason the employee was discharged to
determine whether dismissal was justified.7 33  In the drug-testing
context, the court must thus determine whether refusal to submit to
random mandatory drug testing is just cause for dismissal.
c. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing Exception
Very few courts recognize an implied covenant of good faith and
Springer, supra note 715, at 41 (noting that judicially recognized implied contract terms have
eroded the employment at will doctrine more effectively than public policy exceptions).
729. Lopatka, supra note 707, at 19. One commentator has noted more specifically that
"employer-to-employee communications, including advertisements, interviews, inducements to
leave a job, handbooks, officer speeches, performance appraisals, termination interviews,
termination documents, and benefit plans [may] imply a contract." Springer, supra note 715,
at 41; see, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)
(A company personnel manual that stated a policy of discharging employees only for "just
cause" was sufficient to create an enforceable promise that an employee would not be
terminated except for just cause.). But see Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F.
Supp. 1359, 1362-63 (D.S.C. 1985) (A hire notice, which stated the employee's position, salary,
and starting date, and briefly explained the employer's conflict of interests policy, was not
sufficient to imply contract terms that removed the relationship from at will status.).
730. Lopatka, supra note 707, at 19.
731. The employee will attempt to infer a just cause requirement for dismissal. Springer,
supra note 715, at 41. As of 1986, twenty-six states have recognized the implied contract
exception to employment at will. See Comment, Use and Abuse, supra note 699, at 1022 n.68.
This number represents an increase of eight states since 1984. Lopatka, supra note 707, at 17
n.92.
732. Comment, Use and Abuse, supra note 699, at 1027.
733. Juries typically decide whether the provisions from which an implied contract were
inferred created a just cause requirement for dismissal. See Lopatka, supra note 707, at 20-21.
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fair dealing in the employment relationship as an exception to the
employment at will doctrine.734 This exception, nonetheless, arises in
two contexts. The law may impose a duty on both parties to an
employment agreement that neither will injure the rights of the
other.735 In a more expansive context, a good faith exception to
employment at will may exist regardless of any prior agreements,
express or implied.736 At will employees are primarily concerned with
the second context because they do not enjoy the protection of express
or implied employment agreements that might otherwise offer some
protection from discharge without cause. As an implied in law
exception to employment at will, the covenant of good faith may
restrict an employer's discretion to discharge an employee for refusing
to take a compulsory urinalysis test, even absent an implied con-
tract.7 3 7 The principal question is the extent to which the covenant
of good faith restricts an employer's discretion to discharge
employees.
An employee may recover under the implied covenant of good
faith against an employer who has exhibited bad faith in connection
with an at will discharge. 738  For example, bad faith may exist in the
act of discharging an employee for refusing to submit to drug testing
if the employee has not displayed signs of drug use, does not have an
attendance or disciplinary problem that might indicate drug use, and
is not employed in a sensitive position that might otherwise warrant
drug testing absent individualized suspicion.73 9
In Luck,74 ° an employee recovered compensatory as well as puni-
tive damages under the implied covenant theory. In the suit against
the railroad for wrongful discharge, the jury found that it was not
734. See infra note 737 and accompanying text.
735. Lopatka, supra note 707, at 23.
736. AMERICAN MANAGEMENT AssocIATION, supra note 656, at 74.
737: Only five states recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception
to the employment at will doctrine: California, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, and North
Dakota. Comment, Use and Abuse, supra note 699, at 1022 n.69 (citing Strasser, Employment
at Will The Death of a Doctrine?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 6). The good faith covenant
may apply to the employment at will relationship in Alaska, Nevada, and Oklahoma. See I.
SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at 96 n.31; ef Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles &
Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985) (refusing to extend the covenant of good faith
from the commercial setting to the labor setting).
738. Some state courts that recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
have refused to create a "for cause" requirement in the discharge of employees. See, e.g.,
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 385, 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (1985)
("[The] implied covenant of good faith.., does not create a duty for the employer to terminate
the employee only for good cause [or] 'no cause' . . . because tenure was never a benefit
inherent in the at-will agreement.").
739. Comment, supra note 648, at 1047.
740. No. 843,230 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1987) (udgment on special verdict).
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necessary to include the employee in the company's mandatory drug-
testing program in order to ensure the safe operation and maintenance
of the railroad.?41 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may
also offer a cause of action for an employee who has been discharged
on the basis of one unconfirmed positive test result, or an employee
who is discharged after the employer has used questionable control
procedures in the administration of drug tests. The standard of good
faith and fair dealing may further require employers to confirm posi-
tive drug tests with alternative, highly reliable testing methods and to
utilize strict control procedures when testing employees for drug
use.
74 2
B. Invasion of Privacy
The common law tort of invasion of privacy is divided into four
distinct causes of action: Intrusion upon the plaintiff's private
affairs, public disclosure of private facts, publicity that places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and appropriation of the
plaintiff's name or likeness.743 Privacy issues are divided into mat-
ters of informational and behavioral privacy. "Informational privacy
encompasses the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of informa-
tion about the individual employee. Behavioral privacy concerns the
employee's expectation of autonomy or the right to engage in certain
activities without public or employer intrusion." '744 Both issues are
relevant when employers collect the urine of their employees and per-
form analyses to extract personal information. The common law tort
of invasion of privacy may protect both the informational and behav-
ioral privacy of employees from compulsory drug testing and may, in
some instances, parallel federal constitutional protections available to
public employees.745
741. Id. at 2. The jury awarded the employee $212,000 in compensatory damages and
$273,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 3, 4.
742. For a comparison of the reliability and accuracy of the various drug tests, see supra
notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
743. Dean William Prosser has explained that invasion of privacy is not one tort, but rather
"four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff." See Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 385 (1960). The American Law Institute later adopted these general
privacy principles. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). The fourth
theory, appropriation of the plaintiff's name or likeness, would have no application to
challenges to compulsory urinalyses.
744. Barnes & White, Employee Privacy Rights: "Everything You Always Wanted to
Know-But Shouldn't", MICH. B.J., Oct. 1985, at 1104, 1105.
745. For a discussion of constitutional protections afforded to public employees who are
subjected to compulsory drug testing, see supra notes 84-355 and accompanying text.
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1. INTRUSION UPON PRIVATE AFFAIRS
An intrusion upon a person's private affairs is actionable only if
it is highly offensive to a reasonable person.74 6 Application of this test
to compulsory urinalysis requires balancing an array of competing
interests.747 Employees have an interest in minimizing intrusions into
their private lives. Employers counterpose their obligation to provide
a safe environment for employees and the public, to provide safe prod-
ucts or services of high quality, and to prevent financial loss resulting
from employee drug use.74 8
In determining whether drug testing is highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person, some state courts follow a traditional fourth amend-
ment analysis. 4'" The constitutional analysis begins with a deter-
mination of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, and
then inquires whether the intrusion into this expectation of privacy
was reasonable under the circumstances.75 ° Superimposing constitu-
tional analysis onto a tort claim is somewhat misguided, however.
The test of intrusion upon private affairs is a separate cause of action
that provides greater protection than the fourth amendment, because,
in tort actions, the mere intrusion upon the protected interest itself,
and not whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy that has
been violated, subjects an actor to liability.7 ' If the intrusion is not
highly offensive to a reasonable person, however, the tort claim will
probably fail.752 In this sense, the reasonableness of drug testing is a
compelling factor in determining the degree of offensiveness, if any,
that follows.
746. "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
747. This analysis can proceed in the same manner as cases brought by public employees
under the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. For a discussion of
fourth amendment protection in public sector drug testing, see supra notes 84-150 and
accompanying text.
748. NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEMS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE 11 (1987). For a discussion of the concept
that some employers may have a duty to test their employees for drug use, see infra notes 824-
79 and accompanying text.
749. I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at 22; see, e.g., Jennings v. Minco
Technology Labs, Inc., No. 409,151 (Tex. 1987) (following most recent fourth amendment
drug-testing cases in finding that a random testing program of private employees was
reasonable, and applying that standard to the reasonableness requirement of the tort of
invasion of privacy).
750. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
751. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b (1977).
752. Murphy, How To Protect Employees Who Are Tested for Drug and Alcohol Abuse,
PRAC. LAW., April, 1987, at 27, 36 (1987).
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In an analogous context, employees have challenged mandatory
polygraph examinations under the tort of invasion upon private
affairs. In O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America,75 an employer
required an employee to submit to a polygraph examination based on
suspicion of off-duty drug use. The employee sued for invasion of
privacy and won a jury award of over $400,000 in damages.7"4 The
First Circuit affirmed the award and the finding that, in addition to
answering questions about alleged off-duty drug use, the employee
was "asked about matters that were unrelated to his employment and
that he was entitled to keep private." ' The court concluded that the
investigative techniques used by the employer constituted an invasion
of privacy, and that the employer's conduct exceeded the scope of any
consent that the employee had given to the polygraph examination.756
Consent by an employee is a defense to an invasion of privacy
claim. 57 The issue of whether an employee consented to the inva-
sion is therefore integral to any recovery. If, as in O'Brien, the
employer exceeds the scope of any consent that may have been
granted, the consent is ineffective for the excess, and the employee
may recover for an intrusion upon private affairs.75 Consent is simi-
larly ineffective if given under duress.759
753. 780 F.2d 1067 (lst Cir. 1986).
754. Id. at 1076.
755. Id. at 1071. The employee also sued under theories of wrongful discharge and
defamation. The wrongful discharge claim was unsuccessful. Id. at 1072.
756. O'Brien, 780 F.2d at 1072. The employer had argued that the employee Implicitly
consented to necessary investigations because the personnel manual forbade drug use. Id.; see
also Comment, supra note 653, at 581-82 (discussing the precedential value of O'Brien for
other intrusion of privacy claims). These claims may have merit in cases in which the drug
tests have been administered improperly. See generally Cross & Haney, Legal Issues Involved
in Private Sector Medical Testing of Job Applicants and Employees, 20 IND. L. REV. 517, 521-
22 (1987) (discussing claims of invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
The "high offensiveness" requirement for the invasion of privacy tort may be met in cases
in which drug testing was mandated absent individualized suspicion of drug use by the
employee. Recently, in Black v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., an employee challenged the right of
her employer to require all employees to submit to drug testing as a condition of continued
employment. No. 4-87-512 (D. Minn. filed June 9, 1987) (case dismissed Dec. 27, 1987
pursuant to an agreement between the parties). The employee refused to submit to a drug test
until either the employer had reasonable grounds for suspecting she was using drugs on the
job, or until a drug test was developed that could measure drug impairment. After she was
discharged, Black filed a common law invasion of privacy action, patterned on the elements of
section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and claimed that the employer violated her
right of privacy by mandating drug testing as a condition of continued employment. Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 118, at A-4 (June 22, 1987). Significantly, in Black, the employee who
brought the invasion of privacy claim never submitted to a drug test. See id.
757. Prosser, supra note 743, at 419.
758. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1977).
759. See id. § 892B.
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In Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc. ,760 however, a court
ruled that an employee's consent to a urinalysis that was a condition
of continued employment was a defense to a tort claim for intrusion
upon private affairs.16 ' The court analyzed the elements of the claim
in light of section 652B of the Second Restatement of Torts. The
court's decision suggests that an employee must first refuse a compul-
sory urinalysis test in order to meet the element of intentional intru-
sion. This analysis results in a no-win situation for employees faced
with mandatory drug testing. If an employee submits to a drug test,
the employer will have the benefit of the defense of consent to the
invasion. Conversely, if an employee refuses to submit to compulsory
drug testing, no intentional invasion has taken place, and an invasion
of privacy claim will not be actionable. A more reasonable assess-
ment of the social forces at work may treat consent that is elicited
under the threat of loss of employment as given under duress, and
thus ineffective as a defense to the invasion.762
The intrusion upon private affairs tort theory has been criticized
on several levels because it does not offer adequate protection to
employees against unreasonable searches. First, as explained above,
an employee's consent to a drug test' is a defense to the tort action.
Second, a factual issue exists as to whether the intrusion will be
deemed highly offensive to a reasonable person. Third, in balancing
the relevant interests, the court or jury must ascertain whether the
''employer's purpose outweighed the privacy interest of the
employee. ' 7 63  All of these factors indicate that this action inade-
quately protects employees from compulsory drug testing.
2. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
Employers have an obligation to keep personnel and employee
medical information confidential unless disclosure is necessary for a
legitimate business purpose.7 64 The potential for abuse of informa-
tional privacy has grown as employers increasingly collect personal
760. Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., No. 409,151 (Tex. 1987). For a discussion
of the applicability of the employment at will doctrine to the disposition of Jennings, see supra
notes 701-03 and accompanying text.
761. Letter from Judge Joseph H. Hart, supra note 702.
762. State statutes that regulate the use of polygraph testing in the workplace uniformly
prohibit employers from requiring consent to an exam as a condition of continued
employment. See I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at app. A at 107-46; see also
Note, Lie Detectors in the Workplace: The Need for Civil Action Against Employers, 101
HARV. L. REV. 806, 814 (1988) (discussing the "spurious" nature of consent to polygraphs
given the "economic necessity" of finding new employment).
763. Comment, supra note 648, at 1023.
764. I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at 83.
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information about their employees.7 65  An employee may use the
common law tort of public disclosure of private facts to recover dam-
ages from an employer "when the matter made public [is] highly
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities." 766
Under chemical analysis, urine can yield a wealth of information
about an employee's health, diet, prescription drug use, and physical
and physiological state.767 Like blood, urine is a bodily fluid that
"can be analyzed in a medical laboratory to discover numerous physi-
ological facts about the person from whom it came, including but
hardly limited to recent ingestion of alcohol or drugs. ' 768 Two com-
mentators have identified the attendant privacy issue as a concern
over "behavioral privacy or personal autonomy. "769 An unprece-
dented amount of private information about employees' off-duty con-
duct has been made available to employers through employee drug
testing. During a polygraph examination, an employee's refusal to
answer a question may implicate him in certain matters. Conversely,
urinalysis yields highly specific information extending far beyond a
search for evidence of alcohol and drug use. Moreover, employees
submitting to urinalysis are powerless to distinguish between ques-
tions and information they may wish not to answer or divulge. Con-
sent to urinalysis effectively becomes a blanket consent to an
investigation that is limited only by the technical tools at the
employer's disposal. 770
765. Barnes & White, supra note 744, at 1106.
766. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 856-57 (5th ed. 1984). The public
disclosure of private facts tort has three requirements for recovery: First, the disclosure of
private facts must be made publicly; second, the facts publicly disclosed must be private facts;
and third, the matter made public must be one that would be highly offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. Id.
767. For example, an employee who has taken prescription medication to control epilepsy
will show positive signs of drugs such as phenobarbitol, Dilantin, Mysoline, and Depakene in
his urine. Millions of Americans are under medication to control illnesses such as depression,
diabetes, and hypertension. Pollak, A Bitter Pill for Epileptics, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1986, at
A27, col. 1. The danger is that employers may be tempted to discharge employees with
medical problems despite adequate performance. See Stille, supra note 19, at 22.
768. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387 (E.D. La.
1986) (quoting McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (D. Iowa 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d
1302 (8th Cir. 1986) vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072
(1988).
769. See Barnes & White, supra note 744, at 1106.
770. As of this writing, the public disclosure of private facts theory has not been tested as a
legal means to block an employer's dissemination of private information obtained through
urinalysis drug testing. In Houston Belt & Terminal Railway v. Wherry, an employee
challenged the employer's dissemination of allegedly false positive test results of a urinalysis,
but his recovery was premised on the tort of defamation. 548 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. Ct. App.
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Unlike the tort of invasion upon private affairs, the tort of public
disclosure of private facts attaches to the information collected, and
remains viable long after the initial intrusion. Thus, an employee who
has been tested can use this action to ensure that the private facts
revealed through drug testing are not made public. The public disclo-
sure of private facts theory, however, does not protect employees
against the administration of compulsory drug-testing programs,
because it restricts only the disclosure of the information after it is
collected, and not the collection itself.
3. FALSE LIGHT IN THE PUBLIC EYE
Under the tort theory of placing a person in a false light in the
public eye, the plaintiff must show that the false light is "highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person," and that the defendant knew of the false
light or acted in reckless disregard of the false light in which the
plaintiff would be placed.77' This tort action protects plaintiffs from
statements and other actions that purport to give a factual account of
matters but are actually untrue. In the drug-testing context, this the-
ory may apply in cases in which an employer has disseminated false
results about an employee's drug test.
The dissemination of falsities about employees may result from
1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977). For a discussion of the defamation claim in
Wherry, see infra notes 785-89 and accompanying text.
The issue of the privacy of medical information in the employment context has been
litigated, but the physician-patient privilege of confidentiality of medical data does not extend
to the relationship between employees and a physician retained by an employer to examine the
employees. See Menard & Morrill, The Employer and the Law of Privacy in the Workplace-
The U.S. Model to Date, 9 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 93, 97 (1983). In Bratt v.
International Business Machines Corp., an employee challenged the company physician's
written disclosure to management that the employee might be suffering from a paranoid state
of mind. 392 Mass. 508, 512, 467 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1984). In answer to certified questions
from the First Circuit, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that in determining
whether a company physician's disclosure of private facts about an employee constituted an
invasion of privacy, it would balance the employer's business interest with the employee's right
of privacy. Id. at 523, 467 N.E.2d. at 137. The court stated that disseminating medical
information that is reasonably necessary to serve a substantial and valid interest of the
employer would not constitute an invasion of privacy. Id. at 524, 467 N.E.2d at 137. For
example, an employer has a valid interest in an employee's ability to perform job duties
effectively. The First Circuit reversed the summary judgment granted to IBM, and, because a
genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the violation of Bratt's privacy, remanded the
case to the district court. Bratt v. International Business Machs., Corp., 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir.
1986).
771. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (In an action under the New York invasion of privacy statute, publication
is privilegedunless the defendant made false statements "with knowledge of the falsity or acted
in reckless disregard of the falsity.").
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inaccurate drug tests that result in false positive reports of drug use.77 2
This scenario would not meet the elements of the false light tort
action unless the employer had actual knowledge of the falsity or
acted in reckless disregard of the falsity. It is unclear whether falsi-
ties about an employee that are publicly disseminated under circum-
stances that may approach negligence on the part of an employer will
support an action of this kind." 3
As a potential protection for employees from compulsory
urinalyses and employer drug policies, the tort theory of invasion of
privacy by publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light has only
limited merit. In theory, "[r]ecovery for an invasion of privacy on the
ground that the plaintiff was depicted in a false light makes sense only
when the account, if true, would not have been actionable as an inva-
sion of privacy. ' 774 In other words, the tort recovery is based only on
the intentional or reckless falsity of the information disseminated. In
this respect, these challenges to compulsory urinalyses are no different
than if an employer made deliberate falsehoods about other aspects of
an employee's work or private life.
C. Defamation
Defamation may be a viable cause of action for employees pro-
ceeding against employers who have communicated the results of
inaccurate drugs tests to third parties. A communication is defama-
tory if it "tends to harm [the] reputation [of the employee] so as to
lower him or her in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him or her. ' 775 Most courts
hold that a defendant is subject to liability to a private individual if
the defendant made a defamatory communication and was negligent
with regard to its falsity. 776 Therefore, an employee must show not
only that the employer made an inaccurate statement concerning a
positive drug test, but also that the employer negligently failed to
ensure the validity of the drug test by confirming the result or using
772. For a discussion of the scientific accuracy of urinalysis drug-testing methods, see supra
notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
773. In a caveat to section 652E, the American Law Institute took no position on whether
recovery would be possible if the tortious actor was merely negligent in releasing the false
information, rather than reckless or intentional. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E
caveat (1977).
774. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 766, at 865.
775. Tannenbaum v. Foerster, 648 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (E.D. Wis. 1986); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
776. See, e.g., Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 46 (D. Kan. 1981); Jenoffv. Hearst
Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd, 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981); RESTATEMENT




The two classifications of libel778 are libel per se and libel per
quod. Libel per se means that the statement is defamatory on its
face.779 Libel per quod refers to communications that are either
ambiguous on their face, or for which extrinsic facts are necessary to
show the defamatory character of the words. 780  An employer's writ-
ten statement that an employee has tested positive for drug use is
ambiguous because it does not expressly state that the employee is an
illicit drug user. Courts would therefore consider the employer's
statement actionable per quod.
In a libel per quod action, a plaintiff must prove an "innuendo"
as part of his prima facie case.7 8' An employer's statement that an
employee has tested positive for drug use implies that an employee is
an illicit drug user. This implication serves as the innuendo in a libel
per quod action. In addition, an employee must prove special dam-
ages in a libel per quod action.782 An employee's loss of income
resulting from the publication of an inaccurate drug test would consti-
tute the requisite special harm.783
Of course, truth is always a defense in a defamation action.8
The truth defense must be as broad as the allegation framing the innu-
endo. In a defamation action arising out of drug testing, the employer
777. For a discussion of drug-testing methods, see supra notes 42-65 and accompanying
text.
778. "Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by
its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication that has the
potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(1) (1977). In contrast, "slander consists of the publication of
defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures or by any other form of
communication other than those stated [in the libel definition]." Id. at § 568(2).
779. See Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 66 N.D. 578, 587, 268 N.W.
400, 405 (1936).
- 780. See Battista v. United Illuminating Co., 10 Conn. App. 486, 491, 523 A.2d 1356, 1359,
appeal denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 1352 (1987).
781. See Quartana v. Utterback, 609 F. Supp. 72, 74 (E.D. Mo. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 789 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1986).
782. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. First Wisconsin Fin. Corp., 625 F. Supp. 108, 125-26
(N.D. I11. 1985). Special damages represent a pecuniary loss that flows from the harm to
reputation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 comment b; id. at § 622. In a slander
action, a plaintiff need not prove special damages if the defamatory statement falls within one
of four categories. See id. at § 571 (slanderous imputations of criminal conduct); id. at § 572
(slanderous imputations of loathsome disease); id. at § 573 (slanderous imputations affecting a
business, trade, profession or office); id. at § 574 (slanderous imputations of sexual
misconduct). If an employer publishes a slanderous statement that an employee tested positive
for drugs, an employee may argue that the comment is a statement concerning his fitness in a
given profession. See id. at § 573.
783. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743, 753 (Tex. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
784. 1. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at 100.
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will seek to show as a defense that the employee is in fact an illicit
drug user. In jurisdictions that do not consider truth as an affirmative
defense, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defamatory
statement is false. One opportunity that an employee may have to
disprove statements regarding illicit drug use is to introduce evidence
showing that the result of a confirmatory drug test was negative. In
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway v. Wherry,7"' an employee who ini-
tially tested positive for drug use secured an independent examina-
tion786 revealing that the initial positive test result was inaccurate, and
communicated this finding to the employer.78 7 The employer pub-
lished the inaccurate test result to the Department of Labor despite
knowledge of its falsity,788 and was subsequently held liable for
defamation.789
The utility of a defamation action for employees in drug-testing
cases is limited by the employer's qualified privilege to communicate
defamatory statements to other employees, supervisors, or agents
within a business organization.79 ° In Merritt v. Detroit Memorial
Hospital,79 I an employee brought a defamation action against his
employer for publishing the results of a drug test to supervisory per-
sonnel.792 The employee had submitted to a drug test as part of an
annual physical examination, and had tested positive for morphine.793
The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the employer's commu-
nication of the drug test result to supervisory personnel was privi-
leged.794 In order to overcome this qualified privilege, an employee
must show that the employer abused the privilege. Abuse of a quali-
fied privilege requires proof that (1) the employer had an improper
purpose in publishing the defamatory statements; 79 (2) the employer
had knowledge of the falsity of the statement or had a reckless disre-
gard for the truth;796 or (3) the employer exceeded the scope of the
785. 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977).
786. In Wherry, a urinalysis test of an employee who had fainted on the job revealed traces
of methadone. Id. at 746.
787. Id.
788. Id. at 747.
789. Id. at 755.
790. I. SHEPARD & R. DUSTON, supra note 650, at 100.
791. 81 Mich. App. 279, 265 N.W.2d 124 (1978).
792. Id. at 281-82, 265 N.W.2d at 125.
793. Id.
794. Id. at 285-87, 265 N.W.2d at 127-28.
795. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603.(1977).
796. Id. § 600. In some jurisdictions, negligence with regard to the false matter may subject
an employer to liability. See, e.g., Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982),




Employees have been successful in collecting damages in defama-
tion actions from employers for publicizing the results of inaccurate
drug tests. The defamation action appears to be limited, however, by
an employer's privilege to communicate defamatory statements to
persons within the business organization. Nevertheless, as long as
employees enjoy the right to independently confirm a positive test
result,7 9 8 an employee can show that the employer abused his privi-
lege if he was notified that the initial test result was inaccurate. The
employer's abuse of privilege stems from his knowledge of the falsity
of the initial test result.
D. Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
An employer who intentionally or recklessly causes severe emo-
tional distress by engaging in extreme and outrageous conduct may be
subject to liability under the tort action of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 799 To recover damages based on this theory, an
employee must prove: (1) that the employer acted in an extreme and
outrageous manner; (2) that the employer intended to cause, or acted
in reckless disregard of the probability that severe emotional distress
would result from the conduct; (3) that the employer's extreme and
outrageous conduct actually and proximately caused the emotional
distress; and (4) that the resulting emotional distress was severe. °0
An intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising from
a compulsory urinalysis program is actionable if the manner in which
a test is performed is so improper as to constitute extreme and outra-
geous conduct. Furthermore, an employee who has been discharged
for refusing to submit to a urinalysis drug test absent any reasonable
suspicion of drug use may have a cause of action under this theory.8"'
797. According to the Second Restatement of Torts, an employer exceeds the scope of the
privilege if he publishes the defamatory matter to an unprivileged party, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 604 (1977), publishes the defamatory matter unnecessarily, id. at § 605,
or publishes unprivileged defamatory matter in addition to privileged matter, id. at § 605a.
798. Recently enacted state statutes grant employees the right to rebut a positive drug test
with a confirmatory test. For a discussion of drug-testing statutes, see supra notes 664-89 and
accompanying text.
799. "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46(1) (1977).
800. See Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972).
801. Comment, supra note 653, at 580. Conversely, the individualized suspicion standard
for compulsory drug testing is subject to abuse because it gives employers the discretion to
choose which employees to drug test. If an employer singles out an employee for more testing
than is reasonably necessary to ensure that the employee is not using drugs, the employee may
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Similarly, an employer that does not give employees or job applicants
"adequate notice" before requiring them to submit to urinalyses may
also be subject to potential liability for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.112 The tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress has been successfully invoked to challenge the conduct of an
employer that arises out of compulsory drug testing. In Luck v.
Southern Pacific Transport Company,80 3 a computer programmer
alleged that after her refusal to sign a consent form and submit to a
urinalysis, her employer initiated a series of discussions with her that
lasted for many hours over two days. She alleged that in the course of
the discussions, the employer questioned her about her personal
beliefs, her attitudes toward her person, her bodily functions, and her
assertion of personal rights on which the refusal to submit to the
urinalysis was based. Luck recently won a jury award of $485,000
from her employer.80 4 In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space
Co. ,85 however, the court disposed of a claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress in urinalysis drug testing in summary judgment
for the employer after finding that the employer's conduct did not
constitute extreme and outrageous behavior. The employee was ter-
minated after a drug test administered during an annual employment
physical examination yielded positive results for marijuana use.8°6
The court focused on the manner in which the employee was actually
terminated in finding that the elements of intentional infliction of
emotional distress were not met.80 7
In some jurisdictions, a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress may be an appropriate action for recovery by employees,
primarily when negligence has been exhibited by an employer in
be able to prove that the employer has been engaging in extreme and outrageous conduct
against him.
802. Cross & Haney, supra note 756, at 520.
803. No. 843,230 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1987) (judgment on special verdict).
804. Id. at 3-4; see also Pettigrew v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. 851,847 (filed Nov. 21,
1985), consolidated with Pettigrew v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. 849,343 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed Jan. 17, 1986). In Pettigrew, an employee alleged that his urinalysis produced a false
positive result. The employee was told that he could take another urinalysis, but regardless of
the result, he would have to undergo a five day hospital evaluation program. The second test
yielded negative results. The employer then committed the employee to a twenty-eight day
inpatient hospital rehabilitation program, and subsequently forced him to attend alcohol and
narcotics addiction care meetings, and submit to at least ten drug tests. The plaintiff's suit for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is pending in San Francisco Superior Court, and the
employee also has initiated an action for false imprisonment against the employer based on the
forced inpatient stay. Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1986, at 29, 30.
805. Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985).
806. The court reprinted a substantial portion of the employee's description of his
termination in the opinion. Id. at 1366-69.
807. Id. at 1360.
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the administration of a compulsory urinalysis examination.8 °8
Employers should conduct compulsory urinalyses in accordance with
common law or statutorily defined standards of care, which normally
require that a positive drug test be confirmed by an alternative testing
technique. 8°9 Failure to do so may create a forseeable, unreasonable
risk of harm to an employee for which an employer may be liable. 810
As a protection against compulsory drug testing, claims of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress may prove to be of greater utility
than intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because proof
of the higher order of wrongdoing of intent or recklessness is not
required. If employees can show that after being subjected to a com-
pulsory urinalysis test, their discharge or subsequent employer con-
duct was based on one, unconfirmed false positive urinalysis, a trier of
fact may be able to find negligence in the conduct of the employer.
E. Comment
Common law theories to remedy ill treatment from drug testing
do not adequately protect private sector employees. Different states,
with different common law traditions, afford their citizens varying
degrees of protection. This difference in protection from state to state
facilitates the same pattern of inconsistent protection that employees
have encountered with state constitutional and statutory protections.
The utility of the widely recognized public policy exception to
the employment at will doctrine is limited because only six states have
actually expressed a policy in favor of regulating employment drug
808. Claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress that arise out of compulsory drug
testing are actionable only in jurisdictions that recognize the tort absent the additional
requirement of resulting bodily harm. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., 534
A.2d 1282, 1285-86 (Me. 1987) (no physical injury required).
809. The courts and state statutes typically require an employer to confirm a positive
urinalysis with an alternative technique, usually the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry
procedure. See supra note 684 and accompanying text. An employee who is discharged or
otherwise incurs damages as a result of a single, unconfirmed EMIT test may bring a
negligence action against the employer or the testing firm. See Herman & Bernholz,
Negligence in Employee Drug Testing, CASE & COMMENT, July-August 1987, at 3, 4
(discussing Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 833
F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). For a discussion of the reliability of drug-testing techniques, see
supra notes 42-65 and accompanying text. In Pettigrew v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., an
employee brought claims for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
based on the employer's conduct in relation to a mandatory drug testing policy. Pettigrew, No.
851,847 (filed Nov. 21, 1985) consolidated with No. 849,343 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 17,
1986). The negligent infliction of emotional distress claim includes an allegation that the
employer relied on a false positive test result. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 31, col 2.
810. "[N]egligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 282 (1977).
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testing, upon which the exception could be based.81" ' The courts have
not widely recognized implied in fact contract terms and implied in
law covenants of good faith as providing exceptions to the employ-
ment at will doctrine.' 12  Moreover, one critic has argued that execu-
tives and managers are the types of employees who are most likely to
sue under these exceptions.8" 3 If this is true, most unskilled and
lower-salaried employees, who constitute the majority of discharged
workers, are unlikely to utilize the exceptions, and will therefore
remain unaffected in their vulnerability in at will employment. The
protections accorded employees in at will jurisdictions are inadequate
in comparison to the public employees' relative security of guaranteed
continued employment absent just cause for dismissal, 814 and by pri-
vate employees in states that regulate drug testing.8" 5
Tort recoveries are inherently retrospective in nature. Reinstate-
ments or money damages are offered as restitution after the wrong has
been committed. Successful tort claims result only after employees
have been forced to submit to undue physical, psychological, and
social harm via workplace drug testing. In addition, several of the
tort actions are only available after employers have failed to confirm
positive drug tests with adequate secondary tests.8" 6 Ironically, the
success of certain tort claims inherently depend on theflawed admin-
istration of drug tests.8 7  As drug testing programs proliferate in the
private sector, more employers will realize the need to institute confir-
matory drug tests and other safeguards. The viability of tort claims
811. For a discussion of the public policy exception to employment at will and its limited
utility when statutory remedies are available, see supra notes 713-27 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of legislative responses to employee drug testing, see supra notes 664-89 and
accompanying text.
812. Stieber, supra note 699, at 558.
813. Id.; cf. Comment, Employer-Employee Relations-The Employee Polygraph Protection
Act: Eliminating Polygraph Testing in Private Employment Is Not the Answer, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J.
355, 376 n.122 (1987) (citing survey responses of 295 small- and medium-size firms that
revealed that most employees who have sued for wrongful discharge are from the clerical
ranks).
814. For a discussion of the constitutional protection that public employees may invoke to
challenge compulsory drug testing by government employers, see supra notes 85-355 and
accompanying text.
815. For a discussion of state statutes on drug testing in the private sector, see supra notes
664-89 and accompanying text.
816. Actions for false light in the public eye, defamation, and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, are premised either on an employer's statements and actions based on a
single, unconfirmed positive drug test, or, in the alternative, on the intentional dissemination of
false information based on a drug test. But see Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No.
843,320 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1987) (judgment on special verdict). In Luck, an employee
recovered damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress after refusing to submit to a
drug test. See supra notes 803-04 and accompanying text.
817. See supra notes 808-10 and accompanying text.
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will therefore decrease. Tort theories do not afford the increasing
number of subject employees adequate protections to prevent the
potential for abuse of mandatory drug testing.
The tort theories described above are not totally devoid of benefi-
cial effects, however. As more cases involving challenges to compul-
sory urinalyses enter the courts, the common law may begin to define
the contours of socially desirable behavior in this area of employment
relations. Slowly, the parameters of what constitutes acceptable or
unacceptable workplace drug policies will become clearer. The threat
of large jury awards for aggrieved employees may also help to deter
employers from undesirable behavior in the future.81 s
Compulsory drug-testing in the private sector is becoming com-
monplace and will probably continue to grow in use.819 Unless a pri-
vate employer has a sufficient connection with the government,
private sector employees generally lack the constitutional protections
available to their public sector counterparts.8 20 Although the states
are free to expand individual rights beyond the scope of federal pro-
tections, California is the only state that has extended constitutional
protection to employees from the administration of compulsory drug
testing.82'
Although state legislatures have begun to respond to the needs of
private sector employees by enacting legislation regulating the use of
compulsory drug testing in the private sector,8 22 these statutes provide
inconsistent and limited protection to employees. They suffer from
the same inadequacy as common law exceptions to the employment at
will doctrine and common law tort theories of recovery.82 3 The diver-
gence of drug-testing policies among different jurisdictions may
impede the ability of national employers to establish coherent national
policies of personnel management. The cumulative effect of this lack
of uniform personnel policies among interstate employers may have a
deleterious effect on the national economy.
818. Jury verdicts against employers for invasion of privacy increased 2,000 percent
between 1985 and 1987, as compared to the period between 1981 and 1984. Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 170, at A-10 (Sept. 3, 1987). The average jury verdict from 1985 to 1987 in
employee privacy cases was $316,000. Id.
819. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
820. For a discussion of state action, see supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
821. For a discussion of state constitutional protections available to private employees from
compulsory drug testing, see supra notes 649-63 and accompanying text.
822. For a discussion of state statutes relating to drug testing in the private sector, see supra
notes 664-89 and accompanying text.
823. For a discussion of wrongful discharge, the employment at will doctrine, common law
exceptions to the doctrine, and other common law tort theories of recovery, see supra notes
690-822 and accompanying text.
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Statutory guidelines at the -national level would ensure that the
interests of all concerned were adequately represented. Until Con-
gress enacts legislation addressing mandatory employee drug testing
in the private sector, private employers will remain largely unguided
and unrestrained in their administration of drug testing of both job
applicants and current employees. Meaningful national legislation
would begin to address the twin aims of uniformity of workplace
drug-testing laws and meaningful employee protections in this grow-
ing area of personnel management.
VIII. THE DUTY TO TEST AND PROTECT THIRD PARTIES
The increased frequency and acceptance of employee drug test-
ing give rise to several novel theories sounding in negligence, and in
rare instances, strict liability. 24 Under these theories, an employer
may, in certain circumstances, have a duty to drug test in an attempt
to identify drug-impaired employees. 25 If drug testing reveals that an
employee has used drugs, employers may have an additional duty to
take reasonable action to protect third parties from the hazards asso-
ciated with the presence of drug-impaired employees.8 26 At present,
theories of liability for failure to drug test and failure to protect third
parties from harm have yet to be applied in litigation. As such, their
viability will be discussed within a largely theoretical framework, rely-
ing on general principles of tort law.
A. Negligent Hiring
Employers in certain industries may have a duty to test their job
applicants for drug use as part of a background investigation, depend-
ing upon the safety and security concerns of the particular position,
and in some instances, the burden on the employer to administer a
background check. An employer who has inadequately investigated
or failed to investigate the background of a job applicant may be sub-
ject to liability for negligent hiring. 27 An action for negligent hiring
824. For a discussion of the increased frequency and acceptance of employee drug testing,
see supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
825. A duty to test may arise in two situations: First, when a preemployment investigation
is conducted, and second, when an employer suspects drug use in the workplace.
826. An employee who tests positive for drugs is not necessarily impaired on the job
because a drug test cannot measure intoxication. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
827. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213(b) (1958). Most jurisdictions have
recognized the theory of negligent hiring. See, e.g., Ponticas v. KMS Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907,
910-11 & n.4 (Minn. 1983) (recognizing negligent hiring and surveying jurisdictions);
Minnesota Developments-Employer Liability for the Criminal Acts of Employees Under
Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 68 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1307-08 & n.23
(1984) (surveying jurisdictions) [hereinafter Minnesota Developments]. Courts have applied
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imposes primary, rather than vicarious,828 liability on an employer,
because the employer has, through his own negligence, created an
unreasonable risk of harm to others.8 29  This unreasonable risk of
negligent hiring to the hiring of independent contractors. See, e.g., Western Stock Center, Inc.
v. Sevit, Inc., 195 Colo. 372, 376, 578 P.2d 1045, 1048 (1978); Woodward v. Mettille, 81 I11.
App. 3d 168, 184-85, 400 N.E.2d 934, 947-48 (1980); Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697, 703-04, 190
S.E.2d 189, 193 (1972). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411 (1965)
(negligence in the selection of a contractor). Negligent hiring originated from the fellow
servant rule. See Note, 10 N.M.L. REV. 491, 491 n.3 (1980). This rule recognized that
employers had a duty to hire competent employees to protect other employees from harm. Id.
The protection of the fellow servant rule was extended to the general public. Id. For a
discussion of the historical development of an employer's duty to select competent employees,
see Comment, The Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of Their Employees.- The
Negligent Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717, 719-21 (1977) [hereinafter
Comment, Responsibility of Employers]. For a discussion of the tort of negligent hiring, see
Silver, Negligent Hiring Claims Take Off, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 72; Comment, Negligent
Hiring and Negligent Entrustment.- The Case Against Exclusion, 52 OR. L. REV. 296 (1973);
Comment, Negligent Hiring: Employer's Liability for Acts of an Employee, 7 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 603 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Negligent Hiring]; Comment, Responsibility of
Employers, supra; Minnesota Developments, supra; and Note, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 361
(1984).
If courts recognize a cause of action for negligent hiring based upon an employer's failure
to test for drugs, employers will be fearful of unlimited exposure to liability and may be
unwilling to hire drug abusers even though these individuals may be competent and reliable
employees. Society's goal of rehabilitating drug users, and its perception of drug abuse as a
handicapping condition, may be defeated. For a discussion of the protections offered under the
Rehabilitation Act to employees who are drug abusers, see supra notes 570-647 and
accompanying text.
In Ponticas v. KMS Investments, the court advanced a similar policy argument. 331
N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983). The court held that an owner and operator of an apartment
complex did not have a duty to conduct a background investigation that would have divulged
the complex manager's criminal record. Id. at 913. The court stated:
Were we to hold that an employer can never hire a person with a criminal record
at the risk of later being held liable for the employee's assault, it would offend our
civilized concept that society must make a reasonable effort to rehabilitate those
who have erred so they can be assimilated into the community.
Id.
828. An employer is vicariously liable for an employee's tortious act under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. As a theory of vicarious liability, respondeat superior recognizes that an
employer is best able to compensate a plaintiff for his loss either through insurance coverage,
or by passing the cost to society in the form of higher-priced goods or services. See Minnesota
Developments, supra note 827, at 1304-05. Commentators have referred to this policy
underlying respondeat superior as the "deep pocket," "entrepreneur" or "risk-spreading"
principle. See id. at 1304 n. 11. Negligent hiring incorporates this philosophy but retains the
characteristic of liability based on fault. See id. at 1305. For a comparison of the doctrines of
respondeat superior and negligent hiring, see Comment, Responsibility of Employers, supra
note 827, at 717-19.
829. Bringing suit under a theory of negligent hiring has at least two advantages. First, a
plaintiff may be able to recover punitive damages against an employer for recklessly hiring a
job applicant. See, e.g., Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 595, 682 P.2d 653, 664-
65 (1984); Wilson N. Jones Memorial Hosp. v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 909(b) (1979) (punitive damages may be
awarded against an employer for recklessly employing an employee). For a discussion of
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harm pertains to fellow employees, bystanders, and consumers of the
employer's goods or services. A plaintiff must establish five basic
elements to establish a prima facie case of negligent hiring: (1) an
employment relationship existed; (2) the employee was unfit for
employment; (3) the employer knew or should have known through
reasonable investigation that the employee was unfit for employment;
(4) the employee's tortious act was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's
injuries;8 3° and (5) the negligent hiring was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries.8 3'
punitive damages recoverable under a respondeat superior theory of liability, see Note, The
Employer's Liability for Punitive Damages for the Acts of an Employee, 11 STETSON L. REV.
570 (1982). Second, unlike plaintiffs in actions based on respondeat superior, a plaintiff suing
under a theory of negligent hiring may introduce an employee's prior negligence or other
wrongful acts in a negligent hiring action. See, e.g., Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d
173, 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); cf. Woodward v; Mettille, 81 111. App. 3d 168, 183, 400 N.E.2d
934, 946-47 (1980) (evidence of general reputation for sobriety admissible).
A plaintiff may not be able to recover under both a negligent hiring and respondeat
superior theory of liability. Some courts have held that negligent hiring and respondeat
superior are mutually exclusive theories. See, e.g., Estate of Arrington v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d
173, 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Even if a jurisdiction permits recovery under both theories of
liability, a plaintiff may not be able to succeed under a theory of respondeat superior because in
order to prove vicarious responsibility, the plaintiff must show that the employee's tortious
conduct occurred within the scope of the employee's employment. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Pavelin,
141 Ariz. 195, 205, 685 P.2d 1347, 1357 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that plaintiffs could not
recover under respondeat superior theory because the employee was not acting within the
scope of her employment when she forged documents); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(1) (1957) ("A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment."). See generally W. PROSSER & R.
KEETON, supra note 766, at 501-08 (discussing employer liability). In a respondeat superior
action, an employer generally is not liable for the intentional torts of its employees because an
intentional tort usually falls outside of the scope of employment. See Minnesota Developments,
supra note 827, at 1307 n.22. Yet an employee's intentional tort may be within the scope of
employment if it is committed in the furtherance of an employer's business. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Accelerated Transport-Pony Express, Inc., 219 Md. 252, 255-56, 148 A.2d 783, 785 (1959).
An employee's intentional tort may also be within the scope of employment if it is an "out-
growth of a job-related controversy." See, e.g., Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404, 408 (D.C.
1981). In addition, an employee's intentional tort may be within the scope of employment if
an employer ratifies the employee's act. See, e.g., McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal. App. 2d
249, 256-57, 171 P.2d 85, 90 (1946).
830. For an analysis of causation in general tort law, see Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985).
831. See Focke v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 1325, 1344 (D. Kan. 1982); see also
Comment, Negligent Hiring, supra note 827, at 604-05 (listing elements for a cause of action
for negligent hiring). The fifth element, proximate cause, is also known as "legal cause." See
generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 431 (1965) (defining legal causation). The
term "proximate cause" is a misleading term because it connotes "physical or mechanical
closeness." W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 766, at 273. Proximate cause goes beyond
actual causation. Id. Rather, it is "an issue of whether the defendant is under any duty to the
plaintiff, or whether the duty includes protection against such consequences." Id. Courts
have used the doctrine of proximate cause to limit employers' liability for negligent hiring.
See, e.g., F & T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 701, 594 P.2d 745, 749 (1979) (holding that an
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One of the most difficult elements to prove in a negligent hiring
action is that the employer knew or should have known through rea-
sonable investigation that the employee was unfit for employment.
The issue posed in the context of employee drug testing is whether an
employer has a duty to test employees as part of a reasonable prehir-
ing investigation. It is well settled that the reasonableness of a prehir-
ing investigation depends largely on the nature of the particular
position.832 An employer's duty to conduct a thorough background
investigation before hiring a job applicant increases with the degree of
the sensitivity and safety risk inherent in the particular position.
Welsh Manufacturing Division of Textron v. Pinkerton's, Inc.833 exem-
plifies this rule. In Welsh, a manufacturer alleged that a security
firm negligently hired a security guard who participated as a co-con-
spirator in three major thefts at the manufacturer's facility.834 As
part of its prehiring investigation, the security firm had sent brief ref-
erence forms to previous short-term employers and obtained police
records indicating that the guard had no prior criminal record.835
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the jury had sufficient
evidence to find the security firm negligent in hiring the guard because
its investigation was inadequate considering the sensitive nature of the
position.836 Welsh indicates that a court may find an employer liable
for negligent hiring if it fails to drug test a job applicant for a position
that is sensitive or poses a high degree of risk to the safety of others.
Applying Welsh, a court may find that an employer has a duty to drug
test job applicants for such positions as police officers, firefighters, air
employer was not liable for negligent hiring of an employee who subsequently raped a
customer, because the employer's alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of injury); cf
McQuade v. Arnett, 558 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (holding that an employer owed no
duty to a pedestrian who was hit by an intoxicated employee, because the employer's retention
of the employee had no connection with the death of the pedestrian); Chesterman v. Barmon,
82 Or. App. 1, 727 P.2d 130 (1986) (holding that an employer owed no duty to the plaintiff
and therefore was not liable for negligently retaining an employee who raped the plaintiff after
forcing his way into her house while hallucinating from the effects of drugs), review granted,
302 Or. 614, 733 P.2d 449 (1987).
832. See, e.g., Kassman v. Busfield Enters., Inc., 131 Ariz. 163, 167, 639 P.2d 353, 356 (Ct.
App. 1981); Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980),
petition for review denied, 392 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981); CK Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 137 Ga. App. 159, 161-62, 223 S.E.2d 453, 455 (1976); Ponticas v. KMS Invs.,
331 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Minn. 1983); Welsh Mfg. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 474
A.2d 436, 440-41 (R.I. 1984).
833. 474 A.2d 436 (R.I. 1984). For a further discussion of Welsh, see Comment, Employer
Liable for Negligent Hiring After Cursory Investigation of a Prospective Employee-Welsh
Manufacturing v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 371 (1985).
834. Id. at 438.
835. Id. at 442.
836. Id. at 442-43. Because the guard was responsible for guarding gold, the court classified
the position as "sensitive." Id.
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traffic controllers, and drug enforcement officials.8 37
The burden on employers to conduct background investigations
is also a relevant factor in determining whether a particular back-
ground investigation was reasonable.838  In Evans v. Morsell,8 39 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland found that a tavern owner did not have
a duty to investigate the criminal record of a job applicant, because
requiring an employer to obtain a police report would be too burden-
some.84° The implementation of a drug-testing program for job appli-
cants may be similarly burdensome for employers, because setting up
a reliable program may be costly and time consuming.84' Yet for
employers who already require a preemployment physical examina-
tion, an additional laboratory test may not be unduly burdensome.
Furthermore, as easier, less expensive, and less intrusive drug-testing
methods become available to employers,842 the burden of testing will
decrease, and courts may ultimately find it reasonable to require an
employer to drug test job applicants for certain positions before hiring
them.
B. Negligent Retention
The elements necessary to maintain a cause of action for negli-
gent retention are similar to those for negligent hiring, with one pri-
mary difference. In a negligent hiring action, the plaintiff must prove
that an employer knew or should have known that the job applicant
was unfit for employment when the applicant was hired.843 In a neg-
ligent retention action, the plaintiff must prove that an employer
knew or should have known that an employee was unfit during the
course of employment.8'" In the context of employee drug testing,
an action for negligent retention may arise in two situations. First,
an employer who should know that an employee is using drugs on the
job may have a duty to test that employee. Second, an employer
who knows that-an employee has tested positive may have a duty to
837. Employers frequently require drug testing of job applicants for these types of positions.
See supra note 27.
838. See, e.g., Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 167-68, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978); Stevens v.
Lankard, 31 A.D. 2d 602, 603, 297 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 25
N.Y.2d 640, 306 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1969).
839. 284 Md. 160, 395 A.2d 480 (1978).
840. Id. at 167-68, 395 A.2d at 484.
841. For a discussion of drug-testing methods and techniques, see supra notes 42-66 and
.accompanying text.
842. See, e.g., Cox, Analysis of Hair Traces Drug Use, Nat'l L.J., July 27, 1987, at 3
(reporting a new testing method that analyzes hair strands to detect drug use).




take reasonable action to protect others from the hazards associated
with the presence of drug-impaired employees on the job.
At least one court has recognized that an employer has an affirm-
ative duty to make diligent inquiry about an employee's fitness when
he should have known that the employee was unfit for employment.
In Vanderhule v. Berinstein,84 5 an employee assaulted a customer at
the bowling alley where he was employed. 4 6  Before the assault, the
employer had observed the employee making irrational remarks and
exhibiting unusual behavior on the job.847 A New York state appel-
late court held that the employer had a duty to investigate whether
the employee was mentally unstable after observing such unusual
behavior. 48 An employer who has observed an employee exhibiting
drug-related behavior may similarly have a duty to drug test that
employee to determine whether the employee has been using drugs
that might cause dangerous behavior on the job.
An employer also has a duty to take reasonable action to protect
others from harm when it has actual knowledge of an employee's
unfitness. In Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable,8 49 the Supreme Court of
Kansas held that an employer negligently retained an employee who
the employer knew intended to sabotage an oil drilling
site.85° Similarly, an employer who has learned that an employee has
tested positive for drug use may be liable for negligent retention if it
fails to discharge or suspend the employee to prevent him from harm-
ing others. By allowing the employee to remain on the job, the
employer has created an unreasonable risk of harm to fellow employ-
ees and to the public.85'
C. Negligence
Under a negligent retention theory, the duty to drug test is based
on an employer's individualized suspicion of drug use by an employee.
845. 285 A.D. 290, 136 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1954).
846. Id. at 290, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 95.
847. Id. at 294-95, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
848. Id. at 295, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
849. 235 Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 653 (1984).
850. Id. at 589-92, 682 P.2d at 661-63.
851. To prove that an employer failed to act upon a positive test result, a plaintiff must
show that the employee tested positive. A plaintiff may not be able to meet this burden of
proof because employee test results are confidential under the federal drug-testing statute,
which encompasses drug testing of all federal workers, and under some state drug-testing
statutes. See Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-71, § 503(e), 101 Stat. 468,
471 (1987); McGovern, supra note 59, at 1513-17 (listing state drug-testing legislation
mandating confidentiality of test results). Disclosure also may be regulated under the
Constitution of the United States. See supra notes 219-57 and accompanying text.
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A similar duty based upon general negligence principles may arise
when an employer has a generalized suspicion that a widespread drug
problem might exist in the workplace. For example, when Conrail
learned that the cause of a catastrophic train accident was employee
on-duty marijuana use, 52 it arguably had a duty to begin mandatory
drug testing, because it was on notice that a widespread employee
drug problem might exist. If Conrail failed to drug test employees,
especially those in safety-sensitive positions, it may have exposed pas-
sengers to unreasonable risks of harm.
Under general principles of tort law, an employer is negligent if it
fails to use reasonable care to guard against foreseeable and unreason-
able risks relating to the employer's enterprise. 53 Courts balance
the utility of the conduct against the probability and gravity of the
harm in determining whether a jury may properly find that a risk was
unreasonable.8 54  Within the utility calculation, a court must con-
sider the burden on an employer to take specific measures to prevent
foreseeable risks of harm. 55 In the Conrail example, the cost and
inconvenience of drug testing, and the privacy interest of employees
would be factors in a court's determination of whether the utility of
Conrail's failure to test outweighed the foreseeable risks of harm with-
out testing. Because the gravity of the harm was appreciable, it
appears that the foreseeable risk of harm would have outweighed the
cost of testing Conrail employees in sensitive positions.
D. Negligence Per Se and Strict Liability
Federal regulations and proposed regulations mandate drug test-
ing in certain industries.8 56 For example, the Federal Railroad
Administration has issued regulations authorizing employers to drug
test when a supervisor suspects that a railroad employee is under the
influence of drugs.85 ' The violation of these and similar regulations
852. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
853. See, e.g., Lannon v. Taco Bell, Inc., 708 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd,
744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987). See generally W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, supra note 766, at 169-73
(discussing unreasonable risk of harm).
854. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947);
Shewmake v. Badger Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1184, 1187-88 (D. Colo. 1987).
855. Shewmake, 654 F. Supp. at 1187-88.
856. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 8368, 8374 (1988) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 61, 63, 65, 121,
135) (Federal Aviation Administration proposed regulations requiring drug testing of
commercial airline pilots, flight engineers, flight navigators, repairmen, flight attendants, and
certain other employees); 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(1), (c)(2) (1987) (authorizing drug testing of
railroad employees).
857. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(1), (c)(2) (1987).
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may constitute negligence per se, or perhaps grounds for strict
liability.
The doctrine of negligence per se creates a presumption of negli-
gence that is rebuttable by evidence of a legally sufficient excuse."' 8
To establish an action for negligence per se, a plaintiff must show that
(1) the injured party was a member of the class of persons intended to
be protected under the statute; (2) the injury was one that the statute
was designed to prevent; (3) the defendant violated the statute; and
(4) the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the
injury.859 Of these elements, the most frequently litigated issues are
whether the statute was designed to protect a class of individuals of
which the plaintiff is a member and whether the statute was designed
to protect against the risk of harm that has occurred. The railroad
regulations are expressly intended to protect railroad passengers from
physical injury due to drug related accidents. The regulations state
that their purpose is to "prevent accidents and casualties in railroad
operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or
drugs." 6 ' Assuming that other elements of the cause of action are
met, a plaintiff who is injured in a railroad accident resulting from
employee drug use may have a cause of action for negligence per se
against the federal employer.
Regulations may even impose statutory strict liability on employ-
ers. Strict liability differs from negligence per se in one important
respect. In a negligence per se action, liability is based upon ordi-
nary negligence principles and is established by a violation of a stat-
ute. 61 In a statutory strict liability action, liability is not based on
fault.8 62 For example, in Zerby v. Warren s63 a retailer sold glue to a
858. See Reyes v. Vantage Steamship Co., 558 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1977), modified, 609
F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A(l) (1965) ("An
excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation is not
negligence."). Five excused violations do not constitute negligence per se:
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity; (b) he neither
knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance; (c) he is unable after
reasonable diligence or care to comply; (d) he is confronted by an emergency not
due to his own misconduct; (e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm
to the actor or to others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A(2) (1965) (a)-(e). See generally W. PROSSER & R.
KEETON, supra note 766, at 227-29 (discussing excused violations).
859. See Fox v. Bartholf, 374 So. 2d 294, 295-96 (Ala. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) (listing required conditions before a court will utilize a
statute to set the standard of care). Some jurisdictions treat violations of a statute as only
evidence of negligence. See, e.g., Cowan v. Wheeler, 76 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264-65, 395 N.E.2d
32, 36 (1979).
860. 49 C.F.R. § 219.1(a) (1987).
861. See Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Minn. 1981).
862. Id.
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minor in violation of a state statute.864  After the minor purchased
the glue, he and another boy inhaled the fumes from the glue and one
of the boys subsequently died.8 65  The court held that the retailer was
strictly liable for the death of the minor.8 66
E. The Duty to Control
A person generally does not have a duty to control the conduct
of another, 67 but a special relationship may give rise to such a
duty.8 68 In Otis Engineering Corporation v. Clark,8 69 the Supreme
Court of Texas held that an employer had a duty to control the con-
duct of his employee, even outside of the scope of employment,
because he knew that the employee had been consuming alcohol.8"'
In Clark, widowers of victims of an automobile accident brought a
wrongful death action against an employer for failing to control the
employee who was responsible for the accident.87" ' The employer
knew that the employee had consumed alcohol while on duty on the
day of the accident and on prior occasions.87 2 Nevertheless, the
employer escorted the intoxicated employee to the parking lot and
allowed him to drive home.8 73 The court held that the employer had
a duty to control his employee, because he knew that the employee's
use of alcohol might pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others.8 74
A court may similarly find an employer liable for failing to control an
employee who has tested positive for drugs. The positive drug test
result would furnish the employer with the requisite knowledge that
the employee might create an unreasonable risk of harm to others
because of possible impairment on the job.
F. The Duty to Provide a Safe Working Place
An employer had a duty at common law to promulgate and
enforce rules for the conduct of employees in order to make the work-
place safe.87  This common law duty is codified in various state and
863. 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973).
864. Id. at 137-38, 210 N.W.2d at 61.
865. Id. at .137, 210 N.W.2d at 61.
866. Id. at 140, 210 N.w.2d at 58.
867. See Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.w.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983).
868. Id.
869. 668 S.w.2d at 307.
870. Id.
871. Id. at 308.
872. Id.
873. Id. at 309.
874. Id. at 311.
875. See Horan v. Cold Spring Constr. Co., 441 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
[Vol. 42:553
EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING
federal statutes.876 Consistent with this duty, many employers have
enacted specific rules forbidding the use of drugs in the workplace.
Because an employer has a duty to enforce safety rules, an employer
may have a duty to drug test employees to ensure that employees
comply with both company rules prohibiting drug use on the job and
general health and safety statutes. For example, in Horan v. Cold
Spring Construction Co. ,877 the plaintiff alleged that the employer was
aware of the widespread consumption of alcohol by its employees and
failed to take action to eradicate the alcohol problem.87 8 The New
York Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a claim for
breach of the employer's duty to provide workers with a safe work-
place.879 Under Horan, an employer who knows or should know
about employee drug use and fails to drug test employees to eliminate
or reduce such use may be liable for a breach of the duty to provide
workers with a safe workplace.
IX. A TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK FOR RECONCILING
DRUG-TESTING ISSUES
Employers in the public and private sectors have instituted drug-
testing programs as a panacea for high absenteeism rates, low produc-
tivity, and unsafe working conditions. Although drug testing has
been effective in combating these workplace problems, employers
should recognize the limitations and vast legal implications of drug
testing before embarking on a drug-testing program.
A. The Inception of Drug Testing
In the public sector, drug testing at its inception implicates the
right of privacy, 8 ° and the prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures in the fourth amendment to the Constitution.88' If the
risk of disclosure of personal information is high, public employees
may refuse to submit to drug testing and sue to enjoin the program on
the grounds that it violates their right of privacy. The fourth amend-
ment is implicated by drug-testing programs that mandate mass or
random testing of all employees in the absence of reasonable individu-
alized suspicion. The current division of the courts as to whether
drug testing in the absence of individualized suspicion is reasonable
876. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1982); CAL
LABOR CODE § 6400 (West Supp. 1988).
877. 441 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
878. Id. at 314.
879. Id.
880. See supra notes 219-57 and accompanying text.
881. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra notes 84-150.
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under the fourth amendment leaves the constitutionality of these pro-
grams in doubt.882 The legitimate interests of government employers
in safety and security militate against requiring individualized suspi-
cion for drug testing of employees in certain sensitive positions,883 but
courts have yet to draw the line. A drug-testing program limited to
employees in sensitive positions presents the most compelling case for
upholding the constitutionality of drug testing absent individualized
suspicion.884  But the line becomes blurred for positions that merely
involve, for example, access to confidential information.
Assuming that, in some cases, reasonable individualized suspi-
cion is a requisite element of a drug-testing program, it is uncertain
how courts will define this term. The requirement of reasonable
individualized suspicion may even become a legal conclusion. For
example, the courts are already divided as to whether a serious acci-
dent constitutes reasonable individualized suspicion of drug use by the
responsible employee. 885  If one carries the rationale underlying this
approach to its extreme, a court may find individualized suspicion
whenever an employee deviates from a predetermined range of behav-
ior. A presumption in the law that accidents, or even slight devia-
tions from operating rules,886 must be the product of employee drug
use is a dangerous proposition. Moreover, because the standard of
individualized suspicion is necessarily imprecise and fact-specific, the
potential for an employer to abuse his discretion in applying the stan-
dard is great. In some cases, the employer's abuse of discretion may
go unchecked or unnoticed because of the inherent unreliability and
inaccuracy of certain drug-testing methods and procedures, 887 and the
882. See supra note 141. The Supreme Court of the United States should articulate a fourth
amendment standard for drug testing of public employees when it reviews National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072
(1988).
883. Sensitive positions are those affecting public safety and security, including police
officers, firefighters, airline pilots, and school bus drivers.
884. Thus, mass or random drug testing of Conrail employees may be reasonable after the
Conrail catastrophe. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
885. Compare Railway Labor Executive's Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988)
(invalidating regulations mandating drug testing of all members of a train crew involved in an
accident, because accidents by themselves do not create reasonable suspicion of drug use) with
Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1976) (holding that accidents create reasonable suspicion of drug use by bus
drivers).
886. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988)
("R.L.E.A."). In R.L.E.A., the Ninth Circuit invalidated regulations that authorized
railroads to require drug testing of employees who had violated railroad operating rules. See
id.




fact that no drug-testing method can measure drug intoxication.88 8
As a result, reasonable suspicion-a standard that was designed to
protect individuals from government intrusion-may become a
weapon for employers to harass and discriminate against employees.
Thus, for employees, the issue of reasonable individualized suspi-
cion is a double-edged sword. In the absence of reasonable individu-
alized suspicion, mandatory drug testing seriously intrudes upon the
dignity and privacy interests of all employees in positions that are
subject to a drug-testing program. Yet, at least mass or random
drug testing is objectively systematic in its application. Under the
reasonable individualized suspicion standard, the invasiveness of drug
testing reaches fewer employees, but because the employer determines
who will be tested, the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory
selection is high.
Employees in the private sector do not enjoy the constitutional
protections of their counterparts in the public sector. Unionized
employees' interests are protected prior to the implementation of a
drug-testing program because drug testing is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.8 89 Nonunionized private employees must rely
on common law tort actions to protect their interests during
mandatory drug testing.8 90 Employers may be subject to tort liabil-
ity for intrusion upon private affairs and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.8 9 ' Unlike fourth amendment claims, common law
tort actions typically arise only after an employee has been drug
tested. Tort remedies are inherently retrospective in nature and there-
fore provide more limited protection than the fourth amendment.
Paradoxically, in certain situations, employers may have an
affirmative duty to test job applicants and employees for drugs.8 92 In
the union setting, this duty is separate from any collective bargaining
agreement between management and labor, because collective bar-
gaining agreements cannot preclude third party tort claims.8 93 This
duty to test bears a significant relationship to the reasonable suspicion
requirement of the fourth amendment, because an employer has a
duty to test only those employees or job applicants who pose a fore-
seeable and unreasonable risk of harm to others. The question
remains as to whether the foreseeable risk in tort law and reasonable
888. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
889. See supra notes 383-99 and accompanying text.
890 See supra notes 690-823 and accompanying text.
891. See supra notes 746-74, 799-810 and accompanying text.
892. See supra notes 824-79 and accompanying text.
893. Individuals such as consumers may seek redress against employers for injuries that are
caused by an employer's breach of a duty to test.
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suspicion in constitutional 'law are based on equivalent facts or
probabilities of harm.
B. The Consequences of Drug Testing
Drug tests reveal information on illicit drug use by employees
and personal physiological information such as pregnancy and epi-
lepsy.894 Employers in possession of information on illicit drug use
often present it as evidence of drug abuse by an employee even when
that information is unreliable or inaccurate. The possible conse-
quences from possession of drug-testing information may threaten
more than employment security if the employer improperly discloses
the information to coworkers or other third parties. In effect,
employees face not only the potential loss of livelihood after a positive
test result, but also invasions of privacy from the disclosure of per-
sonal information.
1. THE IMPACT OF DISCLOSURE
For nonunionized employees in the private sector, no cause of
action accrues for disclosure until after the information is revealed
and the damage has already occurred.8 95 This fact precludes nonu-
nionized employees in the private sector from bringing actions for def-
amation until after positive test results or personal information have
been disclosed to coworkers or other third parties. Government
employees and unionized employees, however, need not wait until
after disclosure, but may invoke certain protections to prevent the
potential damage from disclosure before personal information is
revealed. The Constitution of the United States protects public
employees from invasions of privacy from disclosure by affording
them an opportunity to challenge a drug-testing program at its incep-
tion.896 Similarly, the collective bargaining process protects union-
ized employees in the private sector from invasions of privacy and
potential disclosure of personal information.897 An employer cannot
unilaterally implement a drug testing program without bargaining
with the union.898 The union representative should bargain over the
specifics of drug testing to ensure that the proffered program is one
that is acceptable to the union prior to its implementation in the
894. National Treasury Employees, 816 F.2d at 175-76.
895. See R.L.E.A., 839 F.2d at 592.
896. For a discussion of employee protections in the public sector, see supra notes 65-355
and accompanying text.
897. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 184, at D-1 (Sept. 24, 1987).
898. See supra note 363.
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workplace. 899 One of the specifics of the program may be safeguards
to reduce the risks of disclosure to both the employer's personnel and
to third parties. 900 In essence then, public sector workers and union-
ized employees in the private sector are not saddled with the breach
requirement prior to raising the disclosure issue as a cause of action.
Private nonunionized employees, however, do not have the pro-
tection of the right of privacy and do not have collective bargaining
rights.90 ' They cannot attack a drug-testing program based on the
threat of disclosure at the inception of the program. Although these
private nonunionized employees have no Constitution or its
equivalent in the form of a collective bargaining agreement, they can
resort to an appeal to the courts, juries, and legislatures. The courts
offer protection through common law privacy and tort theories.
Juries, as a representative body of the community, may also protect
private employees because they may have compassion for employees
and render substantial verdicts in their favor. Of course, the sympa-
thy of the jury is dependent on the facts of the case and the strengths
of the competing interests. Thus, the types and frequency of jury
verdicts may be favorable to the employee in a Luck scenario, 902 and
unfavorable to employees on a Conrail set of facts. 903 Finally, any
trend of jury verdicts in favor of either employees or employers or
popular movement from lobbyists or voters, may cause state legisla-
tures to enact statutes that limit or favor drug testing. The judicial
system is a limited forum for private employees in preventing the dis-
closure of personal information because it cannot force employers to
adopt safeguards that minimize the risk of disclosure at the inception
of a drug-testing program. Instead, courts are likely to wait for leg-
islative action toward the goals of limiting private invasions. Thus it
is toward the legislative forum that private nonunionized employees
must direct their efforts to gain full protection from mandatory drug
testing.
2. SUBSEQUENT PERSONNEL ACTIONS
Employees who have tested positive for drug use after mandatory
drug testing are subject to a wide range of responses by their employ-
ers. Employers may require employees to enroll in an employee
assistance program as a condition of continued employment.
899. See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
900. See supra notes 219-56 and accompanying text.
901. For a discussion of nonunionized rights in the private sector, see supra notes 648-823
and accompanying text.
902. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
903. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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Employees may also be subject to temporary or permanent reassign-
ment from their current positions to less sensitive positions following
positive drug tests. Most private employees who are not unionized
also risk immediate dismissal after testing positive for drug use.904
Determining whether and to what extent an employer may take
adverse personnel action in response to an employees' positive drug
test requires reconciling the conflicting interests of employers and
employees. An employer has an interest in maintaining a safe and
secure working environment for their employees and the pub-
lic. Conversely, employees possess the right to be free from unwar-
ranted intrusion into their private lives. Employees also have
additional interests in fair personnel procedures and in continued
employment.
Personnel actions that occur after drug testing implicate several
legal issues. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,905
employers may not take adverse personnel action after drug testing if
a disparate impact on members of minority groups would result and
the drug use is not job related. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973906
insulates employees who are addicted to drugs from discharge or
demotion if they would be able to perform safely in their positions
with reasonable accommodation of their handicaps. The protection
provided to employees from adverse personnel action under Title VII
and the Rehabilitation Act is limited in scope, however, because of
the employer's legitimate interests in safety or security, 90 7 which can
override the employment and privacy interests of individual employ-
ees who use drugs.
Government employers must conform to the strictures of proce-
dural due process of law when disciplining employees who have
received positive drug results.908 The right to procedural due pro-
cess of law provides constitutional protection for public employees in
the disciplinary process that follows mandatory drug testing. The
904. Unionized employees who have included drug testing in a collective bargaining
agreement with management have defined their rights and duties regarding treatment of
employees who have tested positive for drug use. For a discussion of drug testing within the
context of collective bargaining, see supra notes 356-535 and accompanying text.
905. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 in the context of mandatory drug testing, see supra notes 538-69 and accompanying text.
906. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (1982 and Supp. H 1984)). For a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 in the context of mandatory drug testing, see supra notes 570-647 and accompanying
text.
907. For a discussion of the fourth amendment in the context of mandatory drug testing,
see supra notes 84-150 and accompanying text.
908. For a discussion of procedural due process in the context of mandatory drug testing,
see supra notes 264-323 and accompanying text.
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concepts embodied in procedural due process implicitly recognize
both the legitimate need for drug testing under certain circumstances
and the concomitant potential for abusive personnel prac-
tices. Although procedural due process does not bar adverse person-
nel actions based on drug testing, it does require that an employer
follow minimum procedures when depriving government employees
of their constitutionally protected interest in employment. For posi-
tions such as firefighters and police officers, an employer's safety or
security concerns may override an individual's interests in employ-
ment, but even in these cases an employer does not enjoy complete
discretion. Procedural due process provides some measure of pro-
tection to government employees in all positions.
The flexibility of procedural due process is illustrated by its
application in drug-testing cases. Due process regulates the discretion
that governmental employers may exercise in subsequent personnel
actions; it does not bar such actions altogether, and it is not hostile to
the interests of employers. Thus, due process will not prevent
employers from meeting their common law duty to initiate adverse
personnel action based on positive reports of drug use.90 9 Employers
may take interim measures such as reassignment, prior to dismissal,
to protect governmental interests in safety or security.
The procedural due process analysis that has been applied in
cases involving employees disciplined for positive drug test results910
may shape the law of procedural due process for governmental
employees who are disciplined in the future, if courts apply such pre-
cedent to other issues in governmental employment. If so, courts
should exercise caution in their application of procedural due process
involving drug testing to other, less urgent, matters of personnel
management.
Employees may seek protection under several state common law
tort theories during the disciplinary process, such as the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing,91' and intentional infliction of
909. Employers may have a common law duty to initiate personnel action against
employees who have tested positive for drug use. For a discussion of this common law duty,
see supra notes 824-79 and accompanying text.
910. See, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(firefighters); Capua v. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (firefighters and police
officers); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986) (school bus attendant), rev'd
and vacated in part, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp 482
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (electric utility workers).
911. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a common law exception to the
employment at will doctrine. For a discussion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the context of mandatory drug testing, see supra notes 734-42 and accompanying
text.
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emotional distress.91 2  These actions are available to employees
under certain circumstances as redress for injuries caused by the con-
duct of employers following drug testing. Based on these theories,
juries have recently returned huge damage awards against employers
to punish their conduct following mandatory drug testing. 91 3  In
awarding damages, juries have sent a message that the people of the
state disapprove of employers' methods of drug testing and disciplin-
ing employees, and that their actions fall short of acceptable behavior
in the drug-testing context.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be a tool
with which courts can regulate the entire process of drug testing,
beginning with the test itself and continuing through the administra-
tive personnel process. This tort remedy, which is based on an excep-
tion to the widely recognized doctrine of employment at will, has been
of limited utility because it is available in only a few states. As courts
review offensive employer conduct in drug-testing cases, however,
they may become motivated to create exceptions to the employment
at will doctrine and increasingly recognize the implied covenant of
good faith.
For private employees, the tort action of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is analogous to the constitutional protection of pro-
cedural due process, because it can limit the discretion that employers
may exercise following drug testing. As employees increasingly take
their claims to court, juries will more clearly define the contours of a
reasonable and rational response by an employer to their employees'
positive drug tests.
Ironically, employers may have a common law duty to take some
kind of restrictive action against employees testing positive for drug
use. This duty is based on theories of negligent retention, negligence,
duty to control, and duty to provide a safe workplace. The prolifera-
tion of employee assistance programs in the workforce, however, evi-
dences a trend in employment relations toward rehabilitation of
employees who use drugs instead of summary dismissal. EAP's may
therefore provide a vehicle for employers to fulfill their common law
duty to take action against employees using drugs, while at the same
time preserving their workforce for continued or future productivity.
912. For a discussion of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort action in the
context of mandatory drug testing, see supra notes 799-810 and accompanying text.
913. An employee who refused to submit to a mandatory drug test was recently awarded
$485,000 in damages, including almost $200,000 in punitive damages, after a jury found that
the employer had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and was liable
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 843,230




The magnitude of the drug problem has caused employers to ini-
tiate drug-testing programs to identify drug-impaired workers and
deter illicit drug use in the public and private sectors. Yet drug-
testing methods cannot determine levels of intoxication, and therefore
cannot determine the degree of impairment of a worker. Drug-testing
programs bring strong interests of employers and employees into con-
flict. Drug testing as a means of furthering employers' interests in a
safe and productive work environment interferes with the employees'
privacy interests. As such, the implementation of an employee drug-
testing program may subject the employer to numerous legal claims
based on constitutional and statutory protections, collective bargain-
ing rights, and common law tort theories.
Employers cannot completely eliminate the use of illicit drugs by
employees, although they may deter some employee drug use through
well crafted drug-testing programs. Employers can maximize the
reliability and accuracy of their drug-testing programs, and avoid the
legal minefields in drug testing, by developing a well tailored drug-
testing program that requires reasonable individualized suspi-
cion. The employer should train supervisors to recognize the signs
and symptoms of illicit drug use as part of this reasonable suspicion
standard. The employer must assess his own workplace situation and
reason through each scenario before implementing a drug-testing pro-
gram. Conversely, the employer's interests of national security, pub-
lic safety, and law enforcement may militate against the requirement
of reasonable suspicion. In determining whether the reasonable sus-
picion standard is appropriate, courts should consider the nature of
the position, and the sector of society in which the work is performed,
as well as the privacy and employment interests of employees. A
drug-testing program must therefore take into consideration the com-
peting interests of both the employer and the employee in order to be
effective and withstand judicial scrutiny.
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